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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirIntroduction: In the field of art history, the white Western male viewpoint, unconsciously accepted as the viewpoint of the art historian, may - and does - prove to be inadequate not merely on moral and ethical grounds, or because it is elitist, but on purely intellectual ones. In revealing the failure of much academic art history, and a great deal of history in general, to take account of the unacknowledged value system, the very presence of an intruding subject in historical investigation, the feminist critique at the same time lays bare its conceptual smugness, its meta-historical naivete. At a moment when all disciplines are becoming more self-conscious, more aware of the nature of their presuppositions as exhibited in the very languages and structures of the various fields of scholarship, such uncritical acceptance of 'what is' as 'natural' may be intellectually fatal. Just as Mill saw male domination as one of a long series of social injustices that had to be overcome if a truly just social order were to be created, so we may see the unstated domination of white male subjectivity as one in a series of intellectual distortions which must be corrected in order to achieve a more adequate and accurate view of historical situations.Comment:Nochlin, Linda. Women, Art, and Power and Other Essays1988, Routledge
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: Seven landmark essays on women artists and women in art history - brings together the work of almost twenty years of scholarship and speculation.Comment:Olberding, Amy. Looking Philosophical: Stuff, Stereotypes, and Self‐Presentation2015, Hypatia 30 (4):692-707
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Self‐presentation is a complex phenomenon through which individuals present themselves in performance of social roles. The success of such performances rests not just on how well a performer fulfills expectations regarding the role she would play, but on whether observers find her convincing. I focus on how self‐presentation entails making use of material environment and objects: One may “dress for the part” and employ props that suit a desired role. However, regardless of dress or props, one can nonetheless fail to “look the part” owing to expectations informed by biases patterned along commonplace social stereotypes. Using the social role of philosopher as my example, I analyze how the stereotype attached to this role carries implications for how demographically under‐represented philosophers may self‐present, specifically with regard to dress and decoration. I look, in particular, to the alienation from one's material environment that may follow on the frustration of self‐presentation through bias. One pernicious effect of bias, I argue, is the power it has to deform and distort its target's relation to her physical setting and objects. Where comfort and ease in one's material environment can be a significant ethico‐aesthetic good, bias can inhibit access to, and enjoyment of, this good.
Comment: In this essay, Olberding explores the ways in which a person's material and aesthetic identity will shape their experience of themselves as well as others' perception of their identity. Further, she applies this ethico-aesthetic analysis to the case of the stereotypical aesthetic norms of the philosopher and the broader community of academic philosophy. In particular, she is interested in investigating (and in some ways, challenging) standard philosophical aesthetic norms, and the way these intersect with marginalisation and bias towards members of the philosophical community who do not fit the traditional image of the old, white bearded man philosopher. Olberding's discussion bears obvious relevance to topic areas such as philosophy of aesthetics and themes in feminist philosophy, but her arguments also apply more broadly to questions about self-identity, human relationship to the material, and economic/political/social justice. Since personal aesthetic choices are always influenced by a broad range of factors beyond simply personal preference - such as socio-economic access, ethnic and social culture, political affiliation, etc. - the text would have a wide range of interesting applications in social and political philosophy beyond the subject matter it directly addresses.Robinson, Jenefer, Ross, Stephanie. Women, Morality, and Fiction1990, Hypatia 5 (2):76-90.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: We apply Carol Gilligan's distinction between a "male" mode of moral reasoning, focussed on justice, and a "female" mode, focussed on caring, to the reading of literature. Martha Nussbaum suggests that certain novels are works of moral philosophy. We argue that what Nussbaum sees as the special ethical contribution of such novels is in fact training in the stereotypically female mode of moral concern. We show this kind of training is appropriate to all readers of these novels, not just to women. Finally, we explore what else is involved in distinctively feminist readings of traditional novelsComment:Weiser, Peg Brand (formerly Peg Zeglin Brand). Disinterestedness and political art1998, In Carolyn Korsmeyer (ed.), Aesthetics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: Can an ordinary viewer ever experience art - particularly politically charged, socially relevant art - in a neutral, detached, and objective way? The familiar philosophical notion of disinterestedness has its roots in eighteenth century theories of taste and was refined throughout the twentieth century. In contrast, many contemporary theorists have argued for what I call an 'interested approach' in order to expand beyond the traditional emphasis on neutrality and universality. Each group, in effect, has argued for the value of a work of art by excluding the other's approach. This essay will consider the legacy of the concept of disinterestedness for contemporary aesthetic theory in light of challenges posed by postmodern skepticism regarding the possibility of disinterestedness, and by the difficulties involved in appreciating political art with a disinterested attitude. My principal examples of political art will be drawn from feminist art. Unlike traditional philosophers, I will advocate that an interested stance toward art is, at times, inevitable and appropriate. I will so argue that not only feminist art- and by extension political art of all kinds - can be experienced disinterestedly, but that it should be. As a position inconsistent with both traditionalists and feminist critics of tradition, my recommendation of both disinterestedness and interestedness affords what I take to be the fullest and fairest experience of a work of art.Comment:
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Nochlin, Linda. Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?
1971, ARTnews.