Sherman, Nancy. Taking Responsibility for our Emotions
1999, Social Philosophy and Policy 16(2): 294.
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Added by: John Baldari
Abstract: We often hold people morally responsible for their emotions. We praise individuals for their compassion, think less of them for their ingratitude or hatred, reproach self-righteousness and unjust anger. In the cases I have in mind, the ascriptions of responsibility are not simply for offensive behaviors or actions which may accompany the emotions, but for the emotions themselves as motives or states of mind. We praise and blame people for what they feel and not just for how they act. In cases where people may subtly mask their hatred or ingratitude through more kindly actions, we still may find fault with the attitude we see leaking through the disguise.Comment : Use this text as a recommended reading to compliment the earlier work on The Fabric of Character.Shuchen Xiang. The Racism of Philosophy’s Fear of Cultural Relativism2020, Journal of World Philosophies 5 (1):99-120-
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Added by: Sara Peppe, Contributed by: Jonathan EgidAbstract:
By looking at a canonical article representing academic philosophy’s orthodox view against cultural relativism, James Rachels’ “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” this paper argues that current mainstream western academic philosophy’s fear of cultural relativism is premised on a fear of the racial Other. The examples that Rachels marshals against cultural relativism default to the persistent, ubiquitous, and age-old stereotypes about the savage/barbarian Other that have dominated the history of western engagement with the non-western world. What academic philosophy fears about cultural relativism, it is argued, is the barbarians of the western imagination and not fellow human beings. The same structure that informs fears of cultural relativism, whereby people with different customs are reduced to the barbarian/savage of the western imagination, can be seen in the genesis of international law which arose as a justification for the domination of the Amerindian (parsed as “barbarians”). It is argued that implicit in arguments against cultural relativism is the preservation of the same right to dominate the Other. Finally, it is argued that the appeal of the fear of cultural relativism is that, in directing moral outrage at others, one can avoid reflecting on the failures of one’s own cultural tradition.
Comment : Introductory reading to be used for students at undergraduate or graduate level claiming that current mainstream philosophy’s fear in the Western academic environment of cultural relativism is based on an intrinsic fear of the racial 'Other'.Shumener, Erica. The Metaphysics of Identity: Is Identity Fundamental?2017, Philosophy Compass 12 (1)-
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Added by: Bjoern Freter, Contributed by: Zach Thornton
Abstract: Identity and distinctness facts are ones like “The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower,” and “The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre.” This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I provide an overview of answers to this question.Comment : This is an introductory text on the topic of grounding identity and distinctness facts. This topic is connected to the literature on Leibniz's Law and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This paper provides an overview of arguments for and against the view that identity and distinctness facts are fundamental, ultimately favoring the view that they are not.Shun, Kwong-Loi. Methodological Reflections on the Study of Chinese Thought2009, in Tan, S-h. (ed.) The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy Methodologies. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 57–74.-
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Added by: Lea CantorAbstract:
Methodology has to do with systematic reflections on the methods adopted in a certain kind of activity, including that of intellectual inquiry. But we cannot talk intelligibly about the method of a certain kind of activity without knowing more about the nature of the activity as well as the goals and interests behind it. For example, we cannot talk intelligibly about the method of writing without knowing what it is that we write and for what purpose and audience, nor about the method of building a house without knowing what kind of house and for what purpose. This is no less true of intellectual inquiry, and in our case, the study of Chinese thought. We cannot talk intelligibly about the method of studying Chinese thought without knowing more about the goals and interests behind such study.
Comment : This chapter offers useful insights into the methodology involved in engaging constructively with the history of philosophy, focusing on the specific challenges that arise in the study of Chinese texts. What is involved in textual analysis and philosophical exegesis? How do concerns about present-day relevance guide philosophical analysis and construction? How far is close reading of texts a precondition for productive engagement with Chinese philosophy? What are the specific challenges that arise in comparative studies involving Chinese texts and thinkers? Shun explores these questions in a nuanced and accessible way. No prior knowledge of Chinese philosophy is required to engage with the paper's main points.Siegel, Susanna. Which Properties are Represented in Perception?2006, In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press: 481-503.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist
Abstract: In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Siegel argues that high-level properties should be attributed to percception itself. That, high-level properties can be the content of perception.Comment : This paper is interesting to consider in the cognition/perception debate, since high-level properties such as being a natural kind, or emotions and intentions, are normally taken to be features of cognition rather than perception. It raises interesting questions about the relationship between concepts, the content of perception and perceptual experience. It would be good in a third year module on perception.Siegel, Susanna. Do Experiences Have Contents?2010, In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Will Hornett
Summary: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.Comment : It is a fairly difficult paper because it has some technical sections and her main argument is rather dense. However, it is generally very clearly written, with numerous helpful examples, and a broad discussion of views on contemporary debate on perception. This paper could be used in a senior year or postgraduate course on the philosophy of perception as seminar reading since it is a detailed and controversial discussion of the metaphysics of perception. It has also been central to recent debates. It is is useful to teach alongside Thomas Raliegh's "Phenomenology Without Representation" (2013). It is a fairly difficult paper because it has some technical sections and her main argument is rather dense. However, it is generally very clearly written, with numerous helpful examples, and a broad discussion of views on contemporary debate on perception. This paper could be used in a senior year or postgraduate course on the philosophy of perception as seminar reading since it is a detailed and controversial discussion of the metaphysics of perception. It has also been central to recent debates. It is is useful to teach alongside Thomas Raliegh's "Phenomenology Without Representation" (2013).Siegel, Susanna. The Content of Visual Experience2010, Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract: properties. The book starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. It then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. It then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kind properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. The book goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. The book's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.Comment : Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.Siegel, Susanna. Do Visual Experiences have contents?2010, in Nanay, Bence (eds.) Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.Comment : This can be used as background reading for a course on epistemology of perception, insofar as the author presents clearly the Content View and its main implications (a useful overview especially in section 1).Siegel, Susanna. The Contents of Perception2010, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this article, the author provides a great overview on the topic of perceptual content, by addressing the following main issues: i) what are perceptual experiences? ii) what can constitute the content of our experience? iii) what is the relation between the content and our experience? iv) in virtue of what experiences have content?Comment : Great article to be used as background/overview reading for undergraduate course on the philosophy of perception.Siegel, Susanna. Affordances and the Contents of Perception2014, in Brogaard, Berit (ed.) Does Perception have Content, OUP-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: The author questions the centrality of representation in perceptual experience that comes from a specific class of experience, namely, those experiences of the environment that compels you to act in a certain way.Comment : This could work as secondary reading for a postgraduate course on philosophy of perception.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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