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Diversity Reading List

Helping you include authors from under-represented groups in your teaching

Individualism and the Concept of Gaia

Posted on November 19, 2019June 26, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: The idea of Gaia—of life on earth as a self-sustaining natural system—is not a gratuitous, semi-mystical fantasy. It is a really useful idea, a cure for distortions that spoil our current world-view. Its most obvious use is, of course, in suggesting practical solutions to environmental problems. But, more widely, it also attacks deeper tangles which now block our thinking. Some of these are puzzles about the reasons why the fate of our planet should concern us. We are bewildered by the thought that we might have a duty to something so clearly non-human. But more centrally, too, we are puzzled about how we should view ourselves. Current ways of thought still tend to trap us in the narrow, atomistic, seventeenth-century image of social life which grounds today’s crude and arid individualism, though there are currently signs that we are beginning to move away from it. A more realistic view of the earth can give us a more realistic view of ourselves as its inhabitants.

Posted in Animal Ethics, Applied Ethics, Environmental Ethics, History of Western Philosophy, Value TheoryTagged anti-individualism, Gaia, individualism, myth, social contractLeave a comment

Philosophical Plumbing

Posted on November 19, 2019June 26, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Introduction: Is philosophy like plumbing? I have made this comparison a number of times when I have wanted to stress that philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult, but is also needed. It is not optional. The idea has caused mild surprise, and has sometimes been thought rather undignified. The question of dignity is a very interesting one, and I shall come back to it at the end of this article. But first, I would like to work the comparison out a bit more fully.

Posted in History of Western Philosophy, Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics & Epistemology, Philosophical MethodsTagged methodologyLeave a comment

The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics and Animal Behaviour

Posted on November 19, 2019May 13, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Introduction: Every age has its pet contradictions. Thirty years ago, we used to accept Marx and Freud together, and then wonder, like the chameleon on the tartan, why life was so confusing. Today there is similar trouble over the question whether there is, or is not, something called Human Nature. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of animal behaviour studies, and comparisons between animals and men have become immensely popular. People use evidence from animals to decide whether man is naturally aggressive, or naturally territorial; even whether he has an Aggressive or Territorial Instinct. On the other hand, many sociologists and psychologists still seem to hold the Behaviourist view that man is a creature entirely without instincts, and so do existentialist philosophers. If so, all comparison with animals must be irrelevant. On that view, man is entirely the product of his culture. He starts off infinitely plastic, and is formed completely by the society in which he grows up.

Posted in Animal Ethics, Applied Ethics, Human nature, Metaphysics, Metaphysics & Epistemology, Persons, Value TheoryTagged animals, instincts, state of natureLeave a comment

Dao Becomes Female

Posted on November 18, 2019May 13, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: Daoism, a Dao based and inspired teaching and practice, has been considered to be the philosophy of yielding in Chinese intellectual history. One important aspect of yielding is being rou 柔—soft, gentle, supple—which the Daodejing couples with the feminine. Not surprisingly, then, the female and femininity have enormous significance for Laozi and Daoism. To highlight this unique philosophical aspect of Daoism, this chapter will place femininity/the feminine/the female center stage to investigate Daoist thought and its possible contribution to feminist thought in a contemporary global setting. In this chapter I promote a somewhat female consciousness of Dao, or a Daoist female consciousness, which may expand, support, or alter feminist assumptions about femininity/the feminine/the female. The overarching focal point of this understanding lies in a depiction of the female and femininity as a cosmic force, a way of knowing, and a strategy for leading a flourishing life. The main points are that Dao does not govern actually existing gender relations—or, at least, that the social and political reality of gender relations is not modeled on Dao, because the patriarchy is not Dao. Highlighting the female or feminine aspect of Dao, or Dao as becoming female, is a feminist intervention, using resources from within classical Daoist thought in order to re-imagine or reconfigure gender for our time.

Posted in Asian Philosophy, Classical Daoism, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophical Traditions, Philosophy of Gender Race and Sexuality, Value TheoryTagged Chinese philosophy, Dao, Daoism, feminismLeave a comment

What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?

Posted on August 11, 2019June 26, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick’s thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill in the concrete details that would make them irrelevant. If we do this, we may see our feelings about the experience machine becoming less negative. Second, I argue that, even if our feelings about the experience machine do not perfectly track hedonistic reasons, there are various reasons to doubt the reliability of our anti-hedonistic intuitions. And finally, I argue that, since in the actual world seeing certain things besides pleasure as ends in themselves may best serve hedonistic ends, hedonism may justify our taking these other things to be intrinsically valuable, thus again making the existence of our seemingly anti-hedonistic intuitions far from straightforward evidence for the falsity of hedonism

Posted in Hedonist Accounts of Well-being, History of Western Philosophy, Value, Value Theory, Well-BeingTagged hedonism, pleasure, well-beingLeave a comment

The subjective intuition

Posted on August 11, 2019June 26, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision that dooms subjective theories to failure. I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists.

Posted in Hedonist Accounts of Well-being, History of Western Philosophy, Hybrid Accounts of Well-being, Value, Value Theory, Well-BeingTagged happiness, hedonism, well-beingLeave a comment

Controlling Attitudes

Posted on August 11, 2019May 13, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, “believing at will” is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

Posted in Control and Responsibility, Decision Theory, Decision-Theoretic Puzzles, Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemology, History of Western Philosophy, Hope, Intentionality, Mental Actions, Metaethics, Metaphysics & Epistemology, Normative Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind, Propositional Attitudes, Reasons, Toxin Puzzle, Value TheoryTagged attitude, belief, epistemology, free will, reasons, truth, voluntaryLeave a comment

Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug

Posted on August 11, 2019May 13, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: There’s a long history of discussion of probability in philosophy, but objective chance separated itself off and came into its own as a topic with the advent of a physical theory—quantum mechanics—in which chances play a central, and apparently ineliminable, role. In 1980 David Lewis wrote a paper pointing out that a very broad class of accounts of the nature of chance apparently lead to a contradiction when combined with a principle that expresses the role of chance in guiding belief. There is still no settled agreement on the proper response to the Lewis problem. At the time he wrote the article, Lewis despaired of a solution, but, although he never achieved one that satisfied him completely, by 1994, due to work primarily by Thau and Hall, he had come to think the problem could be disarmed if we fudged a little on the meaning of ‘chance’. I’ll say more about this below. What I’m going to suggest, however, is that the qualification is unnecessary. The problem depends on an assumption that should be rejected, viz., that using information about chance to guide credence requires one to conditionalize on the theory of chance that one is using. I’m going to propose a general recipe for using information about chance to guide belief that does not require conditionalization on a theory of chance at any stage. Lewis’ problem doesn’t arise in this setting.

Posted in Chance and Objective Probability, Philosophy of Probability, Science Logic & MathematicsTagged chance, David Lewis, probabilityLeave a comment

Pessimism About Russellian Monism

Posted on August 11, 2019May 13, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow us to break out of the current gridlock, it’s no wonder that it’s become ‘hot stuff.’ To my mind, however, the excitement about Russellian monism is misplaced. Though some version of Russellian monism might well be true, I do not believe that it enables us to break free of the dualism/physicalism divide. As I will argue, once we properly understand what’s required to flesh out an adequate monistic story, we will see that we are in an important way right back where we started.

Posted in Metaphysics & Epistemology, Neutral Monism, Panpsychism, Philosophy of Consciousness, Philosophy of Mind, Russellian Monism, Theories of ConsciousnessTagged consciousness, dualism, physicalism, Russellian monism2 Comments

What is Scientific Realism?

Posted on August 11, 2019May 13, 2025 by Simon Fokt

Abstract: Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we encounter some profoundly divergent conceptions of the nature of science and of philosophy.

Posted in General Philosophy of Science, Science Logic & Mathematics, Scientific RealismTagged nature of science, scientific realismLeave a comment

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