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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
The early Confucians recognize that the exchanges and experiences of quotidian life profoundly shape moral attitudes, moral self-understanding, and our prospects for robust moral community. Confucian etiquette aims to provide a form of moral training that can render learners equal to the moral work of ordinary life, inculcating appropriate cognitive-emotional dispositions, as well as honing social perception and bodily expression. In both their astute attention to prosaic behavior and the techniques they suggest for managing it, I argue, the Confucians afford a model useful for appropriation in contemporary efforts to address small but potent moral harms such as microinequities
Reader, Soran, Gillian Brock. Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory2004, Utilitas 16 (3):251-266-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
In this article we argue that the concept of need is as vital for moral theory as it is for moral life. In II we analyse need and its normativity in public and private moral practice. In III we describe simple cases which exemplify the moral demandingness of needs, and argue that the significance of simple cases for moral theory is obscured by the emphasis in moral philosophy on unusual cases. In IV we argue that moral theories are inadequate if they cannot describe simple needs-meeting cases. We argue that the elimination or reduction of need to other concepts such as value, duty, virtue or care is unsatisfactory, in which case moral theories that make those concepts fundamental will have to be revised. In conclusion, we suggest that if moral theories cannot be revised to accommodate needs, they may have to be replaced with a fully needs-based theory.
Comment: In this paper, Brock and Reader present a novel argument for the moral saliency of the concept of need. In doing so, they challenge the reduction of need to other concepts in existing moral theory. The text would be well paired with Reader's "Needs and Moral Necessity" (or used instead) as a way to discuss alternative perspectives on moral theory which depart from traditional ethical accounts (i.e. consequentialism, deontology, virtue ethics). The text might also be well paired with Reader's "The Other Side of Agency" to discuss the virtues of patient-centred (rather than agent-centred) moral theory.
Reader, Soran. Needs and Moral Necessity2007, New York: Routledge-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasPublisher’s Note:
Needs and Moral Necessity analyses ethics as a practice, explains why we have three moral theory-types, consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics, and argues for a fourth needs-based theory.
Comment: In this book, Reader defends a needs-based ethical theory and places it in the context of existing ethical theories. Her style of philosophy is straightforward and for the most part, absent of jargon, making it a very good resource for introductory teaching contexts. At the same time, her arguments are nuanced and developed, and it could just as easily be useful in the context of more advanced students. This book offers a critique of the dominant ethical theories existing in contemporary philosophical literature, and for this reason, could be useful in introductions to western social and political philosophy to teach alongside the traditional approaches to moral theory and to get students to challenge the hegemony of those approaches. It might also be useful as a way to discuss methodology and writing style in philosophy: Reader's approach and style of writing is very accessible to non-philosophers, but she still advances a fairly complex argument. Therefore, it could serve as an illustration of how written philosophy need not be technical or opaque in order to advance interesting claims.
Frowe, Helen. The Duty to Remove Statues of Wrongdoers2019, Journal of Practical Ethics 7(3):1-31-
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Added by: Ten-Herng LaiAbstract:
This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to repudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights violator is a sufficient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. I argue that this applies no less in the case of the ‘morally ambiguous’ wrongdoer, who both accomplishes significant goods and perpetrates serious rights violations. The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can be defeated by lesser-evil considerations. If removing a statue would, for example, spark a violent riot that would risk unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove could be outweighed by the duty not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would provide a lesser-evil justification for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty to remove is outweighed, rather than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when a duty is negated, one still owes something in cases of outweighing. And it especially matters that it is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour by others.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper highlights several important things. First, statues are blunt tools and express pro-attitudes to the persons they represent as a whole. Second, it sets out a clear standard for removal, and defends the conclusion that we should remove many or even most existing statues. Third, to the question “what if removal incites violence?” this paper provides a good answer. Fourth, a legitimate question is what we should do about statues of wrongdoers of the distant past? The discussion on this here is insightful.
Humphreys, Rebekah. Games, Fair-Play and a Sporting-Chance: A Conceptual Analysis of Blood-Sports2020, Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, 2017/18: Special Edition: Humans and Other Animals, 96-114-
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Rebekah Humphreys
Abstract: The killing of Cecil the lion in 2015 by a trophy hunter sparked a global debate regarding the killing of lions for ‘sport’. While many were outraged by Cecil’s killing, Cecil was just one of the millions of animals that have been used in the sports-shooting industry. Cecil’s killing brings with it the question of whether so-called ‘blood sports’ (whether these involve killing big game or smaller animals) are actually ‘sports’ at all, in the ordinary sense. As such, this paper aims to provide an analysis of blood-sport as a concept. The objective will be to examine whether blood-sports are games and to analyse to what extent, if any, blood-sports can be called ‘sports’ properly. Such an analysis will be presented through employing a generalised notion of sport and through a discussion of fair-play. Pace S. P. Morris (2014) who argues that hunting which incorporates a fair-chase code is a game and a sport, this current paper concludes that it is doubtful that blood-sport is a game, and that even if one assumes that it is a game, it cannot be classed as sport, and further that any fair-chase code undermines itself in the context of so-called ‘blood-sports’.
Comment: Basis for a good debate on issues surrounding the ethics of bloodsport and 'bloodsport' as a concept. Is' bloodsport' actually 'sport', for example, in the ordinary sense of the term?
Imafidon, Elvis. Exploring African Philosophy of Difference2020, In: Imafidon, E. (ed.) Handbook of African Philosophy of Difference. Cham: Springer, 15-30-
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Björn Freter
Abstract: It is the tradition of philosophy as a rational and critical human activity across borders to isolate specific human ideas both as syntax and as real and lived human experiences, bring them to the foreground, and make them occupy a crucial and specialized place in philosophical discourse. This is apparent in the many delimited branches of philosophy such as metaphysics – an inquiry into the fundamental principles underlying reality; epistemology – an inquiry concerning the nature, scope, and theories of human knowledge; axiology – an inquiry into the theories of human values; and philosophy of science – a critical examination of the nature, methods, and assumptions of science. African philosophy has thrived and flourished in the last six decades beginning as a reactionary scholarship to prior denial of the possibility of its existence, to becoming an established academic discipline. However, African philosophy although succeeding in establishing its general nature, themes, and problems, is still at the elementary stage of discussing specifics and delimiting its areas of inquiry into specialized fragments. Thus, beyond the general commentaries on African philosophy in existing literature, it is only recently that we find a few scholars writing and laying the groundwork on specialized themes in African philosophy such as African ethics, African epistemology, and African ontology. My goal in this chapter is to bring one essential human experience to the foreground in African philosophy as a specialized area of inquiry. The human experience that interests me here is the ubiquitous concept of difference and the peculiarities of its experience by Africans in Africa and beyond. My intention is to attempt a preliminary sketch of the meaning, nature, scope, and primary tasks of African philosophy of difference. I show, for instance, how African philosophy of difference can shift the discourse of difference from empirical manifestations of difference to an exploration of the theories that stands under such manifestations. I conclude that African philosophy of difference is crucial in understanding and dealing with the complex issues of identity, difference, and the other experienced in Africa in areas such as albinism, xenophobia, race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and politics. The possibility of such an inquiry also indicates the prospect of delimiting African philosophy to more specialized spheres of discourse.Comment:
Srinivasan, Amia. The Aptness of Anger2018, Journal of Political Philosophy, 26 (2):123-144-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Lizzy Ventham
Abstract: This paper argues that anger has an important role in political life. By not recognising this, we risk neglecting groups for whom anger is appropriate, and who have never been allowed to be angry.Comment: This paper is a great conversation starter about the place of anger in political philosophy. It provides original arguments that can go against a lot of students' initial intuitions on the topic, so can be a great way to start discussion and debate. I'd use it on classes on politics, feminism, or applied ethics.
Shapiro, Lisa. Descartes’s Ethics2008, In Janet Broughton & John Carriero (eds.), A companion to Descartes. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 445-463.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Alberto Vanzo
Abstract: I begin my discussion by considering how to relate Descartes's more general concern with the conduct of life to the metaphysics and epistemology in the foreground of his philosophical project. I then turn to the texts in which Descartes offers his developed ethical thought and present the case for Descartes as a virtue ethicist. My argument emerges from seeing that Descartes's conception of virtue and the good owes much to Stoic ethics, a school of thought which saw a significant revival in the seventeenth century. It does, however, deviate from classical Stoicism in critical ways. Towards the end of my discussion, I return to the question of the relation between Descartes's ethics and his metaphysics and epistemology, and I suggest that the Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting Reason and the Meditations on First Philosophy are invested with the virtue ethical considerations of moral education and the regulation of the passions, respectively.Comment:
O'Neill, Onora. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy1989, Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Publisher's Note: Two centuries after they were published, Kant's ethical writings are as much admired and imitated as they have ever been, yet serious and long-standing accusations of internal incoherence remain unresolved. Onora O'Neill traces the alleged incoherences to attempts to assimilate Kant's ethical writings to modern conceptions of rationality, action and rights. When the temptation to assimilate is resisted, a strikingly different and more cohesive account of reason and morality emerges. Kant offers a "constructivist" vindication of reason and a moral vision in which obligations are prior to rights and in which justice and virtue are linked. O'Neill begins by reconsidering Kant's conceptions of philosophical method, reason, freedom, autonomy and action. She then moves on to the more familiar terrain of interpretation of the Categorical Imperative, while in the last section she emphasizes differences between Kant's ethics and recent "Kantian" ethics, including the work of John Rawls and other contemporary liberal political philosophersComment:
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature1990, Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Publisher's Note: This volume brings together Nussbaum's published papers on the relationship between literature and philosophy, especially moral philosophy. The papers, many of them previously inaccessible to non-specialist readers, explore such fundamental issues as the relationship between style and content in the exploration of ethical issues; the nature of ethical attention and ethical knowledge and their relationship to written forms and styles; and the role of the emotions in deliberation and self-knowledge. Nussbaum investigates and defends a conception of ethical understanding which involves emotional as well as intellectual activity, and which gives a certain type of priority to the perception of particular people and situations rather than to abstract rules. She argues that this ethical conception cannot be completely and appropriately stated without turning to forms of writing usually considered literary rather than philosophical. It is consequently necessary to broaden our conception of moral philosophy in order to include these forms. Featuring two new essays and revised versions of several previously published essays, this collection attempts to articulate the relationship, within such a broader ethical inquiry, between literary and more abstractly theoretical elements.Comment:
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Olberding, Amy. Etiquette: A Confucian Contribution to Moral Philosophy
2016, Ethics 126 (2):422-446
Comment: This paper explores the bearing of etiquette on moral sensibility, action, and character, through the philosophy of Confucianism and its concept of 'li 禮'. The author draws attention to the fact that early Confucianism placed an uncharacteristic emphasis on the development of good etiquette as a core component of the development of a moral character. She highlights this feature of Confucian ethics, in part, because it runs counter to much of traditional ethical theory in western philosohpy - where manners and etiquette, as mere social norms, are treated as 'notoriously fallible,' imperfect and often arbitrary: not principles on which we would think to base guidelines for moral development. Olberding, however, argues in their favor: that these rules 'arise in sensitivity to human need', and that robust adherence to them cultivates not only our actions but our character when it comes to interacting with other. The argument is especially straightforward and clear, and does not require any advanced or previous exposure to Confucian ethics, making it accessible to a wide range of ability levels. It would make an interesting addition to any introductory course in ethics, but could also be used to augment a more advanced discussion about contemporary ethical debates. (There are notable connections to the work of other contemporary philosophers discussing sociality and need, including Kimberley Brownlee, Soran Reader, and Anca Gheaus.)