Okruhlik, Kathleen. Gender and the Biological Sciences
1994, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24(sup1): 21-42.
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Summary: Okhrulik offers a feminist critique of biology, a "real" science, to show that it is not just the "soft" social sciences that are affected by bias. She argues that preconceptions can interfere not only in cases of "bad science", but even when the rules of scientific practice are followed. There is no safeguard against the effects of bias in the context of discovery. Even if theories are rigorously tested to remove bias, some theories might not even be generated and so would not get to the point of being counted as competitors in the testing stage. This is illustrated by a number of case studies. Okhrulik concludes that a diversity of viewpoints is crucial.Parke, Emily. Experiments, Simulations, and Epistemic Privilege2014, Philosophy of Science 81(4): 516-536.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Experiments are commonly thought to have epistemic privilege over simulations. Two ideas underpin this belief: first, experiments generate greater inferential power than simulations, and second, simulations cannot surprise us the way experiments can. In this article I argue that neither of these claims is true of experiments versus simulations in general. We should give up the common practice of resting in-principle judgments about the epistemic value of cases of scientific inquiry on whether we classify those cases as experiments or simulations, per se. To the extent that either methodology puts researchers in a privileged epistemic position, this is context sensitive.Comment: Valuable in raising questions about preconceptions of "science experiments". This article would be useful as part of a look at scientific methodology and the real value obtained from our scientific practices.
Richardson, S. Sarah. Sex Itself: The Search for Male and Female in the Human Genome2013, The University of Chicago Press.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Isela
Publisher's Note: Human genomes are 99.9 percent identical—with one prominent exception. Instead of a matching pair of X chromosomes, men carry a single X, coupled with a tiny chromosome called the Y. Tracking the emergence of a new and distinctive way of thinking about sex represented by the unalterable, simple, and visually compelling binary of the X and Y chromosomes, Sex Itself examines the interaction between cultural gender norms and genetic theories of sex from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present, postgenomic age. Using methods from history, philosophy, and gender studies of science, Sarah S. Richardson uncovers how gender has helped to shape the research practices, questions asked, theories and models, and descriptive language used in sex chromosome research. From the earliest theories of chromosomal sex determination, to the mid-century hypothesis of the aggressive XYY supermale, to the debate about Y chromosome degeneration, to the recent claim that male and female genomes are more different than those of humans and chimpanzees, Richardson shows how cultural gender conceptions influence the genetic science of sex. Richardson shows how sexual science of the past continues to resonate, in ways both subtle and explicit, in contemporary research on the genetics of sex and gender. With the completion of the Human Genome Project, genes and chromosomes are moving to the center of the biology of sex. Sex Itself offers a compelling argument for the importance of ongoing critical dialogue on how cultural conceptions of gender operate within the science of sex.Comment:
Sterrett, Susan G.. Turing’s Two Tests For Intelligence2000, Minds and Machines 10(4): 541-559.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli, Contributed by: Susan G. Sterrett
Abstract: On a literal reading of `Computing Machinery and Intelligence'', Alan Turing presented not one, but two, practical tests to replace the question `Can machines think?'' He presented them as equivalent. I show here that the first test described in that much-discussed paper is in fact not equivalent to the second one, which has since become known as `the Turing Test''. The two tests can yield different results; it is the first, neglected test that provides the more appropriate indication of intelligence. This is because the features of intelligence upon which it relies are resourcefulness and a critical attitude to one''s habitual responses; thus the test''s applicablity is not restricted to any particular species, nor does it presume any particular capacities. This is more appropriate because the question under consideration is what would count as machine intelligence. The first test realizes a possibility that philosophers have overlooked: a test that uses a human''s linguistic performance in setting an empirical test of intelligence, but does not make behavioral similarity to that performance the criterion of intelligence. Consequently, the first test is immune to many of the philosophical criticisms on the basis of which the (so-called) `Turing Test'' has been dismissed.Comment: This paper provides a good analysis of some of the problems with the Turing Test and how they can be avoided. It can be good to use in teaching the classic Turing 1950 paper on the question of whether a computer could be said to 'think' that considers the role of gender in the imitation game version of the test. It could also contribute to an examination of the concept of intelligence, and machine intelligence in particular.
Thalos, Mariam. A modest proposal for interpreting structural explanations1998, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(2): 279-295.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Social sciences face a well-known problem, which is an instance of a general problem faced as well by psychological and biological sciences: the problem of establishing their legitimate existence alongside physics. This, as will become clear, is a problem in metaphysics. I will show how a new account of structural explanations, put forward by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, which is designed to solve this metaphysical problem with social sciences in mind, fails to treat the problem in any importantly new way. Then I will propose a more modest approach, and show how it does not deserve the criticism directed at a prototype by Jackson and PettitComment: An interesting argument for the value of structual explanations in sociology. Useful in the context of a discussion of reductionism or of the proper classification of social sciences as real science.
Thalos, Mariam. Truth deserves to be believed2013, Philosophy 88(2): 179-196.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Science seems generally to aim at truth. And governmental support of science is often premised on the instrumental value of truth in service of advancing our practical objectives, both as individuals and as communities, large and small. While there is some political expediency to this view, it is not correct. The value of truth is nowise that it helps us achieve our aims. In fact, just the contrary: truth deserves to be believed only on the condition that its claim upon us is orthogonal to any utility it might have in the service of (any and all) practical endsComment: A good anti-pragmatist argument, useful in an exploration of the aims of science, or a good introduction to truth and objectivity in science as an illustration of the reason that might matter. Suitable for both undergraduate and graduate teaching.
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Comment: Presents a good case for why feminist critiques are relevant even to "harder" sciences, made more salient with easy-to-understand examples. Raises issues of theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination of theory. A good introduction to reasons to doubt that science is completely "objective".