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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: AnonymousAbstract:
Ephecticism is the tendency towards suspension of belief. Epistemology often focuses on the error of believing when one ought to doubt. The converse error—doubting when one ought to believe—is relatively underexplored. This essay examines the errors of undue doubt. I draw on the relevant alternatives framework to diagnose and remedy undue doubts about rape accusations. Doubters tend to invoke standards for belief that are too demanding, for example, and underestimate how farfetched uneliminated error possibilities are. They mistake seeing how incriminating evidence is compatible with innocence for a reason to withhold judgement. Rape accusations help illuminate the causes and normativity of doubt. I propose a novel kind of epistemic injustice, for example, wherein patterns of unwarranted attention to farfetched error possibilities can cause those error possibilities to become relevant. Widespread unreasonable doubt thus renders doubt reasonable and makes it harder to know rape accusations. Finally, I emphasise that doubt is often a conservative force and I argue that the relevant alternatives framework helps defend against pernicious doubt-mongers.Govier, Trudy. What’s Wrong with Slippery Slope Arguments?1982, Canadian journal of philosophy. 12(2): 303-316.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Content: Govier distinguishes four kinds of slippery slope arguments - conceptual, precedential, causal and mixed - and argues that only the last kind are likely to ever be sound.Comment: Useful in teaching about fallacious arguments in general, and about moral arguments an popular discourse about such arguments in particular.
Haack, Susan. The Justification of Deduction1976, Mind 85 (337): 112-119.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: It is often taken for granted by writers who propose - and, for that matter, by writers who oppose - 'justifications' of inductions, that deduction either does not need, or can readily be provided with, justification. The purpose of this paper is to argue that, contrary to this common opinion, problems analogous to those which, notoriously, arise in the attempt to justify induction, also arise in the attempt to justify deduction.Comment: This paper argues that justification for deduction, like justification for induction, also has the problem of circularity. It is suitable for teachings on topic of justification for inference in a course on philosophy of logic.
Hurley, Susan. Animal Action in the Space of Reasons2003, Mind and Language 18(3): 231-256.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: I defend the view that we should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have contextbound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent's reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and connections are made to simulationist accounts of cognitive skills.Comment: An excellent argument in favour of a less-intellectual criteria for reason-having. The arguments are clear and compelling, though at least some familiarity with action theory would be helpful to give proper context. Recommended for higher-level or more in-depth examinations of reasons, as its relevance is partly dependent on some of the other arguments made on the subject.
Jenkins-Ichikawa, Carrie. Knowledge of Arithmetic2005, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56: 727-747.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Abstract: The goal of the research programme I describe in this article is a realist epistemology for arithmetic which respects arithmetic's special epistemic status (the status usually described as a prioricity) yet accommodates naturalistic concerns by remaining funda- mentally empiricist. I argue that the central claims which would allow us to develop such an epistemology are (i) that arithmetical truths are known through an examination of our arithmetical concepts; (ii) that (at least our basic) arithmetical concepts are accurate mental representations of elements of the arithmetical structure of the inde- pendent world; (iii) that (ii) obtains in virtue of the normal functioning of our sensory apparatus. The first of these claims protects arithmetic's special epistemic status relative, for example, to the laws of physics, the second preserves the independence of arithmetical truth, and the third ensures that we remain empiricists.Comment: Useful as a primary or secondary reading in an advanced undergraduate course epistemology (in a section on a priori knowledge) or an advanced undergraduate course on philosophy of mathematics. This is not an easy paper, but it is clear. It is also useful within a teaching context, as it provides a summary of the influential neo-Fregean approach to mathematical knowledge.
Jeshion, Robin. Frege’s Notions of Self-Evidence2001, Mind 110 (440):937-976-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Alexander Yates
Abstract: Controversy remains over exactly why Frege aimed to estabish logicism. In this essay, I argue that the most influential interpretations of Frege's motivations fall short because they misunderstand or neglect Frege's claims that axioms must be self-evident. I offer an interpretation of his appeals to self-evidence and attempt to show that they reveal a previously overlooked motivation for establishing logicism, one which has roots in the Euclidean rationalist tradition. More specifically, my view is that Frege had two notions of self-evidence. One notion is that of a truth being foundationally secure, yet not grounded on any other truth. The second notion is that of a truth that requires only clearly grasping its content for rational, a priori justified recognition of its truth. The overarching thesis I develop is that Frege required that axioms be self-evident in both senses, and he relied on judging propositions to be self-evident as part of his fallibilist method for identifying a foundation of arithmetic. Consequently, we must recognize both notions in order to understand how Frege construes ultimate foundational proofs, his methodology for discovering and identifying such proofs, and why he thought the propositions of arithmetic required proof.Comment: A nice discussion of what sort of epistemic status Frege thought axioms needed to have. A nice historical example of foundationalist epistemology - good for a course on Frege or analytic philosophy more generally, or as further reading in a course on epistemology, to give students a historical example of certain epistemological subtleties.
Leng, Mary. Platonism and Anti-Platonism: Why Worry?2005, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19(1):65-84-
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Added by: Sara Peppe
Abstract: This paper argues that it is scientific realists who should be most concerned about the issue of Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics. If one is merely interested in accounting for the practice of pure mathematics, it is unlikely that a story about the ontology of mathematical theories will be essential to such an account. The question of mathematical ontology comes to the fore, however, once one considers our scientific theories. Given that those theories include amongst their laws assertions that imply the existence of mathematical objects, scientific realism, when construed as a claim about the truth or approximate truth of our scientific theories, implies mathematical Platonism. However, a standard argument for scientific realism, the 'no miracles' argument, falls short of establishing mathematical Platonism. As a result, this argument cannot establish scientific realism as it is usually defined, but only some weaker position. Scientific 'realists' should therefore either redefine their position as a claim about the existence of unobservable physical objects, or alternatively look for an argument for their position that does establish mathematical Platonism.Comment: Previous knowledge both on Platonism in philosophy of mathematics and scientific realism is needed. Essential paper for advanced courses of philosophy of science.
Lovibond, Sabina. Realism and Imagination in Ethics1983, Blackwell.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Publisher's Note: In Realism and Imagination in Ethics, author Sabina Lovibond explores the non-cognitive theory of ethics along with its objections and the alternative of moral realism. Delving into expressivism, perception, moral sense theory, objectivity, and more, this book pulls from Wittgenstein, Hegel, Bradley, Nietzsche and others to explore the many facets of ethics and perception. The discussion analyzes the language, theories, and criteria surrounding ethical action, and describes the faults and fallacies of traditional schools of thought.Comment:
Luis Oliveira. Skeptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil2019, Australasian Journal of Philosophy-
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Luis Oliveira
Abstract: Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism being false: if evil is evidence against God, then seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil must be evidence for it truly being pointless. I think this dialectic is mistaken. In this paper, after drawing a lesson about fallibility and induction from the preface paradox, I argue that the force of the evidential problem of evil is compatible with sceptical theism being true. More exactly, I argue that the collection of apparently pointless evil in the world provides strong evidence for there being truly pointless evil, despite the fact that seeing no justifying reason for some particular instance of evil is no evidence whatsoever for it truly being pointless. I call this result the paradox of evil.Comment: This is a good piece for a class discussing the problem of evil. The progression of instruction on this topic typically proceeds through the logical problem of evil, then the free will defense as a response, then the inductive problem of evil, then skeptical theism as a response. This paper continues the discussion past that typical end point.
M. Giulia Napolitano, Reuter, Kevin. What is a Conspiracy Theory?2021, Erkenntnis-
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Added by: Sara Peppe, Contributed by: Ethan LandesAbstract:
In much of the current academic and public discussion, conspiracy theories are portrayed as a negative phenomenon, linked to misinformation, mistrust in experts and institutions, and political propaganda. Rather surprisingly, however, philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to incorporate a negatively evaluative aspect when either analyzing or engineering the concept conspiracy theory. In this paper, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept conspiracy theory from five studies designed to test the existence, prevalence and exact form of an evaluative dimension to the ordinary concept conspiracy theory. These results reveal that, while there is a descriptive concept of conspiracy theory, the predominant use of conspiracy theory is deeply evaluative, encoding information about epistemic deficiency and often also derogatory and disparaging information. On the basis of these results, we present a new strategy for engineering conspiracy theory to promote theoretical investigations and institutional discussions of this phenomenon. We argue for engineering conspiracy theory to encode an epistemic evaluation, and to introduce a descriptive expression—such as ‘conspiratorial explanation’—to refer to the purely descriptive concept conspiracy theory.Comment: This paper empirically tests whether "conspiracy theory" is evaluative or merely means a theory that evokes a conspiracy, as previous philosophers have typically argued. Using both survey based methods and corpus linguistics, they find that the term does appear to be necessarily derogatory. The paper is very approachable and would be suitable primary/secondary reading for an undegraduate course on conspiracy theories, experimental philosophy, or conceptual engineering.
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Georgi Gardiner. Banal Skepticism and the Errors of Doubt: On Ephecticism about Rape Accusations
2021, Midwest Studies in Philosophy
Comment: Applies epistemology's relevant alternatives theory to diagnosis why rape accusations are doubted so much. It outlines the theory first, so no need for a pre-read. Identifies the tricks and mistakes of "doubt mongers", who refuse to believe despite good evidence. Good for an applied philosophy, feminism, or upper-level epistemology course. Also good to interject current topics / MeToo into a course. Comes with a "cheat sheet" (i.e. a handout that outlines the published essay, to make teaching it easier). A word and PDF version of the cheat sheet are here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Uyki8vj7_FkVHcmThrAbEiw5-BtRSF0n Applies epistemology's relevant alternatives theory to diagnosis why rape accusations are doubted so much. It outlines the theory first, so no need for a pre-read. Identifies the tricks and mistakes of "doubt mongers", who refuse to believe despite good evidence. Good for an applied philosophy, feminism, or upper-level epistemology course. Also good to interject current topics / MeToo into a course. Comes with a "cheat sheet" (i.e. a handout that outlines the published essay, to make teaching it easier). A word and PDF version of the cheat sheet are here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Uyki8vj7_FkVHcmThrAbEiw5-BtRSF0n