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Amijee, Fatema. The Role of Attention in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge
2013, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1175-1193.

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Dominic Alford-Duguid

Abstract: In his Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This paper argues for a new interpretation of the relationship between these two species of knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance of an object neither suffices for knowledge that one is acquainted with the object, nor puts a subject in a position to know that she is acquainted with the object. These conclusions emerge from a thorough examination of the central role played by attention in Russell's theory of knowledge. Attention bridges the gap between knowledge by acquaintance and our capacity to form judgements about the objects of acquaintance.

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Ryan, Sharon. What is Wisdom?
1999, Philosophical Studies, 93: 119-139

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Introduction: What is wisdom? Remarkably few contemporary analytic philosophers have proposed an answer to this ancient question. I think the question is interesting and deserves some careful attention. In this paper, I will present and evaluate several analyses of wisdom. I will then defend my own analysis of wisdom.

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Matilal, Bimal Krishna. Perception: An Essay on Classic Indian theories of Knowledge
1986, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Abstract: This book is a defence of a form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyaya-Vaid'sesika school in classical India. The author presents the Nyaya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. His reconstruction of Nyaya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists

Comment: This can be used as a reading for a course on indian philosophy, focusing on epistemology, and philosophy of science

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Jacskon Balcerak, Magdalena, Brendan Balcerak Jackson. Understanding and Philosophical Methodology
2012,

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Abstract: According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson's arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch a way to understand understanding that shows that there is a clear sense in which we can indeed come to know the answers to (many) philosophical questions purely on the basis of understanding.

Comment: The author argues, contra Williamson, for the role of understanding as a way of gaining knowledge and providing answer to lots of philosophical questions. Good to use as a further reading for postgraduate courses in epistemology of understanding, as well as philosophical methodology.

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Siegel, Susanna & Silins, Nicholas. The epistemology of Perception
2015, in Matthen, Mohan (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, Oxford

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Abstract: An overview of the epistemology of perception, covering the nature of justification, immediate justification, the relationship between the metaphysics of perceptual experience and its rational role, the rational role of attention, and cognitive penetrability. The published version will contain a smaller bibliography, due to space constraints in the volume.

Comment: A great overview on the epistemology of perception, covering issues from the nature of justification, the rational role of experience, as well as the topic of cognitive penetrability. Good to use as background/overview reading for a course on epistemology of perception.

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Shellenberg, Susanna. Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence
, in Symposium withcomments by Matt McGrath, Ram Neta, and Adam Pautz, Philosophical Studies

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Summary: In this paper, the author presents the so-called capacity view, namely, the view that "that perceptual states are systematically linked to what they are of in the good case, that is, the case of a successful perception, and thereby provide evidence for what they are of in the good case". The author discusses the main committments of the view and the implications it has when it comes to the justification of our beliefs and the transparency of our mental states.

Comment: Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.

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Ryan, Sharon. Wisdom
1996, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Introduction: What is wisdom? Philosophers, psychologists, spiritual leaders, poets, novelists, life coaches, and a variety of other important thinkers have tried to understand the concept of wisdom. This entry will provide a brief and general overview, and analysis of, several philosophical views on the topic of wisdom. It is not intended to capture the many interesting and important approaches to wisdom found in other fields of inquiry. Moreover, this entry will focus on several major ideas in the Western philosophical tradition. In particular, it will focus on five general approaches to understanding what it takes to be wise: (1) wisdom as epistemic humility, (2) wisdom as epistemic accuracy, (3) wisdom as knowledge, (4) a hybrid theory of wisdom, and (5) wisdom as rationality.

Comment: Excellent entry on the epistemology of wisdom. Essential as background reading.

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Macdonald, Cynthia. Externalism and first-person authority
1995, Synthese 104 (1):99-122.

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Abstract: In this paper, the author explores the relation between content externalism, i.e., the idea that the content of our thought is determines by factors of the environment, and first-person authority, i.e., the idea that subjects are authoritive with respect to the content of their own intentional states. The author develps an account of first-person authoritive that results being compatible with externalism.

Comment: It is good as a further reading on the topic of content/semantic externalism.

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Jackson Balcerak, Magdalena. Justification by Imagination
2018, In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 209-226

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Summary: The author argues that experience constraints the nature of imagination in such a way that this results having a justificatory role.

Comment: Good to use as further reading in a course on the topic of the epistemology of imagination.

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Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. Denying Relationality: Epistemology and Ethics and Ignorance
2007,

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Summary: In this chapter, the author argues that epistemological and ethical practices of ignorance are strategic and involve a strategic denial of relationality, namely, of the way in which subjects are formed through relation with each other.

Comment: Good as a further reading for a course on epistemology of ignorance.

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