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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author addresses the problem of to what provides epistemic justification for taking someone's testimony as true. That is, to what extent testimony provides conveys warrant? More precisely, the author argues, contra C. J. A. Coady, that testimony does not easily provide warrant in most of the cases, yet the whether a testimony conveys warrant is context-sensitive: different levels of warrant are transmitted in different contexts.Elgin, Z. Catherine. Non-foundationalist epistemology: Holism, coherence, and tenability2005, in Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Boston: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 156-167-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this paper, the author argues that epistemic justification is explained out by coherentism. Although coherence is not the ground of truth, it is the source of epistemic justification.Comment: This can be used as secondary/further reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology, focusing on the foundationalism/coherentism debate on epistemic justification.
Elgin, Z. Catherine. Scepticism Aside2010, in Joseph Keim Campell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry (eds.), Knowledge and Scepticism Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010, 309-324. ed. Silverstein-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: The author presents an argument for disregarding scepticism. Although she does not commit herself to saying that scepticism is false, she argues that it is, not only practicaly, yet epistemologically responsible to assume scepticism to be false.Comment: This can be used as further reading for problematization of skepticism; it focusses on the epistemological problems of scepticism and discusses their practical implications.
Eriksson, Lina, Alan Hájek. What are Degrees of Belief?2007, Studia Logica 86(2): 185-215.-
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Antony EagleAbstract:
Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees - call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are, and then ii) to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been adequately discharged, various authors move on to stage ii) with varied and ingenious arguments. But an unsatisfactory response at stage i) clearly undermines any gains that might be accrued at stage ii) as far as probabilism is concerned: if those things are not degrees of belief, then it is irrelevant to probabilism whether they should be probabilities or not. In this paper, the authors scrutinize the state of play regarding stage i). We critically examine several of the leading accounts of degrees of belief: reducing them to corresponding betting behavior (de Finetti); measuring them by that behavior (Jeffrey); and analyzing them in terms of preferences and their role in decision-making more generally (Ramsey, Lewis, Maher). We argue that the accounts fail, and so they are unfit to subserve arguments for probabilism. We conclude more positively: "degree of belief" should be taken as a primitive concept that forms the basis of our best theory of rational belief and decision: probabilism.Comment: This paper is accessible to an advanced undergraduate audience in a formal philosophy course, since it provides an overview of the different accounts of the notion of degrees of belief. However, it's most adequate for graduate level, where it could be used in a formal epistemology course or in a course on the philosophy of probability.
Gendler, Tamar. Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology2010, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Publisher's Note: This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self?deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization.Comment: The book contains fourteen previously published essays. The first six essays are on thought experiments and the use of the imagination therein. Mainly, these essays take up the tasks of explaining how thought experiments produce novel beliefs and explaining whether and how thought experiments justify beliefs. Those are good papers for teachings on methodology of philosophy and intuitions. The next six essays are on imagination in general: its nature, its role in motivating action and producing emotion, and its relations to other mental states. It covers a range of topics including the paradox of fictional emotions and the nature of self-deception, the puzzle of imaginative resistance, the problem of the precipice. The topic of the last two essays is a mental state called "alief" which are highly relevant materials for teachings on mental states in action, implicit bias and etc.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Alief and Belief2008, Journal of Philosophy 105 (10): 634-663.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. Paradigmatic alief can be characterized as a mental state with associatively-linked content that is representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated - consciously or unconsciously - by features of the subject's internal or ambient environment. Alief is a more primitive state than either belief or imagination: it directly activates behavioral response patterns (as opposed to motivating in conjunction with desire or pretended desire.) I argue that alief explains a large number of otherwise perplexing phenomena and plays a far larger role in causing behavior than has typically been recognized by philosophers. I argue further that the notion can be invoked to explain both the effectiveness and the limitations of certain sorts of example-based reasoning, and that it lies at the core of habit-based views of ethics.Comment: In this influential paper, Gendler argues for the existence of an important cognitive states that she calls alief. It is a highly-relevant material for teachings on many topics, for example forms of belief, rationality and belief, varieties of irrationality, implicit bias and etc, in upper-division undergraduate courses and postgraduate courses.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Alief in Action (and Reaction)2008, Mind and Language 23 (5): 552- 585-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control.Comment: This is an introductory paper on alief. It provides an account of alief and argues for its role in governing non-conscious or automatic actions. The paper is useful for teachings on philosophy of action, mental attitudes, moral philosophy, social psychology, etc.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Philosophical thought experiments, intuitions, and cognitive equilibrium2007, French, Peter A. & Wettstein, Howard K. (eds). Philosophy and Empirical. Oxford: Blackwell. 68-89.-
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Added by: Jie Gao
Summary: Drawing on literature from the dual-processing tradition in psychology, this paper tries to explain why contemplation of an imaginary particular may have cognitive and motivational effects that differ from those evoked by an abstract description of the same content, and hence, why thought experiments may be effective devices for conceptual reconfiguration. It suggests that by presenting content in a suitably concrete way, thought experiments recruit representational schemas that were otherwise inactive, thereby evoking responses that may run counter to those evoked by alternative presentations of relevantly similar content.Comment: In this interesting paper, Gendler elucidates the role and nature of intuition in the light of current philosophical practice. It is a good material for teaching on philosophical intuitions and experimental philosophy.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Thought experiments rethought – and reperceived2004, Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1152-1163.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist
Abstract: Contemplating imaginary scenarios that evoke certain sorts of quasi?sensory intuitions may bring us to new beliefs about contingent features of the natural world. These beliefs may be produced quasi?observationally; the presence of a mental image may play a crucial cognitive role in the formation of the belief in question. And this albeit fallible quasi?observational belief?forming mechanism may, in certain contexts, be sufficiently reliable to count as a source of justification. This sheds light on the central puzzle surrounding scientific thought experiment, which is how contemplation of an imaginary scenario can lead to new knowledge about contingent features of the natural world.Comment: This is a good introductory reading to the philosophy of thought experiements. It would work well as a required reading on the topic.
Gendler, Tamar Szabó. Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment1998, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):397-424.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist
Abstract: By carefully examining one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of science - that by which Galileo is said to have refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones - I attempt to show that thought experiments play a distinctive role in scientific inquiry. Reasoning about particular entities within the context of an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally justified concluusions that - given the same initial information - would not be rationally justifiable on the basis of a straightforward argument.Comment: This paper would be good to put as further reading in a week focusing on thought experiments. Suitable for a third year module.
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Elgin, Z. Catherine. Take it from me – the epistemological status of testimony
2002, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXV (2002), 291-308.
Comment: This could work as secondary reading for a postgraduate course in epistemology, focusin on the epistemology of testimony.