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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual 'open future objective present' models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we might, prima facie, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility.Miller, Kristie. Backwards Causation, Time, and the Open Future2008, Metaphysica 9(2): 173-191.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Here are some intuitions we have about the nature of space and time. There is something fundamentally different about the past, present, and future. What is definitive of the past is that the past events are fixed. What is definitive of the future is that future events are not fixed. What is definitive of the present is that it marks the objective ontological border between the past and the future and, by doing so, instantiates a particularly salient phenomenological property of nowness. Call the combination of these intuitions according to which there exists an objective present, a fixed past, and an open future, the intuitive view. I argue that, given the intuitive view, the possibility of backwards causation - and hence, for instance, backwards time travel - is problematic.Comment: A nice paper to use near the start of a Philosophy of Time course, or in a Metaphysics course before introducing backwards causation and time travel. This is because it gives a good motivation of the 'common sense' view, so it could be good to get clear on this and what it can entail.
Barnes, Elizabeth, Ross Cameron. Back to the Open Future2011, Philosophical Perspectives 25(1): 1-26.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Many of us are tempted by the thought that the future is open, whereas the past is not. The future might unfold one way, or it might unfold another; but the past, having occurred, is now settled. In previous work we presented an account of what openness consists in: roughly, that the openness of the future is a matter of it being metaphysically indeterminate how things will turn out to be. We were previously concerned merely with presenting the view and exploring its consequences; we did not attempt to argue for it over rival accounts. That is what we will aim to do in this paper.Comment: This could be set as a further reading in an undergraduate metaphysics course, or an undergraduate course on the metaphysics of time. It would also work well as a core reading in a postgraduate course on the metaphysics of time paired with the authors' 'The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism, and Ontology'.
Barnes, Elizabeth, Ross Cameron. The Open Future: Bivalence, Determinism, and Ontology2009, Philosophical Studies 146(2): 291-309.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.Comment: This text might seem to be advanced because of the many issues it handles, but it's written so clearly that I think it could (if taught in detail as a core text) be suitable for an intermediate metaphysics class. In particular, the class could be split into three groups, with each group tasked with researching one of bivalence, determinism and eternalism, and explaining i) how they are alleged to conflict with the open future, and ii) how Barnes and Cameron argue that they aren't in fact in conflict with the thesis that the future is open.
Cartwright, Nancy. Causal Laws and Effective Strategies1979, Nous 13(4): 419-437.-
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Daniel Kokotajlo
Summary: Argues for the irreducibility of causal laws to laws of association, probabilistic or deterministic. Statistical or probabilistic analyses of causality, which typically require that the cause increase or alter the probability of the effect, cannot succeed because causes increase the probability of their effects only in situations that exhibit causal homogeneity with respect to that effect (Simpson's paradox). This condition must enter the definition of an effective strategy, which is why causal laws are ineliminable for scientifically grounded interventions in nature.Comment: I would recommend this as a further reading for a unit on causation and the laws of nature. It would be especially useful if situated within a metaphysics course where students have already come across general reductive accounts - e.g. reductive accounts of modality.
Kleinschmidt, Shieva. Refining Four-Dimensionalism2017, Synthese 194(11): 4623-4640.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism may be objected to on grounds that they are too inflexible: the formulations do not seem to allow for enough variety in the views they are paired with. For instance, Kit Fine has noted that formulations of Four-Dimensionalism in terms of instantaneous parts may be too demanding for Four-Dimensionalists who believe nothing is instantaneous. And Trenton Merricks has argued that one can think something persists four-dimensionally without taking it to have proper temporal parts, and claims that our formulation of Four-Dimensionalism should be revised to allow for this. I will add my own worries to those of Fine and Merricks. I will note that current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism are not sufficiently neutral with respect to the structure of time, with respect to how liberally objects decompose into parts, and with respect to whether objects and the regions they fill match in mereological structure. I will show that we can formulate Four-Dimensionalism in a sufficiently neutral way, while still producing a view that can do the work we typically require of Four-Dimensionalism.Comment: A great further reading for a unit on persistence through time - a little too specialised to be a core reading - unless for a masters course, because it requires that readers have a prior (good) understanding of traditional four-dimensionalism. If one's students do have this grasp (e.g. in an MA course) then it could be good to set them the task of reading this paper, and outlining how they think four-dimensionalism entails certain commitments - e.g. not being neutral regarding theories of time.
Steward, Helen. A Metaphysics for Freedom2012, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Publisher's note: A metaphysics for freedom argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. It offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.Comment: Specific chapters (e.g. 1 and 4) would be useful for an advanced philosophy of mind/action course, but also it could be really nice to read the whole book in a dedicated Masters course - reading and discussing one chapter per seminar. Chapter 1 is especially useful because it outlines Steward's position, 'agency incompatibilism' which it could be useful to have students discuss and compare with classical compatibilism and incompatibilism. Chapter 4 is also a great one to use because it discusses animal agency - this could perhaps come towards the end of an intermediate philosophy of mind course - once students have already learned something about agency when considered in relation to humans.
Ney, Alyssa. Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism2016, Analytic Philosophy 57(2): 141-164.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: Physicalism is sometimes portrayed by its critics as a dogma, but there is an empirical argument for the position, one based on the accumulation of diverse microphysical causal explanations in physics, chemistry, and physiology. The canonical statement of this argument was presented in 2001 by David Papineau. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate a tension that arises between this way of understanding the empirical case for physicalism and a view that is becoming practically a received position in philosophy of physics: that microphysics does not support the existence of causal facts (and so does not support causal explanations). Indeed this is a conclusion embraced in recent work by Papineau himself. This paper examines a range of natural ways of avoiding this tension and reconciling the empirical case for physicalism with the rejection of microphysical causation.Comment: A great paper to use as a core reading in either an advanced undergraduate philosophy of mind course, or a Masters philosophy of mind course. Could teach alongside Papineau's 'The Rise of Physicalism' (2001).
Ney, Alyssa. Defining Physicalism2008, Philosophy Compass 3(5): 1033-1048.-
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Greg Miller
Abstract: This article discusses recent disagreements over the correct formulation of physicalism. Although there appears to be a consensus outside those who discuss the issue that physicalists believe that what exists is what is countenanced by physics, as we will see, this orthodoxy faces an important puzzle now frequently referred to as 'Hempel's Dilemma'. After surveying the historical trajectory from Enlightenment-era materialism to contemporary physicalism, I examine several mainstream approaches that respond to Hempel's dilemma, and the benefits and drawbacks of each.Comment: A great paper for an intermediate or advanced metaphysics course that provides a clear and accessible overview of physicalism and its history, but also more detailed discussion around the topic. It canvasses contemporary formulations of physicalism and their problems. This text is helpful for students in supplying them with a strong overview of the debate. Set seminar questions could (for example) ask students to outline Hempel's dilemma, and their preferred response to this dilemma that is discussed by Ney.
Ney, Alyssa. Metaphysics: An Introduction2015, Routledge.-
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Tyron Goldschmidt
Publisher's note: <em>Metaphysics: An Introduction</em> combines comprehensive coverage of the core elements of metaphysics with contemporary and lively debates within the subject. It provides a rigorous and yet accessible overview of a rich array of topics, connecting the abstract nature of metaphysics with the real world. Topics covered include: Basic logic for metaphysics, An introduction to ontology, Abstract objects, Material objects Critiques of metaphysics, Free Will, Time, Modality, Persistence, Causation, Social ontology: the metaphysics of race. This outstanding book not only equips the reader with a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of metaphysics but provides a valuable guide to contemporary metaphysics and metaphysicians. Additional features such as exercises, annotated further reading, a glossary and a companion website www.routledge.com/cw/ney will help students find their way around this subject and assist teachers in the classroomComment: An excellent textbook to use for an introduction to metaphysics course. Provides a great overview of and introduction to topics such as modality, inexistence, causation, time, race, social ontology, and the special composition question. This textbook could be used as the key reading for the whole course.
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Miller, Kristie. Time Travel and the Open Future
2005, Disputatio 19(1): 223-232.
Comment: A nice, short paper that could be a good bridge between teaching Metaphysics of Time and Metaphysics of Time Travel. It would be good to have already taught A-theory vs B Theory first, as well as specific versions of the A theory (although the paper does also give a good overview of some of these).