Yagisawa, Takashi. A New Argument Against the Existence Requirement
2005, Analysis 65 (285): 39-42.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible - worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter 'F' is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one - place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx at t only if x exists at t. Possible worlds are analogous to times. Therefore, (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1973: 503 - 05 and Salmon 1981: 36 - 40). For the second argument, replace 'F' with 'does not exist'. (E) then says that for every x, for every possible world w, x does not exist at w only if x exists at w. This is obviously false. Therefore (E) is false (cf., Kaplan 1977: 498). Despite their considerable appeal, these arguments are not unassailable. The first argument suffers from the weakness inherent in any argument from analogy; the analogy it rests on may not.Comment: A very concise argument against the claim that existence is a prerequisite for having properties. This is a familiar claim, and this paper would be useful when it comes up to show that there is controversy about it. It does presuppose a basic understanding of possible world semantics, so should be reserved for courses where students already have a grasp of such semantics or the instructor wants to teach it beforehand.
Zahle, Julie. The individualism-holism debate on intertheoretic reduction and the argument from multiple realization.
2003, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33.1: 77-99.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Patricia RichAbstract: The argument from multiple realization is currently considered the argument against intertheoretic reduction. Both Little and Kincaid have applied the argument to the individualism-holism debate in support of the antireductionist holist position. The author shows that the tenability of the argument, as applied to the individualism-holism debate, hinges on the descriptive constraints imposed on the individualist position. On a plausible formulation of the individualist position, the argument does not establish that the intertheoretic reduction of social theories is highly unlikely. Nonetheless, the reductive project may run into other potential obstacles. For this reason, it is concluded that the prospect of intertheoretic reduction is uncertain rather than unlikely.Comment: This reading discusses one of the most important arguments in the methodological individualism / holism debate in the philosophy of social science. It is recommended for a philosophy of social science class.
Zhuangzi. Autumn Floods
1968, in B. Watson (trans.), The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press
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Added by: Kas BernaysAbstract:
This chapter presents a dialogue between the Lord of the Yellow River and the Ruo of the North Sea, illustrating Daoist themes of humility, relativism, and the vastness of nature. It challenges narrow perspectives and celebrates the interconnectedness of all things.Comment (from this Blueprint): A primary reading from Zhuangzi, one of the two most significant philosophers in the pre-Qin Daoist tradition. Readers are encouraged to look closely at this chapter for any ecological themes they can discern.
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