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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Early Confucian philosophy is remarkable in its attention to everyday social interactions and their power to steer our emotional lives. Their work on the social dimensions of our moral-emotional lives is enormously promising for thinking through our own context and struggles, particularly, I argue, the ways that public rhetoric and practices may steer us away from some emotions it can be important to have, especially negative emotions. Some of our emotions are bad – unpleasant to experience, reflective of dissatisfactions or even heartbreak – but nonetheless quite important to express and, more basically, to feel. Grief is like this, for example. So, too, is disappointment. In this essay, I explore how our current social practices may fail to support expressions of disappointment and thus suppress our ability to feel it well.
Comment: This essay explores the ways that society and social culture can either facilitate or inhibit our opportunities to practice feeling, experiencing, and managing bad (or undesirable) emotions, and the problems that might be associated with our failure to do so. In particular, the author focuses on the feelings of grief and dissapointment, highlighting their importance in the context of a full and flourishing life. Without them, we may lose other interpersonal and empathetic skills which allow us to live well with others and approach others in good faith. As such, this essay bears obvious relevance to topic areas such as philosophy of death and Confucian philosophy, but also applies more broadly to questions about the practice of virtue, philosophy of emotions, applied/everday ethics, and the cultivation of pro-social habits.
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
The early Confucians recognize that the exchanges and experiences of quotidian life profoundly shape moral attitudes, moral self-understanding, and our prospects for robust moral community. Confucian etiquette aims to provide a form of moral training that can render learners equal to the moral work of ordinary life, inculcating appropriate cognitive-emotional dispositions, as well as honing social perception and bodily expression. In both their astute attention to prosaic behavior and the techniques they suggest for managing it, I argue, the Confucians afford a model useful for appropriation in contemporary efforts to address small but potent moral harms such as microinequities
Comment: This paper explores the bearing of etiquette on moral sensibility, action, and character, through the philosophy of Confucianism and its concept of 'li 禮'. The author draws attention to the fact that early Confucianism placed an uncharacteristic emphasis on the development of good etiquette as a core component of the development of a moral character. She highlights this feature of Confucian ethics, in part, because it runs counter to much of traditional ethical theory in western philosohpy - where manners and etiquette, as mere social norms, are treated as 'notoriously fallible,' imperfect and often arbitrary: not principles on which we would think to base guidelines for moral development. Olberding, however, argues in their favor: that these rules 'arise in sensitivity to human need', and that robust adherence to them cultivates not only our actions but our character when it comes to interacting with other. The argument is especially straightforward and clear, and does not require any advanced or previous exposure to Confucian ethics, making it accessible to a wide range of ability levels. It would make an interesting addition to any introductory course in ethics, but could also be used to augment a more advanced discussion about contemporary ethical debates. (There are notable connections to the work of other contemporary philosophers discussing sociality and need, including Kimberley Brownlee, Soran Reader, and Anca Gheaus.)
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
The Zhuangzi offers two apparently incompatible models of bereavement. Zhuangzi sometimes suggests that the sage will greet loss with unfractured equanimity and even aplomb. However, upon the death of his own wife, Zhuangzi evinces a sorrow that, albeit brief, fits ill with this suggestion. In this essay, I contend that the grief that Zhuangzi displays at his wife’s death better honors wider values averred elsewhere in the text and, more generally, that a sage who retains a capacity for sorrow will be better positioned for the robust joy so often identified as central to the Zhuangzi’s vision of flourishing. The sagely figures who entirely forego sorrow, I argue, achieve equanimity only through a sacrifice of the emotional range and responsiveness necessary not only for grief but also for the delight Zhuangzi recommends.
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Do Lucretius’ vivid evocations of pain and suffering render impotent his therapy for fear of death? Lucretius’ readers have long noted the discord between his avowed aim to provide a rational foundation for cool detachment from death and his impassioned and acute attention to nature’s often cruel brutality. I argue that Lucretius does have a viable remedy for death anxiety but that this remedy significantly departs from Epicurus’ original counsel. Lucretius’ remedy confesses its origins in a heightened, rather than benumbed, sensitivity to the affective and somatic features of human experience, culminating in “the feel of not to feel it.”
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Mundane and often subtle forms of bias generate harms that can be fruitfully understood as akin to the harms evident in rudeness. Although subclinical expressions of bias are not mere rudeness, like rudeness they often manifest through the breach of mannerly norms for social cooperation and collaboration. At a basic level, the perceived harm of mundane forms of bias often has much to do with feeling oneself unjustly or arbitrarily cut out of a group, a group that cooperates and collaborates but does not do so with me. Appealing to the subtle but familiar choreography of mannered social interaction, I argue, makes it easier to recognize how exclusion can be accomplished through slight but symbolically significant gestures and styles of interaction, where bias manifests not in announced hostility but in an absence of the cooperation and collaboration upon which we rely socially.
Comment: This paper explores a manifestation of bias in the form of rudeness (or breaches of good manners) that are specifically attached to social identity. The author targets academic philosophy and the mundane and subtle forms of rudeness that cause, in particular, women to be excluded (and feel excluded) from the discipline, but also makes a more general claim about how the disregard for conventional good manners may make addressing and combatting a wide varity of biases more difficult in many different social contexts. The ideas discussed in the paper bear broad relevance to the philosophical study of bias and exclusion, contemporary feminism, civility and etiquette, and themes in the philosophy of social justice. However, the paper could also be used in discussion about professional and workplace ethics, since it also indirectly considers some normative questions about what kinds of etiquette we should extend to those with whom we cooperate and collaborate.
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Added by: Adriana Clavel-VázquezPublisher’s Note:
Olliz Boyd’s essay examines Blackness in the Latin American literary practices with the aim of showing its centrality to Latin American cultures. He argues that the African heritage of Latin America has been erased as a result of Eurocentric mestizaje. Olliz Boyd first examines this erased heritage in the understanding of race in Latin America and its peculiar processes of racialization, before moving on to centring the analysis on aesthetic practices and literature in particular. Olliz Boyd’s essay examines the erasure of Afro-Latininidad from a perspective that differs from Hooks’ analysis of the erasure of self-identified Afro-Latin communities. He argues that mestizos in general have mixed-race roots that include not just European and Indigenous ancestry, but African as well. The erasure of Afro-Latininidad is, thus, more radical as it involves the negation of an Afro-Latin reality at the heart of mestizaje.Comment (from this Blueprint): Olliz Boyd’s work brings forward the third root of Latin America: the relevance of the African diaspora for the constitution of Latin American identities. An adequate understanding of the complexity of race in Latin America involves not just understanding the erasure of Afro-Latin communities, but the erasure of the contributions of African cultures to mestizo culture. It might be that the latter erasure partly explains the former.
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
An explanation of the Yoruba understanding of rationality, its immediate connection to practical ethics, and its roots in oral Yoruba traditions.Comment (from this Blueprint): By studying Olúwọlé, students can learn this week that African women philosophers have not worked on feminist issues alone. Olúwọlé allows one to learn about a different rationale than the commonly known Western one. This can nicely be juxtaposed with philosophers like Descartes or Kant. Olúwọlé's philosophy of rationality and the connection of this philosophy with Yoruba culture, esp. with Yoruba oral traditions of philosophy, allows to re-evaluate the (seemingly) undeniable evidence of Western philosophy. Furthermore, it also shows some commonalities that were denied in later Western philosophical history (for instance, that at the inception of Western philosophy we do find in Socrates another oral philosopher).
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Added by: Laura JimenezPublisher's note: This unique book challenges the traditional distinction between eros, the love found in Greek thought, and agape, the love characteristic of Christianity. Focusing on a number of classic texts, including Plato's Symposium and Lysis, Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics, and famous passages in Gregory of Nyssa, Origen, Dionysius the Areopagite, Plotinus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, the author shows that Plato's account of eros is not founded on self-interest. In this way, she restores the place of erotic love as a Christian motif, and unravels some longstanding confusions in philosophical discussions of love.Comment: The author’s view represents a new approach to ancient views on eros and its place in the Christian tradition. It is suitable for undergraduate or postgraduate courses on Ethics and Ancient Philosophy. Perfect as a secondary reading for students working on Plato's Symposium and Lysis, or Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordSummary: In this paper, Oshana argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to affirm the Partial-Birth Abortion Act was mistaken. She claims that the Partial-Birth Abortion Act cannot withstand the test of strict scrutiny, that the Act fails to respect the privacy rights of individuals, and that there are compelling reasons (based in autonomy) to allow partial-birth abortion up until the point of fetal viability. As such, she claims, the Act violates the integrity of law.Comment: This text would be excellent to use in a course focused on abortion, any course that covers the suite of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the right to privacy, or a course that wishes to discuss and apply the doctrine of strict scrutiny. While it requires a significant amount of background knowledge (concerning the legislative history on abortion in the United States), it provides an excellent example of applying both the principle of autonomy and the principle of strict scrutiny.
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
The “woman question,” this book asserts, is a Western one, and not a proper lens for viewing African society. A work that rethinks gender as a Western construction, The Invention of Women offers a new way of understanding both Yoruban and Western cultures. Author Oyeronke Oyewumi reveals an ideology of biological determinism at the heart of Western social categories-the idea that biology provides the rationale for organizing the social world. And yet, she writes, the concept of “woman,” central to this ideology and to Western gender discourses, simply did not exist in Yorubaland, where the body was not the basis of social roles. Oyewumi traces the misapplication of Western, body-oriented concepts of gender through the history of gender discourses in Yoruba studies. Her analysis shows the paradoxical nature of two fundamental assumptions of feminist theory: that gender is socially constructed and that the subordination of women is universal. The Invention of Women demonstrates, to the contrary, that gender was not constructed in old Yoruba society, and that social organization was determined by relative age. A meticulous historical and epistemological account of an African culture on its own terms, this book makes a persuasive argument for a cultural, context-dependent interpretation of social reality. It calls for a reconception of gender discourse and the categories on which such study relies. More than that, the book lays bare the hidden assumptions in the ways these different cultures think. A truly comparative sociology of an African culture and the Western tradition, it will change the way African studies and gender studies proceed.Comment (from this Blueprint): A foundational and controversial work of African (feminist) philosophy. Oyěwùmí introduces the idea of gender being a Western construct that has been imposed on African communities. Oyěwùmí provides a perspective on the Western discourse on sex and gender widely unknown within Western philosophical institutions.