Eckert, Maureen. De-centering and Genderqueering Val Plumwood’s Feminist Logic
2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane FairbankAbstract:
The strongest and, until recently, least-explored approach to feminist logic holds that some formal logics have structural features that perpetuate sexism and oppression, whereas other logics are helpful for resisting and opposing these social phenomena. Our choice of logics may not be purely formal on this view: for example, some logics are preferrable to others on the grounds of feminist commitments. This strong account of feminist logic was first articulated by Val Plumwood. We will critically engage salient features of her view, especially her critique of classical logic and the centering and dominating functions she believes classical negation has. We will see that her understanding of classical negation captures neither the development of Intersectional Feminism, nor the position the concept of centering holds in transformative justice. However, Plumwood's critique of classical negation does lead us to a deeper insight regarding which logics to apply in social justice contexts. Robin Dembroff's analysis of genderqueer as a critical gender kind helps us delineate a non-classical context in which a four-valued logic, such as FDE, can structurally account for the critical feature of this gender kind in a way classical logic cannot. We will also observe how four-valued logics precisely capture the destabilization of, and resistance to, the exclusive and exhaustive gender binary categories Dembroff describes.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Edgington, Dorothy. On Conditionals
1995, Mind 104(414): 235-329.
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De CruzSummary: Examines the theory of conditionals and whether it's possible to have a unified theory of them.Comment: Great core text as there are many important discussion points here, and Edginton uses lots of helpful examples. Could set students the task of coming up with their own conditionals, and analysing these in the would/will sense. This definitely requires a background in beginner's logic.
Edgington, Dorothy. Indicative Conditionals
2001, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
The chapter is an introduction to logical treatments of indicative conditionals, comparing truth-functional, non-truth-functional, and suppositional approaches. Some of the topics discussed are truth conditions, conditional belief, assertability, and issues with compounds of conditionals.
Comment: This page can be used in a course focused on the philosophy of conditionals, as an introduction/overview of the basic logical issues; or in any logic course wishing to spend more time on this particular notion.
Eichler, Lauren. Sacred Truths, Fables, and Falsehoods: Intersections between Feminist and Native American Logics
2018, APA Newsletter on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy, 18(1).
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
From the newsletter's introduction: "Lauren Eichler [...] examines the resonances between feminist and Native American analyses of classical logic. After considering the range of responses, from overly monolithic rejection to more nuanced appreciation, Eichler argues for a careful, pluralist understanding of logic as she articulates her suggestion that feminists and Native American philosophers could build fruitful alliances around this topic."
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Elgin, Catherine Z.. True Enough
2004, Philosophical Issues 14 (1): 113-131. also reprinted in Epistemology: and Anthology, Wiley 2008
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: Truth is standardly considered a requirement on epistemic acceptability. But science and philosophy deploy models, idealizations and thought experiments that prescind from truth to achieve other cognitive ends. I argue that such felicitous falsehoods function as cognitively useful fictions. They are cognitively useful because they exemplify and afford epistemic access to features they share with the relevant facts. They are falsehoods in that they diverge from the facts. Nonetheless, they are true enough to serve their epistemic purposes. Theories that contain them have testable consequences, hence are factually defeasible.Comment: In a context in which epistemology takes truth to be a necessary condition for knowledge and falsehood as an immediate knowledge defeater, this paper offers a new perspective on the epistemic value of falsehood as playing an important role both in science and in philosophy. In a nutshell, the author argues that although falsehoods diverge from the facts, they are "true enough" to serve their epistemic purpose. Some of the falsehoods employed both in science and philosophy result in models, idealisations and thought experiments: by sharing and exemplifying relevant features of the facts, they end up being cognitively useful. This could work as secondary literature for a postgraduate course in epistemology and philsoophy of science, insofar as it gives a new perspective on epistemic value falshood can play. In a context in which epistemology takes truth to be a necessary condition for knowledge and falsehood as an immediate knowledge defeater, this paper offers a new perspective on the epistemic value of falsehood as playing an important role both in science and in philosophy. In a nutshell, the author argues that although falsehoods diverge from the facts, they are "true enough" to serve their epistemic purpose. Some of the falsehoods employed both in science and philosophy result in models, idealisations and thought experiments: by sharing and exemplifying relevant features of the facts, they end up being cognitively useful. This could work as secondary literature for a postgraduate course in epistemology and philsoophy of science, insofar as it gives a new perspective on epistemic value falshood can play.
Elsamahi, Mohamed. A ctitique of localized realism
2005, Philosophy of Science 72(5): 1350-1360.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: In an attempt to avert Laudan's pessimistic induction, Worrall and Psillos introduce a narrower version of scientific realism. According to this version, which can be referred to as "localized realism", realists need not accept every component in a successful theory. They are supposed only to accept those components that led to the theory's empirical success. Consequently, realists can avoid believing in dubious entities like the caloric and ether. This paper examines and critiques localized realism. It also scrutinizes Psillos's historical study of the caloric theory of heat, which is intended to support localized realism.Comment: Recommended as further reading for studying scientific realism and anti-realism. Preferable for postgraduate students since previous knowledge of theories in science helps to a better understanding of this article.
Emery, Nina. Chance, Possibility and explanation
2015, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 0(2015): 1–64.
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Added by: Laura JimenezSummary: In this paper the author argues against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, she claims, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of 'chance' and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. Emery suggests an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies.Comment: This could serve as a secondary reading for those studying metaphysic theories of chance. Previous background in metaphysics is needed. The paper is recommended for postgraduate students.
Émilie du Châtelet. Foundations of Physics
2009, Selected Philosophical and Scientific Writings, ed. with an Introduction by Judith P. Zinsser, transl. by Isabelle Bour, Judith P. Zinsser, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 115-200
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: I have always thought that the most sacred duty of men was to give their children an education that prevented them at a more advanced age from regretting their youth, the only time when one can truly gain instruction. You are, my dear son, in this happy age when the mind begins to think, and when the heart has passions not yet lively enough to disturb it.
Now is perhaps the only time of your life that you will devote to the study of nature. Soon the passions and pleasures of your age will occupy all your moments; and when this youthful enthusiasm has passed, and you have paid to the intoxication of the world the tribute of your age and rank, ambition will take possession of your soul; and even if in this more advanced age, which often is not any more mature, you wanted to apply yourself to the study of the true Sciences, your mind then no longer having the flexibility characteristic of its best years, it would be necessary for you to purchase with painful study what you can learn today with extreme facility. So, I want you to make the most of the dawn of your reason; I want to try to protect you from the ignorance that is still only too common among those of your rank, and which is one more fault, and one less merit.
You must early on accustom your mind to think, and to be self-sufficient. You will perceive at all the times in your life what resources and what consolations one finds in study, and you will see that it can even furnish pleasure and delight.Comment: Introduces the conception of scientific revolution and compares it to political revolutions. A quick introduction for undergraduates can be found at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-revolutions/#SciRevTopForHisSci and, more generally, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emilie-du-chatelet/.
Erickson, Evelyn. More Limits of Abductivism About Logic
2025, Studia Logica, 113: 503–322.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
Logical abductivism is the method which purports to use Inference to the Best Explantion (IBE) to determine the best logical theory. The present essay argues that this is not the case, since the method fails to meet the criteria requisite for the fruitful application of IBE. This occurs due to an intrinsic difficulty in choosing the appropriate evidence and theoretical virtues which guide theory revision in logic: one’s previous conception of logic influences both these choices. Logical abductivism fails, moreover, to select the best logical theory, exactly because a lack of agreement on theory and virtues for Logic. Rather than direct comparison between two options, a more suitable approach to theory revision in logic is piecemeal, because this method neither assumes nor needs a neutral ground from which to start revising theories.Comment: This is an accessible introduction to the contemporary debate regarding "abductivism about logic" (not to be confused with "abductive logic"). It might be included in any course on the epistemology of logic, particularly for anyone interested in so-called anti-exceptionalism about logic.
Fausto-Sterling, Anne. Sex/Gender: Biology in a Social world
2012, Routledge.
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Added by: Benny GoldbergPublisher's Note: Sex/Gender presents a relatively new way to think about how biological difference can be produced over time in response to different environmental and social experiences. This book gives a clearly written explanation of the biological and cultural underpinnings of gender. Anne Fausto-Sterling provides an introduction to the biochemistry, neurobiology, and social construction of gender with expertise and humor in a style accessible to a wide variety of readers. In addition to the basics, Sex/Gender ponders the moral, ethical, social and political side to this inescapable subject.Comment: This is a good text for courses in philosophy of science dealing with biology, feminist philosophy (and feminist philosophy of science), as well as courses dealing with issues of sex and gender. While it uses a lot of scientific detail, it is suitable for advanced undergraduates regardless of major.
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