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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
The “woman question,” this book asserts, is a Western one, and not a proper lens for viewing African society. A work that rethinks gender as a Western construction, The Invention of Women offers a new way of understanding both Yoruban and Western cultures. Author Oyeronke Oyewumi reveals an ideology of biological determinism at the heart of Western social categories-the idea that biology provides the rationale for organizing the social world. And yet, she writes, the concept of “woman,” central to this ideology and to Western gender discourses, simply did not exist in Yorubaland, where the body was not the basis of social roles. Oyewumi traces the misapplication of Western, body-oriented concepts of gender through the history of gender discourses in Yoruba studies. Her analysis shows the paradoxical nature of two fundamental assumptions of feminist theory: that gender is socially constructed and that the subordination of women is universal. The Invention of Women demonstrates, to the contrary, that gender was not constructed in old Yoruba society, and that social organization was determined by relative age. A meticulous historical and epistemological account of an African culture on its own terms, this book makes a persuasive argument for a cultural, context-dependent interpretation of social reality. It calls for a reconception of gender discourse and the categories on which such study relies. More than that, the book lays bare the hidden assumptions in the ways these different cultures think. A truly comparative sociology of an African culture and the Western tradition, it will change the way African studies and gender studies proceed.Comment (from this Blueprint): A foundational and controversial work of African (feminist) philosophy. Oyěwùmí introduces the idea of gender being a Western construct that has been imposed on African communities. Oyěwùmí provides a perspective on the Western discourse on sex and gender widely unknown within Western philosophical institutions.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
¿Seguimos reglas de inferencia al razonar? Por más intuitiva que resulte la respuesta positiva a esta pregunta, hay una serie de dificultades para vincular reglas lógicas y prácticas inferenciales. El Problema de la Adopción de Reglas de Inferencia constituye un desafío para todo aquel que proponga que podemos seguir nuevos patrones inferenciales a partir del reconocimiento de reglas. En esta sección temática se exploran diversos asuntos conectados a si podemos seguir un nuevo patrón inferencial en virtud de una regla.
Comment: This is a clear, Spanish-language introduction to the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic.
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: According to an adequacy-for-purpose view, models should be assessed with respect to their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes. Such a view has been advocated by scientists and philosophers alike. Important details, however, have yet to be spelled out. This article attempts to make progress by addressing three key questions: What does it mean for a model to be adequate-for-purpose? What makes a model adequate-for-purpose? How does assessing a model’s adequacy-for-purpose differ from assessing its representational accuracy? In addition, responses are given to some objections that might be raised against an adequacy-for-purpose view.
Comment: A good overview (and a defence) of the adequacy-for-purpose view on models. Makes the case that models should be assessed with respect to their adequacy for particular purposes.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: This article identifies conditions under which robust predictive modeling results have special epistemic significance---related to truth, confidence, and security---and considers whether those conditions hold in the context of present-day climate modeling. The findings are disappointing. When today's climate models agree that an interesting hypothesis about future climate change is true, it cannot be inferred---via the arguments considered here anyway---that the hypothesis is likely to be true or that scientists' confidence in the hypothesis should be significantly increased or that a claim to have evidence for the hypothesis is now more secure
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Added by: Sophie Nagler, Contributed by: Sophie NaglerAbstract:
Much has been said about intuitionistic and classical logical systems since Gentzen’s seminal work. Recently, Prawitz and others have been discussing how to put together Gentzen’s systems for classical and intuitionistic logic in a single unified system. We call Prawitz’ proposal the Ecumenical System, following the terminology introduced by Pereira and Rodriguez. In this work we present an Ecumenical sequent calculus, as opposed to the original natural deduction version, and state some proof theoretical properties of the system. We reason that sequent calculi are more amenable to extensive investigation using the tools of proof theory, such as cut-elimination and rule invertibility, hence allowing a full analysis of the notion of Ecumenical entailment. We then present some extensions of the Ecumenical sequent system and show that interesting systems arise when restricting such calculi to specific fragments. This approach of a unified system enabling both classical and intuitionistic features sheds some light not only on the logics themselves, but also on their semantical interpretations as well as on the proof theoretical properties that can arise from combining logical systems.
Comment: A relatively light-touch and philosophically focussed introduction to ecumenical proof systems, i.e. sequent calculi that combine aspects of different logics. Suitable for discussion in a class on philosophy of logic class or on proof theory if more philosophically focussed. Also potentially usable for a class on logical pluralism.
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
The author argues that there is a strong connection between the dualisms that have strengthened and naturalized systematic oppression across history (man/woman, reason/emotion, etc.), and "classical" logic. It is suggested that feminism's response should not be to abandon logic altogether, but rather to focus on the development of alternative, less oppressive forms of rationality, of which relevant logics provide an example.
Comment (from this Blueprint): This is a seminal text of feminist logic, and thus a natural pick for any course wanting to discuss the topic. It could however also be assigned in a course on relevant logics interested in discussing particular applications, especially if such a course has previously spent time on the arguments in Plumwood's "False laws of logic" (or more generally, in Sylvan&co's "Relevant logics and their rivals"). Eckert and Donahue's "Towards a Feminist Logic" is a useful reading companion.
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
Introduction: Plumwood’s second essay uses logical distinctions to map the difficult terrain of feminist theories of difference. By carefully distinguishing among forms of difference, Plumwood refutes attempts by some feminist theorists to identify dichotomous thinking with oppressive thinking.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Helpful in clarifying the views presented in Plumwood's "The politics of reason: towards a feminist logic". It is also a possible pick for any course interested in looking specifically at negation from feminist perspectives, in which case it is best paired with some of the feminist critiques of negation she challenges (e.g. Nancy Jay's "Gender and dichotomy", or Frye's "The necessity of differences").
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Anya PlutynskiAbstract: The discussion of the adaptive landscape in the philosophical literature appears to be divided along the following lines. On the one hand, some claim that the adaptive landscape is either 'uninterpretable' or incoherent. On the other hand, some argue that the adaptive landscape has been an important heuristic, or tool in the service of explaining, as well as proposing and testing hypotheses about evolutionary change. This paper attempts to reconcile these two views.Comment: I use this in my philosophy of biology class to discuss the use of metaphor and analogy in science.
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Melissa Vergara Fernandez
Abstract: Since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, economic research and instruction in South Africa have become far more quantitative and technically sophisticated. In this paper, I trace and discuss reasons for these developments, and I argue that this quantification of economics should not be at the expense of exchanges with qualitative data that fail the criterion of being representative, or with other disciplines that are less quantitative. With South Africa’s complex history, persistent inequality and considerable cultural diversity, economics has much to gain from interdisciplinary collaboration and mixed methods research.
Comment: Excellent account of an economist about how mixed methods allow her to answer the questions that purely econometric ones wouldn't allow her to.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: A common argument against explanatory reductionism is that higher-level explanations are sometimes or always preferable because they are more general than reductive explanations. Here I challenge two basic assumptions that are needed for that argument to succeed. It cannot be assumed that higher-level explanations are more general than their lower-level alternatives or that higher-level explanations are general in the right way to be explanatory. I suggest a novel form of pluralism regarding levels of explanation, according to which explanations at different levels are preferable in different circumstances because they offer different types of generality, which are appropriate in different circumstances of explanation.Comment: An interesting anti-anti-reductionist article. Would be useful in a discussion of explanatory power or levels of explanation in a philosophy of science course.