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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: Appropriation art has often been thought to support the view that authorship in art is an outmoded or misguided notion. Through a thought experiment comparing appropriation art to a unique case of artistic forgery, I examine and reject a number of candidates for the distinction that makes artists the authors of their work while forgers are not. The crucial difference is seen to lie in the fact that artists bear ultimate responsibility for whatever objectives they choose to pursue through their work, whereas the forger's central objectives are determined by the nature of the activity of forgery. Appropriation artists, by revealing that no aspect of the objectives an artist pursues are in fact built in to the concept of art, demonstrate artists' responsibility for all aspects of their objectives and, hence, of their products. This responsibility is constitutive of authorship and accounts for the interpretability of artworks. Far from undermining the concept of authorship in art, then, the appropriation artists in fact reaffirm and strengthen it.Jackson, Jennifer. Telling the Truth1991, Journal of Medical Ethics 17(1): 5-9.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Are doctors and nurses bound by just the same constraints as everyone else in regard to honesty? What, anyway, does honesty require? Telling no lies? Avoiding intentional deception by whatever means? From a utilitarian standpoint lying would seem to be on the same footing as other forms of intentional deception: yielding the same consequences. But utilitarianism fails to explain the wrongness of lying. Doctors and nurses, like everyone else, have a prima facie duty not to lie - but again like everyone else, they are not duty-bound to avoid intentional deception, lying apart; except where it would involve a breach of trust.Comment: Useful in teaching on applied ethics issues related to trust, and general values in normative ethics. To provide an interesting narrative and selection of views, this text can be used alongside Jennifer Saul's 'Just go ahead and lie' and Clea Rees' 'Better lie!'
Jackson, Jennifer. An Introduction to Business Ethics1996, London: Blackwell.-
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Publisher’s Note:
Publisher: This book is a concise overview of the relevance and application of moral philosophy to all those involved in business and employment. It is the ideal introduction for beginning students of applied philosophy, business or management ethics.Comment: This is an excellent introduction to business ethics for undergraduate students, presented mostly from a virtue ethics perspective. It is written in a very accessible way and chapters are concluded with sets of study questions. The book can be used as a textbook in applied and business ethics modules, though it might be useful to supplement it with some more general introduction to ethical theory and other readings which are not embedded in virtue ethics.
Jackson, Jennifer. Common Codes: Divergent Practices1994, In Chadwick, Ruth (ed.), Ethics and the Professions. Avebury: Ashgate.-
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Comment: Jackson explores the differences between variations in application and in interpretation of codes of ethics in professional settings, and argues that differences in application need not be problematic. She distinguishes aspirational obligations and obligations imposing side constraints in codes of ethics, and argues that they should not be confused. The text is most useful in teaching applied and professional ethics classes on codes of ethics, but can also offer a good further reading in introduction to ethics modules which aim to show the practical relevance of moral philosophy.
Jackson, Jennifer. Ethics in medicine: Virtue, Vice and Medicine2006, Cambridge: Polity.-
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Publisher’s Note:
Publisher: How, in a secular world, should we resolve ethically controversial and troubling issues relating to health care? Should we, as some argue, make a clean sweep, getting rid of the Hippocratic ethic, such vestiges of it as remain? Jennifer Jackson seeks to answer these significant questions, establishing new foundations for a traditional and secular ethic which would not require a radical and problematic overhaul of the old. These new foundations rest on familiar observations of human nature and human needs. Jackson presents morality as a loose anatomy of constituent virtues that are related in different ways to how we fare in life, and suggests that in order to address problems in medical ethics, a virtues–based approach is needed. Throughout, attention is paid to the role of philosophy in medical ethics, and how it can be used to clarify key notions and distinctions that underlie current debates and controversial issues. By reinstating such concepts as justice, cardinal virtue, and moral duty, Jackson lays the groundwork for an ethics of health care that makes headway toward resolving seeming dilemmas in medical ethics today. This penetrating and accessible book will be invaluable to students of sociology and health care, as well as those who are interested in the ethical uncertainties faced by the medical world.Comment: Particularly useful in teaching is Chapter 10 which discusses abortion, reviewing arguments made by J.J. Thompson and M. Tooley, and enquiring into what makes killing wrong. Chapter 9 looks at distributive justice in medicine, reviewing some problematic cases and distinguishing between bad luck and injustice. Chapter 5 treats on conscientious objection and issues related to toleration and imposition of values.
Jackson, Jennifer. Truth, trust and medicine2001, London: Routledge.-
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Publisher’s Note:
Publisher: Truth, Trust and Medicine investigates the notion of trust and honesty in medicine, and questions whether honesty and openness are of equal importance in maintaining the trust necessary in doctor-patient relationships. Jackson begins with the premise that those in the medical profession have a basic duty to be worthy of the trust their patients place in them. Yet questions of the ethics of withholding information and consent and covert surveillance in care units persist. This book boldly addresses these questions which disturb our very modern notions of a patient's autonomy, self-determination and informed consent.Comment: This text is best used as a further reading in medical, professional and applied ethics courses. It is very detailed and thorough in its approach, but some chapters can be used as more introductory standalone texts. In particular, chapters 3 and 4 offer a good discussion on 'Why truthfulness matters' and 'What truthfulness requires', and chapters 2 and 9 look critically at lying or withholding information for the benefit of the patient.
Jackson, Jennifer C.. Toleration in the Abortion Debate1992, In: Bromham D.R., Dalton M.E., Jackson J.C., Millican P.J.R. (eds) Ethics in Reproductive Medicine. Springer, London pp 189-200-
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Added by: Barbara Cohn, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: What methods, what strategies, is it defensible for us to employ when campaigning on a contentious moral issue? What kinds of intolerance may we legitimately manifest towards the opposition in our endeavour to win converts and influence opinion? Could we be justified in refusing on principle even to engage with the opposition in public debate? And what of the legitimacy of 'playing' on people's emotions, or of not correcting misinformation put about by some of our supporters which helps our cause? Or, in making use of premises in argument that our opponents accept but we do not or, of appealing to arguments that we know to be invalid but by which the opposition may be taken in?Comment:
Jaggar, Alison. What is Terrorism, Why is it Wrong, and Could it Ever Be Morally Justified?2005, Journal of Social Philosophy 36(2): 202-217.-
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Added by: Carl Fox
Content: Starts with a nice historical discussion of the emergence of the term 'terrorism' and some of the ways that it changed before and after the 9/11 attacks. Jaggar offers a specification of the concept and then her own conception, which can be practiced by governments and international bodies, and then discusses several kinds of conflict in which it may be deployed as a tactic. Here is her definition: "Terrorism is the use of extreme threats or violence designed to intimidate or subjugate governments, groups, or individuals. It is a tactic of coercion intended to promote further ends that in themselves may be good, bad or indifferent. Terrorism may be practiced by governments or international bodies or forces, sub-state groups or even individuals. Its threats or violence are aimed directly or immediately at the bodies or belongings of innocent civilians but these are typically terrorists’ secondary targets; the primary targets of terrorists are the governments, groups or individuals that they wish to intimidate" (2005: 209).Comment: Would make good required reading on the subject of terrorism.
Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Presupposition and Consent2020, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly. 6(4).-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
I argue that “consent” language presupposes that the contemplated action is or would be at someone else’s behest. When one does something for another reason—for example, when one elects independently to do something, or when one accepts an invitation to do something—it is linguistically inappropriate to describe the actor as “consenting” to it; but it is also inappropriate to describe them as “not consenting” to it. A consequence of this idea is that “consent” is poorly suited to play its canonical central role in contemporary sexual ethics. But this does not mean that nonconsensual sex can be morally permissible. Consent language, I’ll suggest, carries the conventional presupposition that that which is or might be consented to is at someone else’s behest. One implication will be a new kind of support for feminist critiques of consent theory in sexual ethics.Comment (from this Blueprint): Here Ichikawa argues that the language of "consent" to sex presupposes that there is a 'requester' who asks for sex and a 'consenter' who then replies yes or no. Ichikawa argues that this reinforces sexist norms of how sex works.
Jenkins, David, Kimberley Brownlee. What a Home Does2022, Law and Philosophy 41 (4):441-468-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Analytic philosophy has largely neglected the topic of homelessness.
The few notable exceptions, including work by Jeremy Waldron and Christopher
Essert, focus on our interests in shelter, housing, and property rights, but ignore the
key social functions that a home performs as a place in which we are welcomed,
accepted, and respected. This paper identifies a ladder of home-related concepts
which begins with the minimal notion of temporary shelter, then moves to persistent
shelter and housing, and finally to the rich notion of a home which focuses on meeting
our social needs including, specifically, our needs to belong and to have meaningful
control over our social environment. This concept-ladder enables us to distinguish
the shelterless from the sheltered; the unhoused from the housed; and the unhomed
from the homed. It also enables us to decouple the concept of a home from property
rights, which reveals potential complications in people’s living arrangements. For
instance, a person could be sheltered but unhoused, housed but homeless, or, indeed,
unhoused but homed. We show that we should reserve the concept of home to
capture the rich idea of a place of belonging in which our core social needs are met.Comment: This paper provides an in-depth exploration of existing analytic literature on the concept of home and the topic of homelessness, and provides a novel account of both. As such, it would be a useful addition to any syllabus interested in social ethics, social rights, and social needs. It could be used as a specialised reading for courses interested in questions of justice regarding access to a home or exploring the sorts of needs which constitute social needs. It is also written in a clear, straightforward style, and is therefore accessible to a wide range of experience levels, so it would be possible to use in a more introductory or general context as well. For an intro-level social or political philosohpy, for example, it could be used to introduce or supplement discussions on social welfare or duties of the state.
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Irvin, Sherri. Appropriation and authorship in contemporary art
2005, British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2):123-137.
Comment: