Topic: Social Philosophy -> Gender Sex and Sexuality
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Hursthouse, Rosalind. Virtue, Theory and Abortion
1991, Philosophy & public affairs 20(3): 223-246.

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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or of what would be involved in thinking about a real moral issue in its terms. In the first half I aim particularly to secure an understanding that will reveal that many of these criticisms are simply misplaced, and to articulate what I take to be the major criticism of virtue theory. I reject this criticism, but do not claim that it is necessarily misplaced. In the second half I aim to deepen that understanding and highlight the issues raised by the criticisms by illustrating what the theory looks like when it is applied to a particular issue, in this case, abortion.
Comment: Most useful as further reading in two contexts: (1) the ethics of abortion and the use of virtue ethics in determining its moral status; (2) virtue ethics, its relations with deontology and utilitarianism, and objections against it, with a discussion of the problem of abortion supporting the value of the neo-Aristotelian theory.
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Hutchings, Kimberley, Owens, Patricia. Women Thinkers and the Canon of International Thought: Recovery, Rejection, and Reconstitution
2021, American Political Science Review, 115 (2): 347–59.

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Added by: Rebecca Buxton
Abstract:
Canons of intellectual “greats” anchor the history and scope of academic disciplines. Within international relations (IR), such a canon emerged in the mid-twentieth century and is almost entirely male. Why are women thinkers absent from IR’s canon? We show that it is not due to a lack of international thought, or that this thought fell outside established IR theories. Rather it is due to the gendered and racialized selection and reception of work that is deemed to be canonical. In contrast, we show what can be gained by reclaiming women’s international thought through analyses of three intellectuals whose work was authoritative and influential in its own time or today. Our findings question several of the basic premises underpinning IR’s existing canon and suggest the need for a new research agenda on women international thinkers as part of a fundamental rethinking of the history and scope of the discipline.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In this paper, Hutchings and Owens put forward a new research agenda for women's international thought. This can help us to think though how new canon's might be created or transformed. The paper therefore begins to project of bringing women back into intellectual history.
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Hutchison, Katrina, Fiona Jenkins (eds.). Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?
2013, Oxford University Press USA.

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Added by: Sara Peppe
Publisher's Note: Despite its place in the humanities, the career prospects and numbers of women in philosophy much more closely resemble those found in the sciences and engineering. This book collects a series of critical essays by female philosophers pursuing the question of why philosophy continues to be inhospitable to women and what can be done to change it. By examining the social and institutional conditions of contemporary academic philosophy in the Anglophone world as well as its methods, culture, and characteristic commitments, the volume provides a case study in interpretation of one academic discipline in which women's progress seems to have stalled since initial gains made in the 1980s. Some contributors make use of concepts developed in other contexts to explain women's under-representation, including the effects of unconscious biases, stereotype threat, and micro-inequities. Other chapters draw on the resources of feminist philosophy to challenge everyday understandings of time, communication, authority and merit, as these shape effective but often unrecognized forms of discrimination and exclusion. Often it is assumed that women need to change to fit existing institutions. This book instead offers concrete reflections on the way in which philosophy needs to change, in order to accommodate and benefit from the important contribution women's full participation makes to the discipline.
Comment: This book offers a detailed analysis about how women's role in philosophy is perceived and all the viable ways to chage the status quo. This can be used for undergraduate women studies courses or feminist philosophy courses.
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Inness, Julie C.. Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation
1996, OUP USA.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Publisher's Note: This book undermines privacy scepticism, proving a strong theoretical foundation for many of our everyday and legal privacy claims. Inness argues that intimacy is the core of privacy, including privacy appeals in tort and constitutional law. She explores the myriad of debates and puts forth an intimacy and control-based account of privacy which escapes these criticisms.
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Ipadeola, Abosede Priscilla. African Philosophy and the Shackles of Androcentrism
2022, in Feminist African Philosophy. Women and the Politics of Difference. 1st ed. London: Routledge

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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc Gwodog
Abstract:
The book argues that women's perspectives and gender issues must be mainstreamed across African philosophy in order for the discipline to truly represent the thoughts of Africans across the continent. African philosophy as an academic discipline emerged as a direct challenge to Western and Eurocentric hegemonies. It sought to actualize the project of decolonization and to contribute African perspectives to global discourses. There has, however, been a dominance of male perspectives in this field of human knowledge. This book argues that African philosophy cannot claim to have liberated people of African descent from marginalization until the androcentric nature of African philosophy is addressed. Key concepts such as Ujamaa, Negritude, Ubuntu, Consciencism, and African Socialism are explored as they relate to African women's lives or as models of inclusion or exclusion from politics. In addition to offering a feminist critique of African philosophy, the book also discusses topics that have been consistently overlooked in African philosophy. These topics include sex, sexuality, rape, motherhood, prostitution, and the low participation of women in politics. By highlighting the work of women feminist scholars such as Oyeronke Oyewumi, Nkiru Nzegwu, Ifi Amadiume, Amina Mama, and Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, the book engages with African philosophy from an African feminist viewpoint. This book will be an essential resource for students and researchers of African philosophy and gender studies.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Ipadeola's work not only addresses the problem of the marginalization of African women philosophers but also allows us to understand that this problem has a massive impact on philosophy itself. Students can find in these two chapters (1) a solid overview of the androcentric problem and (2) an epistemological approach to how to solve not only the androcentric problem, but the problem of suppressive thought in general by claiming that whatever is used to suppress can no longer be understood as knowledge but as not-knowledge. This not-knowledge lacks any argumentative power. This is one of the most ingenious recent African ideas in philosophy.
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Ipadeola, Abosede Priscilla. African Women, Illogicality and Epistemic Tyranny
2022, in Feminist African Philosophy. Women and the Politics of Difference. 1st ed. London: Routledge

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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc Gwodog
Abstract:
The book argues that women's perspectives and gender issues must be mainstreamed across African philosophy in order for the discipline to truly represent the thoughts of Africans across the continent. African philosophy as an academic discipline emerged as a direct challenge to Western and Eurocentric hegemonies. It sought to actualize the project of decolonization and to contribute African perspectives to global discourses. There has, however, been a dominance of male perspectives in this field of human knowledge. This book argues that African philosophy cannot claim to have liberated people of African descent from marginalization until the androcentric nature of African philosophy is addressed. Key concepts such as Ujamaa, Negritude, Ubuntu, Consciencism, and African Socialism are explored as they relate to African women's lives or as models of inclusion or exclusion from politics. In addition to offering a feminist critique of African philosophy, the book also discusses topics that have been consistently overlooked in African philosophy. These topics include sex, sexuality, rape, motherhood, prostitution, and the low participation of women in politics. By highlighting the work of women feminist scholars such as Oyeronke Oyewumi, Nkiru Nzegwu, Ifi Amadiume, Amina Mama, and Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, the book engages with African philosophy from an African feminist viewpoint. This book will be an essential resource for students and researchers of African philosophy and gender studies.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Ipadeola's work not only addresses the problem of the marginalization of African women philosophers but also allows us to understand that this problem has a massive impact on philosophy itself. Students can find in these two chapters (1) a solid overview of the androcentric problem and (2) an epistemological approach to how to solve not only the androcentric problem, but the problem of suppressive thought in general by claiming that whatever is used to suppress can no longer be understood as knowledge but as not-knowledge. This not-knowledge lacks any argumentative power. This is one of the most ingenious recent African ideas in philosophy.
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Irigaray, Luce. Is the Subject of Science Sexed?
1987, Hypatia, 2 (3): 65-87, trans. C. Bové

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
The premise of this paper is that the language of science, like language in general, is neither asexual nor neutral. The essay demonstrates the various ways in which the non-neutrality of the subject of science is expressed and proposes that there is a need to analyze the laws that determine the acceptability of language and discourse in order to interpret their connection to a sexed logic.
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Irigaray, Luce. The “Mechanics” of Fluids
1985, In This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. C. Porter and C. Burke

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
The paper argues that science's focus on the ideal and stable hides, and thus contributes to the silencing of, the real and fluid, which corresponds to womanhood.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Irigaray, Luce, Carlston, Erin G.. The Language of Man
1989, Cultural Critique, 13: 191-202

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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:
This paper enumerates Irigaray's main arguments and thoughts regarding the gendered nature of language and "the logos".
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Irvin, Sherri. Appropriation and authorship in contemporary art
2005, British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2):123-137.

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: Appropriation art has often been thought to support the view that authorship in art is an outmoded or misguided notion. Through a thought experiment comparing appropriation art to a unique case of artistic forgery, I examine and reject a number of candidates for the distinction that makes artists the authors of their work while forgers are not. The crucial difference is seen to lie in the fact that artists bear ultimate responsibility for whatever objectives they choose to pursue through their work, whereas the forger's central objectives are determined by the nature of the activity of forgery. Appropriation artists, by revealing that no aspect of the objectives an artist pursues are in fact built in to the concept of art, demonstrate artists' responsibility for all aspects of their objectives and, hence, of their products. This responsibility is constitutive of authorship and accounts for the interpretability of artworks. Far from undermining the concept of authorship in art, then, the appropriation artists in fact reaffirm and strengthen it.
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