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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
In light of the impact of work on human flourishing, an intractable problem for political theorists concerns the distribution of meaningful work in a community of moral equals. This article reviews a number of partial solutions that a well-ordered society could draw upon to provide equality of opportunity for eudemonistically meaningful work and to minimize the impact of bad work upon those who perform it. Even in view of these solutions, however, it is not likely that opportunities for meaningful work can be guaranteed for all people, which carries an implication that, even in well-ordered societies, it is likely that not all people will flourish. The author argues that the limitedness of meaningful work is not a reason to reject the normative claim that meaningful work is integral in flourishing, nor is it a reason against working to transform social and political institutions to increase opportunities for meaningful work.
Comment: This paper highlights the central importance, for an equal society, of answering questions about distribution of meaningful work, and more specifically, whether it is even possible for all people in such a society to have some access to it. It addresses the normative challenges that arise when thinking about routine, or as the author describes, 'eudaimonistically meaningless' work in a society in which the flourishing of any member is presumed to be equal in importance and value to that of any other member. As such, this article would be useful as a secondary or supplementary reading when examining the topics of labor distribution, divisions of labor, meaningful work and work as a finite good, as well as courses that more generally cover topics in political theory, justice and fairness, critiques of capitalism, and socialist philosophy. In this text, Veltman surveys an wide array of the philosophical and adjacent literatures on meaningful work and work distribution, and as such, may also be a useful resource for getting a broad sense contemporary academic discussion on these topics.
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper examines Simone de Beauvoir's account of marriage in The Second Sex and argues that Beauvoir's dichotomy between transcendence and immanence can provide an illuminating critique of continuing gender inequities in marriage and divisions of domestic work. Beauvoir's existentialist ethics not only establishes a moral wrong in marriages in which wives perform the second shift of household labor but also supports the need to transform existing normative expectations surrounding wives and domestic work.
Comment: This paper revisits the contemporary literature on the gendered divisions of household labour and argues for a new ethical framework based on Simone de Beauvoir's analysis of marriage in terms of transcendence and immanence. According to Beauvoir, 'marriage is oppressive and involves a moral wrong when it facilitates the transcendence of one spouse by relegating the other to the round of relatively uncreative chores needed to maintain life in the home.' Veltman also argues that, contrary to a common reading of de Beauvoir's account, de Beauvoir does not reject marriage per se, but in fact leaves open the opportunity for reform, such that a marriage 'has the potential to support equitable unions between free beings.' For this reason, the paper may be useful as specialised or further reading for courses interested in contemporary feminist critiques, the work of Simone de Beauvoir, or more broadly, 20th Century feminism. In addition, it also offers an interesting discussion of housework and domestic labor which may prove useful in the context of courses examining work and gendered divisions of labour. It would also be well paired with the work of Hannah Arendy, and another of Veltman's essays, "Simone de Beauvoir and Hannah Arendt on Labor."
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Sridhar VenkatapuramSummary: Social factors have a powerful influence on human health and longevity. Yet the social dimensions of health are often obscured in public discussions due to the overwhelming focus in health policy on medical care, individual-level risk factor research, and changing individual behaviours. Likewise, in philosophical approaches to health and social justice, the debates have largely focused on rationing problems in health care and on personal responsibility. However, a range of events over the past two decades such as the study of modern famines, the global experience of HIV/AIDS, the international women’s health movement, and the flourishing of social epidemiological research have drawn attention to the robust relationship between health and broad social arrangements.Comment: This text is considered to be one of the core text of the areas of health justice. theories of social justice applied to health and health inequalities. It extends the capabilities approach to health, and makes an argument for moral right to health capability.
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Added by: Rossen VentzislavovSummary: Vergine's account of the formative years of performance art takes stock of the many innovative strategies artists developed for re-engaging the human body. One of the crucial dimensions of this reengagement is the positioning of one's body in physical proximity with others. This happens in art through the bodily negotiation of basic dichotomies such as nature/artifice, ethos/pathos, agency/abandon, publicity/privacy, mortality/immortality etc. Vergine sees objects, and the body's undifferentiated objecthood, as active participants in the performative communication and communion between artist and audience. These forms of togetherness stand or fall on the intensity of all parties' affective investment, but they are also equally affected by the level of intellectual mutuality an art work occasions. According to Vergine, the demand for intelligent analysis and deep understanding that performance art places on its audience is balanced out by the artists' bodily presence. For her the artist's body does not serve merely as a mechanical expedient. It also "contributes to the life of consciousness and memory in a psycho-physical parallelism of processes that assume meaning and relief only when they are connected."Comment: This text offers a historical overview of our concept of the human body in the context of art. It can be useful in any class on body aesthetics, performance art, or dance.
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Rosa VinceAbstract: This paper defends the claim that there are two previously underexplored ways in which pornography silences women. These ways that pornography silences are (1) the smothering of refusal and (2) the smothering of sexual assault reports, and they can be explained in part through Kristie Dotson’s account of “testimonial smothering.” Unlike the work of other writers in the pornography as silencing literature, my discussion of silenced refusal of sex deals with the cases where women have said yes to sex but would have said no if they had felt that they could have. I show that this, and cases where women do not report sexual assault, count as testimonial smothering through identifying rape myths as a species of “pernicious ignorance.” I make the connection to pornography in presenting evidence that pornography contributes to acceptance of rape myths. This takes us to my general conclusion: Dotson’s account of testimonial smothering gives us a way in which pornography contributes to the silencing of women, by silencing their refusal of sex and their reports of sexual assault.Comment: This paper can be used as a stand-alone argument for how some pornography might silence women, or can be viewed as part of the literature on silencing and pornography; as an alternative strategy to Rae Langton's approach, using Kristie Dotson's work instead of J L Austin's. It can also be used as an example of how Kristie Dotson's work on Testimonial Injustice has broad application.
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This paper explores a neglected normative dimension of algorithmic opacity in the workplace and the labor market. It argues that explanations of algorithms and algorithmic decisions are of noninstrumental value. That is because explanations of the structure and function of parts of the social world form the basis for reflective clarification of our practical orientation toward the institutions that play a central role in our life. Using this account of the noninstrumental value of explanations, the paper diagnoses distinctive normative defects in the workplace and economic institutions which a reliance on AI can encourage, and which lead to alienation.
Comment: This paper offers a novel approach to the exploration of alienation at work (i.e., what makes work bad) from an algorithmic ethics perspective. It relies on the noninstrumental value of explanation to make its central argument, and grounds this value in the role that explanation plays in our ability to form a practical orientation towards our scoial world. In this sense, it examines an interesting, and somewhat underexplored, connection between algorithmic ethics, justice, the future of work, and social capabilities. As such, it could be useful in a wide range of course contexts. This being said, the central argument is fairly complex, and relies on some previous understanding of analytic political philosophy and philosophy of AI. It also employs technical language from these domains, and therefore would be best utilised for masters-level or other advanced philosophical courses and study.
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This article argues for a right to explanation, on the basis of its necessity to protect the interest in what I call informed self- advocacy from the serious threat of opacity. The argument for the right to explanation proceeds along the lines set out by an interest- based account of rights (Section II). Section III presents and motivates the moral importance of informed self- advocacy in hierarchical, non- voluntary institutions. Section IV argues for a right to so- called rule- based normative and causal explanations, on the basis of their necessity to protect that interest. Section V argues that this protection comes at a tolerable cost.
Comment: This paper asserts a right to explanation grounded in an interest in informed self-advocacy, the term the author uses to describe a cluster of abilities to represent one's interests and values to decision-makers and to further those interests and values within an institution. Vredenburgh also argues that such form of self-advocacy are necessary for hierarchical, non-voluntary institutions to be legitimate and fair - and it is on these grounds that a person may reasonably reject insitutional set-ups that prevent them from engaging in these abilities. In this sense, Vredenburgh's argument applies to a broader set of problems then simply algorithmic opacity - they may feasibly be applied to cases in which systems (such as bureacratic ones) deny an individual this right to explanation. Therefore, this paper presents an argument which would be useful as further or specialised reading in a variety of classroom contexts, including courses or reading groups addressing technological and algorithmic ethics, basic political rights, bureacratic ethics, as well as more general social and political philosophical courses. It might be interesting, for example, to use it to in an introductory social/political course to discuss with students some of the ethical questions that are particular to a 21st century context. As systems become more complex and individuals become further removed from the institutional decision-making that guides/rules/directs their lives, what right do we have to understand the processes that condition our experience? In what other situations might these rights become challenged?
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Added by: Kas Bernays
Report Summary: Rarely has a Māori river claim been so persistently maintained as that of the Whanganui people. Uniquely in the annals of Māori settlement, the country’s longest navigable river is home to just one iwi, the Atihau-a-Paparangi. It has been described as the aortic artery, the central bloodline of that one heart. The Atihau-a-Paparangi claim to the authority of the river has continued unabated from when it was first put into question. The tribal concern is evidenced by numerous petitions to Parliament from 1887. In addition, legal proceedings were commenced as early as 1938, in the Māori Land Court, on an application for the investigation of the title to the riverbed. From there the action passed to the Māori Appellate Court in 1944, the Māori Land Court again in 1945, the Supreme Court in 1949, to a further petition and the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1950, to a reference to the Court of Appeal in 1953, to a reference to the Māori Appellate Court in 1958 and to a decision of the Court of Appeal in 1962. This may represent one of the longest set of legal proceedings in Māori claims history, yet in all those proceedings, it is claimed, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi had no direct bearing. Nor did the matter rest there for the court hearings were followed by further petitions and investigations, and in more recent times, Atihau-a-Paparangi were again involved in the Catchment Board inquiry on minimum river flows in 1988 and in the Planning Tribunal and High Court hearings on the same matter in 1989, 1990 and 1992.
Comment (from this Blueprint): The Whanganui River Report famously led to the recognition of the Whanganui River as a legal person in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The selected fragment from this report offers a detailed account, presented by claimants in their own words, of the Māori views toward the natural world which led to this ruling.
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Added by: Rebecca BuxtonAbstract:
In “Sex, Lies, and Bigotry: The Canon of Philosophy” I explore several questions: What does it mean for our understanding of the history of philosophy that women philosophers have been left out and are now being retrieved? What kind of a methodology of the history of philosophy does the recovery of women philosophers imply? Whether and how excluded women philosophers have been included in philosophy? Whether and how feminist philosophy and the history of women philosophers are related? I also explore the questions “Are there any themes or arguments that are common to many women philosophers?” and “Does inclusion of women in the canon require a reconfiguration of philosophical inquiry?” I argue that it is either ineptness or simple bigotry that led most historians of philosophy to intentionally omit women’s contributions from their histories and that such failure replicated itself in the university curricula of recent centuries and can be remedied by suspending for the next two centuries the teaching of men’s contributions to the discipline and teaching works by women only. As an alternative to this drastic and undoubtedly unpopular solution, I propose expanding the length and number of courses in the philosophy curriculum to include discussion of women’s contributions.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this scathing chapter, Waithe argues that people who have left women out of the history of philosophy are either inempt of bigoted. Rather than being an accidental fact of women's general exclusion, she argues that women philosophers have been ignored intentionally.
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Added by: Erich Hatala MatthesSummary: Walsh and Lopes argue that some appropriation can be beneficial and productive: in particular, the appropriation of elements of dominant culture by members of culturally marginalized groups. They explore this idea through discussion of such appropriative artwork by a number of contemporary First Nations artists, which they argue challenges "the assumed alignment of appropriator with oppressor and appropriatee with victim"(227).Comment: This text serves as a useful counterpoint to the general framework employed in much of the other cultural appropriation literature. It is also a useful selection for course units focusing on art practice.