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Wang, Robin. Dao Becomes Female
2017, In Garry, A., Khader, S.J. and Stone, A (eds.) New York: Routledge, pp. 35–38

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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner
Abstract: Daoism, a Dao based and inspired teaching and practice, has been considered to be the philosophy of yielding in Chinese intellectual history. One important aspect of yielding is being rou 柔—soft, gentle, supple—which the Daodejing couples with the feminine. Not surprisingly, then, the female and femininity have enormous significance for Laozi and Daoism. To highlight this unique philosophical aspect of Daoism, this chapter will place femininity/the feminine/the female center stage to investigate Daoist thought and its possible contribution to feminist thought in a contemporary global setting. In this chapter I promote a somewhat female consciousness of Dao, or a Daoist female consciousness, which may expand, support, or alter feminist assumptions about femininity/the feminine/the female. The overarching focal point of this understanding lies in a depiction of the female and femininity as a cosmic force, a way of knowing, and a strategy for leading a flourishing life. The main points are that Dao does not govern actually existing gender relations—or, at least, that the social and political reality of gender relations is not modeled on Dao, because the patriarchy is not Dao. Highlighting the female or feminine aspect of Dao, or Dao as becoming female, is a feminist intervention, using resources from within classical Daoist thought in order to re-imagine or reconfigure gender for our time.
Comment: A useful way of introducing some feminist thought into a course on classical Chinese philosophy. It would fit well either in a unit on Daoism or in a unit on feminism. It would be tough to use this in a feminist course to introduce some Daoist thought; the chapter is tricky without some familiarity with the Daodejing
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Wee, Cecilia. Xin, Trust, and Confucius’ Ethics
2011, Philosophy East and West, 61 (3): 516-533.

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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Ian James Kidd
Abstract: Confucius frequently employs the term xin 信 in the Analects. The frequency of his usage suggests that xin has a significant place within his ethics. The main aim of this article is to offer an account of the roles played by xin within Confucius' ethics. To have a clear understanding of these roles, however, one needs first to understand what Confucius encompasses within his notion of xin. The article begins by delineating the Confucian conception of xin, as presented in the Analects. The notion of xin is often taken to be isomorphic with the notion of trust. I argue that Confucius' notion of xin does not quite map onto the notion of trust as usually understood in contemporary Western contexts. To understand better what Confucian xin amounts to, I compare and contrast the Confucian conception of xin with contemporary Western accounts of trust by Baier, McLeod, and Mullin. This comparison helps elucidate what xin is as well as how xin relates to morality. With this in hand, the roles that Confucius ascribes to xin in social and political contexts are then delineated.
Comment: Clear discussion of Confucian conceptions of trustworthiness and trust and their roles in the moral life. Useful for those who want to do comparative work with Chinese philosophy.
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Wong, David. Zhuangzi and the Obsession with Being Right
2005, History of Philosophy Quarterly 22(2), pp. 91-107.
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Added by: Lea Cantor
Abstract:

Since Zhuangzi laments the human obsesssion with being right, he would be highly amused at the scholarly obsession with being right on the meaning of his text, especially on the matter of whether he ultimately believed in a right versus wrong. The fact is that he invites our obsession by raising the question and then refusing to answer it. In chapter two, we are invited to take a stance above the debating Confucians and Mohists. What one shis 是 the other feis 非 (what is 'right' for one is 'not right' for the other); what one feis the other shis. Argument is powerless to declare a victor. Zhuangzi asks, "Are there really shi and fei, or really no shi and fei?".

Comment: This remains one of the best and most accessible articles on the philosophy of the classical Daoist text Zhuangzi. It offers one of the clearest accounts in anglophone literature of the text's sceptical stance, highlighting the ethical and political stakes of disputes (including among Confucian and Mohist philosophers) to which the Zhuangzi refers in different parts of the text. The article does not presuppose any knowledge of classical Chinese, of the Zhuangzi, or of Chinese philosophy. The article makes a strong case for reading the Zhuangzi as displaying a sophisticated sceptical stance, the character of which will be of interest to anyone interested in scepticism quite generally (both ancient and modern). The article might be easily integrated into a general course on scepticism, the history of philosophy, classical Chinese philosophy, and/or Daoist philosophy.
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Wong, David, Hourdequin, Marion. Hiding the World in the World: A Case for Cosmopolitanism Based in the Zhuangzi
2019, In Ames, Roger T. and Hershock, Peter (eds.), Philosophies of Place: An Intercultural Conversation (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press): 15–33

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, Contributed by: Tammo Lossau
Abstract:
As a species, we have long been both settled and mobile, with some of us rooted in place and others more migratory. Mobility is not a new feature of human life; however, contemporary forms of mobility diminish geographical, cultural, and ecological rootedness and bring together people with many diverse ways of life. This cultural interchange offers both challenges and opportunities: challenges as people encounter unfamiliar contexts and navigate values and perspectives that differ radically from their own; and opportunities as new perspectives can generate new insights and possibilities for living well together. Along with this cultural exchange, there are significant pressures to reach common moral understanding on issues such as climate change, migration, humanitarian intervention, and responses to poverty. Global discourse is no longer governed exclusively by international political realism, and moral reasons are frequently invoked in international debates. In light of these contexts, many believe that we should view the world as a single moral community—we should be cosmopolitans—but precisely what this entails remains subject to debate. Do the Confucian Analects and the early Daoist text, the Zhuangzi, offer resources relevant to the contexts just described and to understanding what forms contemporary cosmopolitanism might take? The first, theoretical/textual portion of this chapter answers affirmatively, showing how insights can be gleaned from both traditions and how these insights complement one another. The Analects illustrates the importance of certain forms of rootedness and con nection for moral personhood, suggesting that cosmopolitanism needs to make space for sustained relations and take seriously the significance of culture. On the other hand, the Zhuangzi cautions against fixating too strongly on a single outlook and casts doubt on claims of a single, uniquely correct moral point of view. The second part of the chapter considers the relevance of these perspec tives for contemporary debates over cosmopolitanism and human rights. There we critique approaches that place too much weight on a universal moral minimum and show how both Confucian and Zhuangian insights may inform a genuinely multicultural cosmopolitanism.
Comment: Good elaboration on the political implications of teh Zhuangzi. This text can be placed alongside Confucian writings on politics and ethics, to bring out the rivaling Daoist view. It could also be used in a course that covers muticulturalism as an idea.
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Xi, Zhu. Chapter 34 Part B: The Complete Works of Chu Hsi
1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.
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Xiangshan, Lu. Recorded Sayings
2009, In Ivanhoe, Philip (ed.), Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company
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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:

This volume provides selected translations from the writings of Lu Xiangshan; Wang Yangming; and the Platform Sutra, a work which had profound influence on neo-Confucian thought. Each of these three sections is preceded by an introduction that sketches important features of the history, biography, and philosophy of the author and explores some of the main features and characteristics of his work. The range of genres represented—letters, recorded sayings, essays, meditations and poetry—provide the reader with insights into the philosophical and stylistic themes of this fascinating and influential branch of neo-Confucian thought.

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Xuanzang. Chapter 23: Buddhist Idealism – Hsüan-tsang of theConsciousness-Only School
1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Xunzi. Chapter Nine: Xunzi
2023, In Ivanhoe, Philip and Van Norden, Bryan (eds.), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 3rd edition. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
The third edition of Ivanhoe and Van Norden's acclaimed anthology builds on the strengths of previous editions with the addition of new selections for each chapter; selections from Shen Dao; a new translation of the writings of Han Feizi; selections from two texts, highly influential in later Chinese philosophy, the Great Learning and Mean ; and a complete translation of the recently discovered text Nature Comes from the Mandate . Each section of this volume begins with a brief Introduction and concludes with a lightly annotated Selective Bibliography. Also included are four appendices: Important Figures, Important Periods, Important Texts, and Important Terms.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
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Yagisawa, Takashi. Possible Objects
2005, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. Online: Stanford University.

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approach, which has been influenced by the philosophy of Alexius Meinong. The Meinongian approach is relevant to theorizing about possible objects because it attempts to construct a general theory of objects other than ordinary concrete existing objects. Independently of the debate about the nature of possible worlds or about Meinongianism, it is not always as straightforward as it may at first appear to determine whether putative possible objects are indeed possible. Another category of object similar to that of a possible object is the category of a fictional object. Although initially attractive, the idea that fictional objects are possible objects should not be accepted blindly. An important instance of theoretical usefulness of possible objects is their central role in the validation of two controversial theorems of a simple quantified modal logic.
Comment: A good introduction to the different positions on possible objects, including their impact on modal logic. Would be a good starting point for a discussion of these issues in a metaphysics course, or as an introduction to these positions for an ontology of art/fiction course.
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Yagisawa, Takashi. Against Creationism in Fiction
2001, Noûs 35(s15): 153-172.

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist "in the world of" the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists "in the world of" the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pre-theoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist "in the world of" the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim.
Comment: A good argument against the existence of fictional characters. Clear presentation of the logic involved in various claims. In addition to ontology of art, the case of fictional characters can be an interesting way to present the arguments about ontology and linguistic commitment more generally, and this paper would be useful in that role as well.
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