Adrian Piper. Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception
2008, APRA Foundation Berlin
Topics: Historiography of Philosophy; Identity and Change; Metaethics; Theoretical Epistemology
Keywords: Critique of Pure Reason; Hume; Kant; agency; coherence; integrity; moral behaviour; moral justification; moral motivation
Keywords: Critique of Pure Reason; Hume; Kant; agency; coherence; integrity; moral behaviour; moral justification; moral motivation
Traditions: Critical; Historical; North American
Languages: English
Figures: David Hume; Immanuel Kant
Languages: English
Figures: David Hume; Immanuel Kant
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Added by: Sara PeppePublisher’s Note:
Adrian Piper argues that the Humean conception can be made to work only if it is placed in the context of a wider and genuinely universal conception of the self, whose origins are to be found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This conception comprises the basic canons of classical logic, which provide both a model of motivation and a model of rationality. These supply necessary conditions both for the coherence and integrity of the self and also for unified agency. The Kantian conception solves certain intractable problems in decision theory by integrating it into classical predicate logic, and provides answers to longstanding controversies in metaethics concerning moral motivation, rational final ends, and moral justification that the Humean conception engenders. In addition, it sheds light on certain kinds of moral behavior – for example, the whistleblower – that the Humean conception is at a loss to explain.
Difficulty: Advanced
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Akins, Kathleen. What is it Like to Be Boring and Myopic?
1993, in Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, ed. B Dahlbom, Blackwell, 124-160.
Topics: Consciousness; Grammar and Meaning; Intentionality; Language and Mind; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: aural; consciousness; experience; perception; visual
Keywords: aural; consciousness; experience; perception; visual
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Summary: A response to Thomas Nagel's famous paper "What is it Like to be a Bat?". Akins uses neuroscientific data to argue that we can find out that bats may not actually have a point of view, and that, contrary to Nagel, this kind of objective study can bring us closer to understanding individuals' subjective experiences, not further away.Comment: As "What is it Like to be a Bat?" is frequently taught, this paper serves as an interesting counterpoint response to it, providing an alternative perspective. A bit technical and heavy on hard neuroscience, but full understanding of that part is not essential to grasping the basic argument.
Difficulty: Advanced
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Akins, Kathleen. Of sensory systems and the “aboutness” of mental states
1996, Journal of Philosophy 93(7): 337-372.
Topics: Cognitive Science; Intentionality; Mental States and Processes
Keywords: neurology; objectivity; perception; sensation; sensory-motor
Keywords: neurology; objectivity; perception; sensation; sensory-motor
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Summary: The author presents a critique of the classical conception of the senses assumed by the majority of naturalist authors who attempt to explain mental content. This critique is based on neurobiological data on the senses that suggest that they do not seem to describe objective characteristics of the world, but instead act "narcissistically", so to speak, representing information depending on the specific interests of the organism.Comment: This paper provides a good explanation of the integrated sensory-motor approach in philosophy of mind and how it differs from the classical conception. A good, easy to understand presentation of a challenge to the naive view that the senses give us objective information about the way the world is.
Difficulty: Easy
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Akins, Kathleen. A bat without qualities?
1993, In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. pp. 345--358.
Topics: Consciousness; Metaphysics of Mind and Body
Keywords: Nagel; consciousness; psychology; science
Keywords: Nagel; consciousness; psychology; science
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Discusses the alleged elusiveness of phenomenal consciousness / argues . . . that there is no way of telling ahead of time just what science will reveal to us / if we start from the thought that science can shed some light upon an alien point of view, we may well find ourselves with the intuition, nevertheless, that there is something that science must leave out / perhaps science can reveal the shape or structure of experience, but it leaves out the tone or shading / perhaps science can make plain to us the representational properties of experience, but it is silent about the phenomenal feel argues that this intuition . . . is to be resisted because it rests upon the flawed idea that we can separate the qualitative from the representational aspects of experience: the idea that it makes sense to try to imagine an experience that is qualitatively just like the visual experience that I am having now, but represents quite different objects and properties in the worldComment: This paper can be used as further reading on a session on consciousness. Although it presupposes familiarity with Thomas Nagel's "What is it like to be a a bat?", it can also be used as mandatory reading.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory or further readingComments (0): read and add advice on using this textExport citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Akkitiq, Atuat, Akpaliapak Karetak, Rhoda. Inunnguiniq (Making a Human Being)
2017, In: Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit: What Inuit Have Always Known to be True. Joe Karetak, Frank Tester, Shirley Tagalik (eds.), Fernwood Publishing.
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Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin PharrAbstract:
The Inuit have experienced colonization and the resulting disregard for the societal systems, beliefs and support structures foundational to Inuit culture for generations. While much research has articulated the impacts of colonization and recognized that Indigenous cultures and worldviews are central to the well-being of Indigenous peoples and communities, little work has been done to preserve Inuit culture. Unfortunately, most people have a very limited understanding of Inuit culture, and often apply only a few trappings of culture -- past practices, artifacts and catchwords --to projects to justify cultural relevance. Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit -- meaning all the extensive knowledge and experience passed from generation to generation -- is a collection of contributions by well- known and respected Inuit Elders. The book functions as a way of preserving important knowledge and tradition, contextualizing that knowledge within Canada's colonial legacy and providing an Inuit perspective on how we relate to each other, to other living beings and the environment.Comment:
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Alcoff, Linda. Is the Feminist Critique of Reason Rational?
1995, Philosophical Topics, 23 (2): 1-26
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane FairbankAbstract:
Recent criticism of feminist philosophy poses a dilemma. Feminism is taken to be a substantive set of empirical claims and political commitments, whereas philosophy is taken to be a discipline of thought organized by the pursuit of truth, but uncommitted to any particular truth. This paper responds to this dilemma, and defends the project of feminist philosophy.The first task toward understanding the feminist critique of reason, Alcoff argues, is to historically situate it within the rather long tradition of critiquing reason that has existed within the mainstream of philosophy itself.Comment:
available in this Blueprint
Difficulty: Intermediate
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Alcoff, Linda Martin. On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?
2000, In Naomi Zack (ed.), Women of Color and Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 235-262.
Topics: Culture; Gender Sex and Sexuality; Race; Social Epistemology
Keywords: epistemology; feminism; identity; politics
Keywords: epistemology; feminism; identity; politics
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Abstract: In assessing the likely credibility of a claim or judgment, is it ever relevant to take into account the social identity of the person who has made the claim? There are strong reasons, political and otherwise, to argue against the epistemic relevance of social identity. However, there are instances where social identity might be deemed relevant, such as in determinations of criminal culpability where a relatively small amount of evidence is the only basis for the decision and where social prejudices can play a role in inductive reasoning. This paper explores these issues.Comment:
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Alcoff, Linda Martin. Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self
2006, Oxford University Press.
Topics: Gender Sex and Sexuality; Personal and Social Identity; Race
Keywords: Latino identiy; conformism; essentialism; gender; identity; mestizo; race; racism; reductive approaches
Keywords: Latino identiy; conformism; essentialism; gender; identity; mestizo; race; racism; reductive approaches
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Publisher's Note: Visible Identities critiques the critiques of identity and of identity politics and argues that identities are real but not necessarily a political problem. Moreover, the book explores the material infrastructure of gendered identity, the experimental aspects of racial subjectivity for both whites and non-whites, and in several chapters looks specifically at Latio identity.Comment:
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Alexander, Larry, Hurd, Heidi, Westen, Peter. Consent Does Not Require Communication: A Reply to Dougherty
2016, Law and Philosophy. 35: 655-660.
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
Tom Dougherty argues that consenting, like promising, requires both an appropriate mental attitude and a communication of that attitude.Thus, just as a promise is not a promise unless it is communicated to the promisee, consent is not consent unless it is communicated to the relevant party or parties. And those like us, who believe consent is just the attitude, and that it can exist without its being communicated, are in error. Or so Dougherty argues. We, however, are unpersuaded. We believe Dougherty is right about promises, but wrong about consent. Although each of us gives a slightly different account of the attitude that constitutes consent, we all agree that consent is constituted by that attitude and need not be communicated in order to alter the morality of another’s conduct.Comment (from this Blueprint): The authors argue that consent is an attitude, rather than an act of communication. They give two examples to support this view where the communication of consent doesn’t occur or goes wrong somehow, but nonetheless (they claim) it is intuitively a consensual interaction.
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Alfred, Gerald Taiaiake. Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom
2005, University of Toronto Press.
Topics: Applied Ethics; Culture; Freedom and Rights; Justice; Personal and Social Identity
Keywords: anarcho-indigenism; colonialism; resistance; violence
Keywords: anarcho-indigenism; colonialism; resistance; violence
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Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin PharrPublisher’s Note:
The word Wasáse is the Kanienkeha (Mohawk) word for the ancient war dance ceremony of unity, strength, and commitment to action. The author notes, "This book traces the journey of those Indigenous people who have found a way to transcend the colonial identities which are the legacy of our history and live as Onkwehonwe, original people. It is dialogue and reflection on the process of transcending colonialism in a personal and collective sense: making meaningful change in our lives and transforming society by recreating our personalities, regenerating our cultures, and surging against forces that keep us bound to our colonial past."Comment:
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Difficulty: Easy-Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory with overviewComments (0): read and add advice on using this text
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Comment: Best discussed alongside Kantian and Humean texts. In particular, the work considered requires prior knowledge of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Hume's conception of the self.