Root, Deborah. Fat-Eaters and Aesthetes: The Politics of Display
1996, in Cannibal Culture: Art, Appropriation, and the Commodification of Difference. USA: Westview Press.
Topics: Culture; Ethics and Socio-Politics of Aesthetics; Individual Arts and Crafts
Keywords: art; colonialism; consumption; culture; power
Keywords: art; colonialism; consumption; culture; power
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Added by: Erich Hatala MatthesSummary: Root employs Méxica mythology as a lens for revealing the consumptive, and even cannibalistic, character of power. In particular, she points to the way colonial power sets up Westerners as "experts" and arbiters of art and culture, presenting appreciation of culture as a pretext for violence and control.Comment: This chapter serves as an introduction to Root's booklength study of these themes, so the presentation only gestures at these relationships and provides a brief selection of examples that illustrate them. However, if can be useful for raising initial questions about the relationships among power, art, and culture. It provides a counterpoint to a more sanguine perspective on cross-cultural appreciation expressed by Thomas Heyd in "Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation."Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: FurtherComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Roskies, Adina L.. Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility
2006, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10(9): 419-423.
Topics: Applied Ethics; Free Will; Mental States and Processes; Metaethics; Neuroscience
Keywords: ethics; free will; neuroethics; neuroscience; responsibility
Keywords: ethics; free will; neuroethics; neuroscience; responsibility
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract: Recent developments in neuroscience raise the worry that understanding how brains cause behavior will undermine our views about free will and, consequently, about moral responsibility. The potential ethical consequences of such a result are sweeping. I provide three reasons to think that these worries seemingly inspired by neuroscience are misplaced. First, problems for common-sense notions of freedom exist independently of neuroscientific advances. Second, neuroscience is not in a position to undermine our intuitive notions. Third, recent empirical studies suggest that even if people do misconstrue neuroscientific results as relevant to our notion of freedom, our judgments of moral responsibility will remain largely unaffected. These considerations suggest that neuroethical concerns about challenges to our conception of freedom are misguided.Comment: Roskies offers an overview of the debate, providing useful glossary of positions related to it together with a graph representing the relations between them. This can be particularly useful when explaining the differences between the metaphysical, epistemic and ethical claims made in this debate.
Ross, Steven, Warenski, Lisa. Socratic Metaethics Imagined
2017, Sophia and Philosophia 1.3., 1-8
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: A time machine mysteriously appeared one day in ancient Athens. Curious about the future of philosophical dialogue, Socrates entered the device and traveled to the 21st Century. He spent several months in the United Kingdom and United States discussing metaethics before returning to Athens, now a devoted and formidable quasi-realist moral genderexpressivist.
Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Rudder Baker, Lynne. Death and the Afterlife
2005, in William J. Wainwright (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Topics: Afterlife; Metaethics; Normative Ethics
Keywords: death; personal identity; philosophy of the afterlife
Keywords: death; personal identity; philosophy of the afterlife
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Monotheistic conceptions of an afterlife raise a philosophical question: In virtue of what is a postmortem person the same person who lived and died? Four standard answers are surveyed and criticized: sameness of soul, sameness of body or brain, sameness of soul-body composite, sameness of memories. The discussion of these answers to the question of personal identity is followed by a development of my own view, the Constitution View. According to the Constitution View, you are a person in virtue of having a first-person perspective, and a postmortem person is you if and only if that person has the same first-person perspective. The Christian doctrine of resurrection has three features: (i) a postmortem person is embodied; (ii) a postmortem person is identical to some premortem person; and (iii) the postmortem person owes existence to a miracle. I show how the Constitution View accommodates these three features.Comment: Useful for an introductory philosophy of religion course, or a more specialised course on the afterlife. Because of the personal identity aspects here, Rudder Baker's account could also be applied to reincarnation: does the constitution view work here? Is it harder to maintain personal identity in reincarnation cases than in other cases of surviving our death?Difficulty: Easy, IntermediateRecommended use: Introductory, OverviewComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Rudder Baker, Lynne. Is the first-person perspective gendered?
2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 41-53
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Added by: Adriana Alcaraz Sanchez and Jodie RussellAbstract:
The notion of gender identity has been characterized as "one's sense of oneself as male, female or transgender." To have a sense of oneself at all, one must have a robust first-person perspective - a capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself in the first person. A robust first-person perspective requires that one have a language complex enough to express thoughts like "I wonder how I am going to die." Since a robust first-person perspective requires that one have a language, and languages embed whole worldviews, the question arises: in learning a language, does the robust first-person perspective itself introduce gender stereotypes? Without denying that we unconsciously acquire attitudes about gender that shape our normative expectations, this chapter argues that one's gender identity is not just attributable to the biases implicit in the language one speaks. So the robust first-person perspective itself is not responsible for which gender-specific attitudes a person acquires.Comment (from this Blueprint): Rudder Baker's chapter on the first-person perspective and gender identity is a great starting place to begin thinking about what it means to experience the world through the lens of gender. Rudder Baker's chapter also poses interesting thought experiements, such as whether a disembodied being would have a gender idetity (she argues "no") or whether it is possible to live in a gender-less society. The chapter also introduces the reader to the necessary conditons by which we might want to say that someone has a gender identity andso is a fruitful springboard for further and deeper discussions about not only gender, but language and personal identity more broadly.Difficulty: Easy, IntermediateRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Ruether, Rosemary R.. Symbolic and Social Connections of the Oppression of Women and the Domination of Nature
1999, in Adams, C. J. (eds), Ecofeminism and the sacred, New York: Continuum.
Topics: Applied Ethics; Gender Sex and Sexuality; Justice; Law and Public Policy; Sustainability
Keywords: culture; ecofeminism; ecology; feminism
Keywords: culture; ecofeminism; ecology; feminism
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Comment: This text offers an introduction to ecofeminism. It discusses the history of associating maleness with culture and femaleness with nature and identifies some of the issues which led to the current ecological crisis. The text has the potential to challenge received views and inspire a lively discussion, and as such it is best used as an introductory text in classes on environmental ethics and on feminist ethics.Difficulty: EasyRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Ruetsche,Laura. Interpreting Quantum Theories: The art of the possible
2011, Oxford University Press.
Topics: Logic and Mathematics; Modality; Physical Sciences
Keywords: quantum field theory; quantum mechanics; scientific realism
Keywords: quantum field theory; quantum mechanics; scientific realism
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Added by: Laura JimenezPublisher's Note: Traditionally, philosophers of quantum mechanics have addressed exceedingly simple systems: a pair of electrons in an entangled state, or an atom and a cat in Dr. Schrodinger's diabolical device. But recently, much more complicated systems, such as quantum fields and the infinite systems at the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics, have attracted, and repaid, philosophical attention. Interpreting Quantum Theories has three entangled aims. The first is to guide those familiar with the philosophy of ordinary QM into the philosophy of 'QM infinity', by presenting accessible introductions to relevant technical notions and the foundational questions they frame. The second aim is to develop and defend answers to some of those questions. Does quantum field theory demand or deserve a particle ontology? How (if at all) are different states of broken symmetry different? And what is the proper role of idealizations in working physics? The third aim is to highlight ties between the foundational investigation of QM infinity and philosophy more broadly construed, in particular by using the interpretive problems discussed to motivate new ways to think about the nature of physical possibility and the problem of scientific realism.Comment: Really interesting book for postgraduate courses involving the study of interpretative theories of Quantum Mechanics. The argument is focused on the quantum theory of systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom. The philosophical approach is defended through careful attention to scientific details.Difficulty: AdvancedRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Ruth Garrett Millikan. Truth, Rules, Hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein Paradox
1990, Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-53
Topics: Grammar and Meaning; Truth and Truthmaking
Keywords: Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox; meaning; paradox; truth; truth rules
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Hannah Ginsborg
Abstract: "[T]he sceptical argument that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, and even the 'sceptical solution', are of considerable importance regardless of whether they are clearly Wittgenstein's. The naturalistically inclined philosopher, who rejects Brentano's irreducibility and yet holds intentionality to be an objective feature of our thoughts, owes a solution to the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox." The challenge is a welcome one. Although I will argue that the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox is not a problem for naturalists only, I will propose a naturalist solution to it. (Should the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox prove to be soluble from a naturalist standpoint but intractable from other standpoints, that would, I suppose, constitute an argument for naturalism.) Then I will show that the paradox and its solution have an important consequence for the theories of meaning and truth. The Kripke-Wittgenstein arguments which pose the paradox also put in question Dummett's and Putnam's view of language understanding. From this view it follows that truth rules must be "verificationist rules" that assign assertability conditions to sentences, rather than "realist rules" that assign correspondence truth conditions. The proposed solution to the paradox suggests another view of language understanding, according to which a speaker can express, through his language practice, a grasp of correspondence truth rules.
Comment: Can be assigned alongside Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* as part of an undergraduate course in the theory of meaning or the philosophy of language. Engaging and sparks good discussion.Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Ryan, Sharon. Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality
2012, Acta Analytica, 27(2): 99-112.
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: After surveying the strengths and weaknesses of several well-known approaches to wisdom, I argue for a new theory of wisdom that focuses on being epistemically, practically, and morally rational. My theory of wisdom, The Deep Rationality Theory of Wisdom, claims that a wise person is a person who is rational and who is deeply committed to increasing his or her level of rationality. This theory is a departure from theories of wisdom that demand practical and/or theoretical knowledge. The Deep Rationality Theory salvages all that is attractive, and avoids all that is problematic, about theories of wisdom that require wise people to be knowledgeable.Comment: Very good as background reading on the topic of wisdom, particulary in the first ha;f of the paper where the author offers a good overview of the main theories of wisdom that could be classified into three categories: i) the ones focusing on epistemic humility, ii) the ones focusing on acquisition of knowledge, iii) the ones focusin on well living.Difficulty: Easy, IntermediateRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Ryan, Sharon. Wisdom
1996, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Topics: Mental States and Processes; Theoretical Epistemology
Keywords: epistemic humility; epistemic rationality; wisdom
Keywords: epistemic humility; epistemic rationality; wisdom
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Added by: Giada FratantonioIntroduction: What is wisdom? Philosophers, psychologists, spiritual leaders, poets, novelists, life coaches, and a variety of other important thinkers have tried to understand the concept of wisdom. This entry will provide a brief and general overview, and analysis of, several philosophical views on the topic of wisdom. It is not intended to capture the many interesting and important approaches to wisdom found in other fields of inquiry. Moreover, this entry will focus on several major ideas in the Western philosophical tradition. In particular, it will focus on five general approaches to understanding what it takes to be wise: (1) wisdom as epistemic humility, (2) wisdom as epistemic accuracy, (3) wisdom as knowledge, (4) a hybrid theory of wisdom, and (5) wisdom as rationality.Comment: Excellent entry on the epistemology of wisdom. Essential as background reading.Difficulty: Easy, IntermediateRecommended use: OverviewComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
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