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Added by: Hans Maes
Summary: The gender of both artist and sitter needs to be taken into account when considering the history of portraiture. Explores how and why women were often portrayed in certain roles (as goddesses, historical or religious figures, allegorical embodiments of abstract notions). Discusses why many women artists before the 20th century were portraitists and considers a few examples. Also highlights changing notions of masculinity in portraiture.West, Shearer. What is a Portrait?2004, In: Portraiture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-41.-
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Added by: Hans Maes
Summary: Explores three fundamental claims: (1) portraits can be placed on a continuum between the specificity of likeness and the generality of type; (2) all portraits represent something about the body and face, on the one hand, and the soul, character, or virtues of the sitter, on the other; (3) all portraits involve a series of negotiations – often between artist and sitter, but sometimes there is also a patron who is not included in the portrait. NB: In the Introduction preceding this chapter West also questions the cliché that portraits are an invention of the Renaissance and an exclusively Western phenomenon.Comment: This text offers a great introduction to the topic of portraiture and an overview of the subject. It can also be useful in a wider context of depiction and representation.
Artworks to use with this text:
Jan Van Eyck, Madonna With Chancellor Rolin (1433) vs Rogier van der Weyden, The Donor, Chancellor Rolin, Kneeling in Prayer; from the reverse of Last Judgment Polyptych (1445)
A comparison of these two paintings reveals how likenesses are always mediated by the varying functions of portraits and the distinct styles of the artists.
Angelica Kauffmann, Portrait of J.W. Goethe (1787-8)
For women artists such as Kauffmann the control of the gaze during sessions with male sitters could be socially uncomfortable but empowering. This text offers a great introduction to the topic of portraiture and an overview of the subject. It can also be useful in a wider context of depiction and representation.
Artworks to use with this text:
Jan Van Eyck, Madonna With Chancellor Rolin (1433) vs Rogier van der Weyden, The Donor, Chancellor Rolin, Kneeling in Prayer; from the reverse of Last Judgment Polyptych (1445)
A comparison of these two paintings reveals how likenesses are always mediated by the varying functions of portraits and the distinct styles of the artists.
Angelica Kauffmann, Portrait of J.W. Goethe (1787-8)
For women artists such as Kauffmann the control of the gaze during sessions with male sitters could be socially uncomfortable but empowering.
Wetzel, Linda. Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects2009, MIT Press.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Publisher's Note: There is a widely recognized but infrequently discussed distinction between the spatiotemporal furniture of the world (tokens) and the types of which they are instances. Words come in both types and tokens - for example, there is only one word type 'the' but there are numerous tokens of it on this page - as do symphonies, bears, chess games, and many other types of things. In this book, Linda Wetzel examines the distinction between types and tokens and argues that types exist (as abstract objects, since they lack a unique spatiotemporal location). Wetzel demonstrates the ubiquity of references to (and quantifications over) types in science and ordinary language; types have to be reckoned with, and cannot simply be swept under the rug. Wetzel argues that there are such things as types by undermining the epistemological arguments against abstract objects and offering extended original arguments demonstrating the failure of nominalistic attempts to paraphrase away such references to (and quantifications over) types. She then focuses on the relation between types and their tokens, especially for words, showing for the first time that there is nothing that all tokens of a type need have in common other than being tokens of that type. Finally, she considers an often-overlooked problem for realism having to do with types occurring in other types (such as words in a sentence) and proposes an important and original solution, extending her discussion from words and expressions to other types that structurally involve other types (flags and stars and stripes; molecules and atoms; sonatas and notes).Comment: The book, or extracts from the book, could be used in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, nominalism or philosophy of language. Chapter 2 of the book provides a clear account of the ways Quine and Frege thought about ontological commitment and language. Chapters 3-5 are also useful for students who want to understand nominalism better, though more recent nominalist strategies, such as the kinds of fictionalism developed by Mark Balaguer and Mary Leng, are not addressed.
Wetzel, Linda. The Trouble With Nominalism2000, Philosophical Studies 98(3): 361-370.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Wetzel raises an important but underdiscussed argument for Platonism. We quantify over types (contrast with tokens) in sentences that we take to be true. This means we are, prima facie, committed to the existence of types. Wetzel considers various 'nominalization' strategies to get rid of type discourse and finds them all wanting. As a result, argues Wetzel, nominalism is untenable.Comment: This would be useful in a course on metaphysics, ontology, or any course in which the debate between nominalists and platonists is an issue. The paper is short, clear, and relatively untechnical. It raises an important dispute in metaphysics which has not received as much attention as it deserves.
Wetzel, Linda. Types and Tokens2006, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. Online: Stanford University.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Abstract: The distinction between a type and its tokens is a useful metaphysical distinction. In §1 it is explained what it is, and what it is not. Its importance and wide applicability in linguistics, philosophy, science and everyday life are briefly surveyed in §2. Whether types are universals is discussed in §3. §4 discusses some other suggestions for what types are, both generally and specifically. Is a type the sets of its tokens? What exactly is a word, a symphony, a species? §5 asks what a token is. §6 considers the relation between types and their tokens. Do the type and all its tokens share the same properties? Must all the tokens be alike in some or all respects? §7 explains some problems for the view that types exist, and some problems for the view that they don't. §8 elucidates a distinction often confused with the type-token distinction, that between a type (or token) and an occurrence of it. It also discusses some problems that occurrences might be thought to give rise to, and one way to resolve them.Comment: Would be useful in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics or philosophy of language. Though Wetzel's goal is, ultimately, to address metaphysical questions about the existence of types, the type/token distinction crops up in many areas of philosophy, and this would be an excellent reference point for explaining what the distinction amounts to. Though the entry is on the less-discussed topic of types, it is also relevant to the more-discussed topic of universals. This would be very suitable for an undergraduate course in metaphysics or philosophical logic. It would also work well at the beginning of a masters course in metaphysics or philosophical logic. This is a particularly good alternative to Wetzel's book "Types and Tokens" if that is unavailable at your institution.
Wiesler, Christine. Epistemic Oppression and Ableism in Bioethics2020, Hypatia. 35: 714–732.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-TurnerAbstract:
Disabled people face obstacles to participation in epistemic communities that would be beneficial for making sense of our experiences and are susceptible to epistemic oppression. Knowledge and skills grounded in disabled people's experiences are treated as unintelligible within an ableist hermeneutic, specifically, the dominant conception of disability as lack. My discussion will focus on a few types of epistemic oppression—willful hermeneutical ignorance, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic imperialism—as they manifest in some bioethicists’ claims about and interactions with disabled people. One of the problems with the epistemic phenomena with which I am concerned is that they direct our skepticism regarding claims and justifications in the wrong direction. When we ought to be asking dominantly situated epistemic agents to justify their knowledge claims, our attention is instead directed toward skepticism regarding the accounts of marginally situated agents who are actually in a better position to know. I conclude by discussing disabled knowers’ responses to epistemic oppression, including articulating the epistemic harm they have undergone as well as ways of creating resistant ways of knowing.Comment (from this Blueprint): Wieseler draws on resources developed by feminists and disability theorists to critique the practice of philosophical bioethics (bioethics done by philosophers). In particular, she argues that philosophical bioethics involves and perpetuates ableism. Among its many problems, this ableism is epistemically fraught. It interferes with disabled people’s ability to participate in various kinds of knowledge production. Wieseler uses a lot of technical terms—like epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance—but she explains everything clearly and the payoff is worthwhile. Wieseler uses these concepts to develop a powerful and thought-provoking critique of bioethical practice with respect to disability. The concepts are also useful in broader contexts, as we’ll see in section 3.
Williams, Melissa. Citizenship as Identity, Citizenship as Shared Fate, and the Functions of Multicultural Education2003, In Kevin McDonough & Walter Feinberg (eds.), Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities. Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This is the second of the four essays in Part II of the book on liberalism and traditionalist education; all four are by authors who would like to find ways for the liberal state to honour the self-definitions of traditional cultures and to find ways of avoiding a confrontation with differences. Melissa Williams examines citizenship as identity in relation to the project of nation-building, the shifting boundaries of citizenship in relation to globalization, citizenship as shared fate, and the role of multicultural education within the view of citizenship-as-shared-fate. She argues the other side of the same coin to that presented by Shelley Burtt in the previous chapter: according to Williams, the liberal state often demands too much in the way of loyalty from traditional groups, and when it does, it runs a strong risk of becoming oppressive and illiberal. Moreover, she holds that there is no need for a single shared identity among citizens of the liberal state. Her conception of people tied together by a shared fate is to this extent compatible with Burtt’s attempt to make liberalism’s commitment to autonomy more hospitable to groups of individuals encumbered by unchosen attachments, but her notion of citizenship as shared fate also goes further than that, and possibly stands in some tension with, Burtt’s view, since it allows and even encourages people to develop primary affiliation to all kind of groups – traditional as well as global.
Comment: This text explores existing conceptions of citizenship as identity and the challenges these pose for the ideal liberal state. In addition, the author proposes a previous unrecognised conception of citizenship as shared fate. In doing so, the paper touches on a variety of topics in contemporary political philosophy and theory, such as multiculturalism and globalization, the boundaries of political identity, the grounding of liberal democracy, and the project of civic education. As such, it would be most useful as a supplemental reading in undergraduate level political philosophy courses discussing any of the aforementioned topics, or in more specific contexts to explore questions about citizenship and what it means to share an idenitity with a group of others, with whom we may never meet face-to-face or have direct interpersonal dealings. The article itself has interesting implications for questions of social cohesion and group identity.
Willis, Ellen. Toward a Feminist Sexual Revolution1982, Social Text, 6: 3-21.-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
In this essay I argue that a sexual liberationist perspective is essential to a genuinely radical analysis of women's condition. Much of my argument centers on the psychosexual dynamics of the family, where children first experience both sexism and sexual repression. This discussion refers primarily to the family as it exists - actually and ideologically - for the dominant cultures of modern industrial societies. Clearly, to extend my focus backward to feudal societies or outward to the Third World would require (at the very least) a far longer, more complex article. I strongly suspect, however, that in its fundamentals the process of sexual acculturation I describe here is common to all historical (i.e., patriarchal) societies.Comment (from this Blueprint): Willis describes the double binds women are in: between being too good – boring, frigid, a sexual failure, a cold bitch – and being bad – easy, insatiable, demanding. Willis argues that the only way to solve this is to end the association between sex and badness. This presents an answer to Bartky's dilemma: we should choose to eradicate sexual shame, rather than our desires.
Wilson, Catherine. Descartes’s Meditations: An Introduction2003, Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by: Pauline Phemister
Abstract: This new introduction to a philosophical classic draws on the reinterpretations of Descartes' thought of the past twenty-five years. Catherine Wilson examines the arguments of Descartes' famous Meditations, revealing how he constructs a theory of the mind, body, nature, and God from a premise of radical uncertainty. She discusses in detail the historical context of Descartes' writings and their relationship to early modern science, and at the same time she introduces concepts and problems that define the philosophical enterprise as it is understood today.Comment: Following closely the text of the Meditations and meant to be read alongside them, this survey is accessible to readers with no previous background in philosophy. It is well-suited to university-level courses on Descartes, but can also be read with profit by students in other disciplines.
Wilson, Yolonda, et al.. Intersectionality in Clinical Medicine: The Need for a Conceptual Framework2019, The American Journal of Bioethics. 19(2): 8–19.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-TurnerAbstract:
Intersectionality has become a significant intellectual approach for those thinking about the ways that race, gender, and other social identities converge in order to create unique forms of oppression. Although the initial work on intersectionality addressed the unique position of black women relative to both black men and white women, the concept has since been expanded to address a range of social identities. Here we consider how to apply some of the theoretical tools provided by intersectionality to the clinical context. We begin with a brief discussion of intersectionality and how it might be useful in a clinical context. We then discuss two clinical scenarios that highlight how we think considering intersectionality could lead to more successful patient–clinician interactions. Finally, we extrapolate general strategies for applying intersectionality to the clinical context before considering objections and replies.Comment (from this Blueprint): Wilson et al. argue that intersectionality is an important concept in clinical practice. They clarify the concept and distinguish their call for intersectionality from nearby claims. For instance, they argue that intersectionality goes beyond mere cultural competence that healthcare providers are already trained in, at least to some degree. Their paper is anchored around two fictionalized case studies, which they use to make vivid and explain their central claims. They end by responding to objections, including the very idea of intersectionality itself.
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West, Shearer. Gender and Portraiture
2004, In: Portraiture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 144-161.
Comment: Useful in aesthetics classes discussing portraiture, depiction and representation, as well as philosophy of gender classes discussing representations of women.
Artworks to use with this text:
Lotte Laserstein, Self-Portrait with Cat (1928) vs Otto Dix, Portrait of the Journalist Sylvia von Harden (1926)
Both portraits were painted in 1920s Germany by artists linked to the New Objectivity art movement. Still, there is a notable difference between the 'objective' view of the male artist and the subjective self-image of the woman artist.
Elizabeth Siddal, Self-Portrait (1854)
There's a marked contrast between the unhappiness and fatigue visible in this self-portrait and the beauty and eroticism in Dante Gabriel Rossetti's Beata Beatrix (c.1862) in which he transfers the ideal qualities of Dante's Beatrice into the real portrait of Siddal.
Artemisia Gentileschi, Self-Portrait as "La Pittura" (c. 1630)
It could be said that the artist is complicit in the tendency of portraitists to generalize their women subjects as she embodied herself as the allegory of Painting. Nevertheless, Artemisia does not show herself in an idealized way and by self-consciously manipulating a set of conventions makes a unique contribution to the corpus of self-portraiture. Useful in aesthetics classes discussing portraiture, depiction and representation, as well as philosophy of gender classes discussing representations of women.
Artworks to use with this text:
Lotte Laserstein, Self-Portrait with Cat (1928) vs Otto Dix, Portrait of the Journalist Sylvia von Harden (1926)
Both portraits were painted in 1920s Germany by artists linked to the New Objectivity art movement. Still, there is a notable difference between the 'objective' view of the male artist and the subjective self-image of the woman artist.
Elizabeth Siddal, Self-Portrait (1854)
There's a marked contrast between the unhappiness and fatigue visible in this self-portrait and the beauty and eroticism in Dante Gabriel Rossetti's Beata Beatrix (c.1862) in which he transfers the ideal qualities of Dante's Beatrice into the real portrait of Siddal.
Artemisia Gentileschi, Self-Portrait as "La Pittura" (c. 1630)
It could be said that the artist is complicit in the tendency of portraitists to generalize their women subjects as she embodied herself as the allegory of Painting. Nevertheless, Artemisia does not show herself in an idealized way and by self-consciously manipulating a set of conventions makes a unique contribution to the corpus of self-portraiture.