Hall, Alison. Free enrichment or hidden indexicals?
2008, Mind and Language 23 (4):426-456.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Thomas HodgsonAbstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or 'unarticulated constituents' can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed that cannot plausibly be accounted for in this way, and that advocates of this approach will therefore also have to appeal to free enrichment. The final section starts to address the question of how free enrichment is constrained: I argue that it involves only local development or adjustment of parts of logical form, any global developments being excluded by the requirement for the proposition expressed to provide an inferential warrant for the intended implications of the utterance.Comment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
Hall, Nicole, Brady, Emily. Environmental Virtue Aesthetics
2023, British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (1): 109-126
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Added by: Colin TroeskenAbstract:
How should we characterize the interaction between moral and aesthetic values in the context of
environmental aesthetics? This question is important given the urgency of many environmental
problems and the particular role played by aesthetic value in our experience of environment. To
address this question, we develop a model of Environmental Virtue Aesthetics (EVA) that, we argue,
offers a promising alternative to current theories in environmental aesthetics with respect to the
relationship between aesthetics and ethics. EVA counters environmental aesthetic theories that focus
more narrowly on scientific knowledge and ground aesthetic value in ways that obfuscate pluralistic
modes of appreciation of and relationships with natural and semi-natural environments. To develop
EVA, we work with a revised notion of respect and engage with ideas concerning the development of
aesthetic sensibilities, care, and virtuous aesthetic appreciation. EVA has the potential to support
forms of human-nature co-flourishing, as well as constituting an aesthetic grounding for ecological
citizenship.Comment: This article presupposes some familiarity with issues in environmental aesthetics, specifically debates concerning the connection between moral and aesthetic value in nature. Students reading this article would also benefit from some degree of acquaintance with virtue theory. In an introductory course on aesthetics, it could be read alongside a more introductory article such as Emily Brady's previous article "Aesthetic Character and Aesthetic Integrity in Environmental Conservation" (2002). The article is also well-suited for an advanced course in aesthetics, especially one which focuses heavily on the aesthetics of nature.
Hampton, Jean. Contracts and Choices: Does Rawls Have a Social Contract Theory?
1980, Journal of Philosophy 77(6): 315-338.
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Added by: Carl FoxIntroduction: In A Theory of Justice John Rawls tells us he is presenting a social contract theory: "My aim," he writes, "is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found in say, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant". And indeed his many and various critics have generally assumed he has a contractarian position and have criticized him on that basis. However, it will be my contention in this paper that a contractual agreement on the two principles not only does not but ought not to occur in the original position, and that, although Rawls uses contract language in his book, there is another procedure outlined in Part One of A Theory of Justice through which the two principles are selected.Comment: Questions the nature of the Rawlsian contract and asks whether it really belongs in the same tradition as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Useful if engaging with Rawls's methodology at a deep level. Would make good further reading for a module on either Rawls specifically or the social contract tradition more generally.
Hampton, Jean. Political Philosophy
1996, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
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Added by: Carl FoxPublisher's Note: Political philosophy, perhaps even more than other branches of philosophy, calls for constant renewal to reflect not just re-readings of the tradition but also the demands of current events. In this lively and readable survey, Jean Hampton has created a text for our time that does justice both to the great traditions of the field and to the newest developments. In a marvelous feat of synthesis, she links the classical tradition, the giants of the modern period, the dominant topics of the twentieth century, and the new questions and concerns that are just beginning to rewrite contemporary political philosophy.Hampton presents these traditions in an engaging and accessible manner, adding to them her own views and encouraging readers to critically examine a range of ideas and to reach their own conclusions. Of particular interest are the discussions of the contemporary liberalism-communitarianism debates, the revival of interest in issues of citizenship and nationality, and the way in which feminist concerns are integrated into all these discussions. Political Philosophy is the most modern text on the topic now available, the ideal guide to what is going on in the field. It will be welcomed by scholars and students in philosophy and political science, and it will serve as an introduction for readers from outside these fields.Comment: Many of the chapters would make for good introductory readings to standard topics in political philosophy, including: social contract theories, political authority, distributive justice, liberalism vs communitarianism, nationalism.
Hanson, Karen. Dressing down Dressing up – The Philosophic Fear of Fashion
1990, Hypatia 5 (2):107 - 121.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: There is, to all appearances, a philosophic hostility to fashionable dress. Studying this contempt, this paper examines likely sources in philosophy's suspicion of change; anxiety about surfaces and the inessential; failures in the face of death; and the philosophic disdain for, denial of, the human body and human passivity. If there are feminist concerns about fashion, they should be radically different from those of traditional philosophy. Whatever our ineluctable worries about desire and death, whatever our appropriate anger and impatience with the merely superficial, whatever our genuine need to mark off the serious from the trivial, feminism may be a corrective therapy for philosophy's bad humor and self-deception, as these manifest themselves when the subject turns to beautiful clothes.
Hanson, Louise. The Reality of (Non-Aesthetic) Value
2013, Philosophical Quaterly 63(252): 492-508.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: It has become increasingly common for philosophers to make use of the concept of artistic value, and, further, to distinguish artistic value from aesthetic value. In a recent paper, 'The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value', Dominic Lopes takes issue with this, presenting a kind of corrective to current philosophical practice regarding the use of the concept of artistic value. Here I am concerned to defend current practice against Lopes's attack. I argue that there is some unclarity as to what aspect of this practice Lopes is objecting to, and I distinguish three kinds of objection that he could be read as making. I argue that none of these is adequately supported by Lopes's arguments, and that the corresponding three aspects of current philosophical practice are on firmer footing than Lopes's paper suggests. A new, plausible characterisation of artistic value will emerge from this discussion.Comment: This paper would be useful for undergrads and postgrads studying and questioning the difference between aesthetic value and artistic value, the dependence relation between features of works and their value, and generally the metaphysical basis of value in art. Hanson is very clear about her argumentative strategy. This makes the paper a prime example of good philosophical methodology.
Haramia, Chelsea. Applied Ethics
2018, 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Nathan NobisAbstract: To date, there are several areas of applied ethical study. Given their situational nature, they are often distinct from one another, though they regularly employ similar methods detailed here. Applied ethicists qua applied ethicists are more concerned with particular cases than with more abstract theoretical questions. They aim to apply their ethical training to the study of actual ethical situations, and to draw conclusions about the moral status of scenarios that people out in the world actually encounter, and of situations that have real, practical import.Comment: An overview of the nature of applied or practical ethics.
Harman, Elizabeth. Does moral ignorance exculpate?
2011, Ratio 24 (4):443-468.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Corbin CovingtonAbstract: Non-moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spooning sugar, then Anne may be blameless for poisoning Bill. Gideon Rosen argues that moral ignorance can also exculpate: if one does not believe that one's action is wrong, and one has not mismanaged one's beliefs, then one is blameless for acting wrongly. On his view, many apparently blameworthy actions are blameless. I discuss several objections to Rosen. I then propose an alternative view on which many agents who act wrongly are blameworthy despite believing they are acting morally permissibly, and despite not having mismanaged their moral beliefs.1
Harman, Elizabeth. Can we harm and benefit in creating?
2004,
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: The non-identity problem concerns actions that affect who exists in the future. If such an action is performed, certain people will exist in the future who would not otherwise have existed: they are not identical to any of the people who would have existed if the action had not been performed. Some of these actions seem to be wrong, and they seem to be wrong in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose existence is dependent on their having been performed. The problem arises when it is argued that the actions do not harm these people - because the actions do not make them worse off than they would otherwise be.1 Consider: Radioactive Waste Policy: We are trying to decide whether to adopt a permissive radioactive waste policy. This policy would be less inconvenient to us than our existing practices. If we enact the newly-proposed policy, then we will cause there to be radioactive pollution that will cause illness and suffering. However, the policy will have such significant effects on public policy and industry functioning, that different people will exist in the future depending on whether we enact the policy. Two things should be emphasized. First, the illness and suffering caused will be very serious: deformed babies, children with burns from acid rain, and adults dying young from cancer. Second, the policy will affect who will exist in the future because our present practices invade people's everyday lives, for example by affecting recycling practices in the home; these practices will change if the policy is adopted. Furthermore, whether we adopt the policy will determine which plants are built where, what jobs are available, and what trucks are on the road. These effects will create small differences in everyone's lives which ultimately affect who meets whom and who conceives with whom, or at least when people conceive. This affects who exists in the future.
Harman, Elizabeth. Creation Ethics: The Moral Status of Early Fetuses and the Ethics of Abortion
1999, Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):310-324.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktIntroduction: There has been considerable discussion of the moral status of early fetuses and the ethics of the choice whether to abort a pregnancy. But one tenable view about the moral status of early fetuses has been regularly ignored. As a consequence, a very liberal view about the ethics of abortion is more attractive than has previously been thought. Let us use the term 'early fetus' as follows: (1) 'early fetus': a fetus before it has any intrinsic properties that themselves confer moral status on the fetus. I assume that there is a nonnegligible period of time in which fetuses are early fetuses in my sense; it may be as short as a few weeks or as long as several months, depending on which intrinsic properties can them- selves confer moral status. One plausible view says that an early fetus is a fetus before it has any conscious experience and before it can properly be described as the subject of experience.
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