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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Julia Jorati
Abstract: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was a true polymath: he made substantial contributions to a host of different fields such as mathematics, law, physics, theology, and most subfields of philosophy. Within the philosophy of mind, his chief innovations include his rejection of the Cartesian doctrines that all mental states are conscious and that non-human animals lack souls as well as sensation. Leibniz’s belief that non-rational animals have souls and feelings prompted him to reflect much more thoroughly than many of his predecessors on the mental capacities that distinguish human beings from lower animals. Relatedly, the acknowledgment of unconscious mental representations and motivations enabled Leibniz to provide a far more sophisticated account of human psychology. It also led Leibniz to hold that perception—rather than consciousness, as Cartesians assume—is the distinguishing mark of mentality.Jorati, Julia. Leibniz on Causation, Part 22015, Philosophy Compass 10 (6):398-405-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Julia Jorati
Abstract: Leibniz is almost unique among early modern philosophers in giving final causation a central place in his metaphysical system. All changes in created substances, according to Leibniz, have final causes, that is, occur for the sake of some end. There is, however, no consensus among commentators about the details of Leibniz's views on final causation. The least perfect types of changes that created substances undergo are especially puzzling because those changes seem radically different from paradigmatic instances of final causation. Building on my more general discussion of efficient and final causation in ‘Leibniz on Causation – Part 1,’ I will examine and assess some of the rival interpretations of Leibniz's account of final causation.Comment: Can be used for a survey course on early modern philosophy or for a more specialized course on the history of causation.
Jorati, Julia. Leibniz on Causation, Part 12015, Philosophy Compass 10 (6):389-397-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Julia Jorati
Abstract: Leibniz holds that created substances do not causally interact with each other but that there is causal activity within each such creature. Every created substance constantly changes internally, and each of these changes is caused by the substance itself or by its prior states. Leibniz describes this kind of intra-substance causation both in terms of final causation and in terms of efficient causation. How exactly this works, however, is highly controversial. I will identify what I take to be the major interpretive issues surrounding Leibniz's views on causation and examine several influential interpretations of these views. In ‘Leibniz on Causation – Part 2’ I will then take a closer look at final causation.Comment: Can be used for a survey of early modern philosophy or for a more advanced class on the history of theories of causation.
Jorati, Julia. Gottfried Leibniz [on Free Will]2017, In Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 293–302-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Julia Jorati
Abstract: Leibniz was obsessed with freedom. He turns to this topic again and again throughout his long career. And what he has to say about freedom is much more resourceful and inventive than typically acknowledged. While building on medieval theories—for instance by describing freedom in terms of the relation between the agent’s will and intellect—he also adds radically new elements and even anticipates some views that are popular today. The combination of theses about free will that Leibniz endorses in his mature writings is unusual and may at first appear inconsistent: (a) he claims that some of our actions are free, (b) he links free agency closely to agent causation and in fact appears to deny that there is event causation; (c) he accepts a form of determinism. In other words, Leibniz endorses what we can describe as an agent-causal compatibilist theory of freedom. The three theses may seem to be in tension not only because proponents of agent causation views are typically incompatibilists, but also because determinism is often defined in a way that presupposes event causation. As we will see soon, however, the tension is merely apparent. Leibniz’s version of agent-causal compatibilism is perfectly coherent and has some unique advantages over rival accounts.Comment: Gives an overview of Leibniz's views on freedom of the will; can be used for survey courses on early modern philosophy or for courses on the free will debate.
Kachi, Daisuke. Do time travelers suffer from paradoxes?2009, Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15(2): 95-98.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: In this paper I give consideration to some apparent impossibilities for the time travelers to the past. After criticizing the views of D. Lewis and K. Vihvelin, I will show in what sense they are really impossible.Comment: Really introductory and short paper. It focuses on three issues: changing the past, autofanticide, and autoparenthood. Recommended as an introductory and basic reading for undergraduate students.
Kantymir, Lori, Carolyn McLeod. Justification for Conscience Exemptions in Health Care2013, Bioethics 28 (1): 16-23.-
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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: Some bioethicists argue that conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves, just as objectors in the military do. They should have to provide reasons that explain why they should be exempt from offering the services that they find offensive. There are two versions of this view in the literature, each giving different standards of justification. We show these views are each either too permissive (i.e. would result in problematic exemptions based on conscience) or too restrictive (i.e. would produce problematic denials of exemption). We then develop a middle ground position that we believe better combines respect for the conscience of healthcare professionals with concern for the duties that they owe to patients. Our claim, in short, is that insofar as objectors should have to justify themselves, they should have to do it according to the standard that we defend rather than according to the standards that others have developed.Comment: This text responds to two proposals for justifying concientious objection in the provision of health care services: genuineness and reasonableness. It would fit well within a course on medical ethics or bioethics. It also would fit well within a more general course on professional ethics, as it concerns the question of when a professional is able to justify the omission of an action that they are bound by professional duty to complete.
Karlström, Anna. Authenticity2015, In Heritage Keywords, edited by Kathryn Lafrenz Samuels and Trinidad Rico. USA: University Press of Colorado.-
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: This text offers a brief overview of some approaches to the concept of authenticity in international heritage management. Focusing on a case study of Buddhist sites in Laos, Karlström then argues that culturally specific understandings of authenticity pose problems for the universal application of a preservationist approach to heritage management. It concludes with some open-ended questions about how we should pursue alternative approaches.Comment: This is a good text for instructors who want to discuses authenticity in the context of a reasonably in-depth look at a particular non-Western cultural context. While the article itself is light on conceptual/ philosophical work, if offers useful material for philosophical analysis and discussion. It would pair well with the theoretical framework provided in Yuriko Saito's "Why Restore Works of Art?", or the alternative approach to authenticity captured in Carolyn Korsmeyer's "Real Old Things."
Keefe, Rosanna. Theories of Vagueness2000, Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Berta Grimau
Publisher's Note: Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this timely book Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories of vagueness and their supporting arguments, and she offers a powerful and original defence of a form of supervaluationism, a theory that requires almost no deviation from standard logic yet can accommodate the lack of sharp boundaries to vague predicates and deal with the paradoxes of vagueness in a methodologically satisfying way. Her study will be of particular interest to readers in philosophy of language and of mind, philosophical logic, epistemology and metaphysics.Comment: This book could be used in a philosophy of logic or a philosophy of language course which had a section on vagueness (either at undergraduate or postgraduate level). The first chapter provides a good main reading for such purpose. The book can also be used in a course focused on vagueness exclusively. The technical discussion is minimized throughout and presupposes only some familiarity with elementary logic.
Keefe, Rosanna. What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be2014, Synthese 191 (7):1375-1390-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
Logical Pluralists maintain that there is more than one genuine/true logical consequence relation. This paper seeks to understand what the position could amount to and some of the challenges faced by its formulation and defence. I consider in detail Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism—which seeks to accommodate radically different logics by stressing the way that they each fit a general form, the Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT)—arguing against the claim that different instances of GTT are admissible precisifications of logical consequence. I then consider what it is to endorse a logic within a pluralist framework and criticise the options Beall and Restall entertain. A case study involving many-valued logics is examined. I next turn to issues of the applications of different logics and questions of which logic a pluralist should use in particular contexts. A dilemma regarding the applicability of admissible logics is tackled and it is argued that application is a red herring in relation to both understanding and defending a plausible form of logical pluralism. In the final section, I consider other ways to be and not to be a logical pluralist by examining analogous positions in debates over religious pluralism: this, I maintain, illustrates further limitations and challenges for a very general logical pluralism. Certain less wide-ranging pluralist positions are more plausible in both cases, I suggest, but assessment of those positions needs to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.
Comment: Makes for a nice counter in any course discussing Beall and Restall's pluralism. Given that the paper is a direct response, some previous familiarity with the topic is advised.
Keinschmidt, Shieva. Atheistic Prayer2017, Faith and Philosophy 34(2): 152-175.-
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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: In this paper I will argue, contrary to common assumptions, that rational atheistic prayer is possible. I will formulate and respond to two powerful arguments against the possibility of atheistic prayer: first, an argument that the act of prayer involves an intention to communicate to God, precluding disbelief in God's existence; second, an argument claiming that reaching out to God through prayer requires believing God might exist, precluding rational disbelief in God. In showing options for response to these arguments, I will describe a model on which atheistic prayer is not only possible, but is on a par with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect.Comment: Very useful for a unit/module on atheism and agnosticism - in particular, as a bridge into fictionalism. This paper would be a great core reading prior to a debate on e.g. the rationality of theism/atheism/agnosticism.
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Jorati, Julia. Gottfried Leibniz: Philosophy of Mind
2014, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Comment: Overview over Leibniz's philosophy of mind; can be used for a survey course on early modern philosophy or for a more specialized course on the history of the philosophy of mind.