Olsaretti, Serena. The Concept of Voluntariness – A Reply
2008, Journal of Political Philosophy 16(1): 165-188.
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Added by: Carl FoxAbstract: In his paper on 'The Concept of Voluntariness', Ben Colburn helpfully takes up the task of developing my view about the sense of voluntariness that is relevant for judgments of substantive responsibility, or judgments about individuals' liability to pick up some costs of their choices. On my view, a necessary condition for holding people responsible for their choices is that those choices be voluntary in the sense that they are not made because there is no acceptable alternative, where the standard for the acceptability of options is an objective standard of well-being. [...] Colburn's first point is entirely well-taken. By way of endorsing it, I ask whether we are justified in taking some but not all kinds of beliefs to affect the voluntariness of choice, as his elaboration of my view suggests. However, I find Colburn's second point less convincing, and argue that we should allow for the moral character of options to affect the voluntariness of choice.Comment: Short debate article responding to some criticisms of Olsaretti's account of voluntariness made by Ben Colburn and probably best read in conjunction with Colburn's article. Does a good job of responding to the criticisms and explaining her account. Good further reading for teaching about voluntariness and autonomy.
Olufemi Taiwo. Exorcising Hegel’s ghost: Africa’s challenge to philosophy
1998, African Studies Quarterly 1(4)
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Added by: Sara Peppe, Contributed by: Jonathan EgidAbstract:
Anyone who has lived with, worked on, and generally hung out with philosophy as long as I have and who, and this is a very important element, inhabits the epidermal world that it has pleased fate to put me in, and is as engaged with both the history of that epidermal world and that of philosophy, must at a certain point come upon the presence of a peculiar absence: the absence of Africa from the discourse of philosophy. In the basic areas of philosophy (e.g.. epistemology, metaphysics, axiology, and logic) and in the many derivative divisions of the subject (e.g., the philosophy of ...) once one begins to look, once one trains one's eyes to apprehend it, one is struck by the absence of Africa from the disquisitions of its practitioners.
Comment: A good way of responding to Hegel's denigrating views of Africans and Enlightenment racism more generally. Could be used in a class on philosophy and colonialism, or the global reception of German idealism.
Oluwole, Sophie. Socrates and Ọ̀rúnmìlà: Two Patron Saints of Classical Philosophy
2014, Ark Publishers.
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Added by: Rebecca BuxtonPublisher’s Note:
Oluwole's teachings and works are generally attributed to the Yoruba school of philosophical thought, which was ingrained in the cultural and religious beliefs (Ifá) of the various regions of Yorubaland. According to Oluwole, this branch of philosophy predates the Western tradition, as the ancient African philosopher Orunmila predates Socrates by her estimate. These two thinkers, representing the values of the African and Western traditions, are two of Oluwole's biggest influences, and she compares the two in her book Socrates and Orunmila.Comment (from this Blueprint): This book compares Socrates to Ọ̀rúnmìlà, an 'Orisha' or an important sprit in Yoruba. Both Socrates and Orunmila undertook their philosophy orally and passed their teachings and thinking onto students. Oluwole therefore challenges the western assumption that African philosophy does not have a long-standing on deep tradition.
Olúwọlé, Sophie Bọsẹdé. The Rational Basis of Yoruba Ethical Thinking
1992, in Witchcraft, Reincarnation and the God-Head (Issues in African Philosophy). Lagos: Excel Publishers
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
An explanation of the Yoruba understanding of rationality, its immediate connection to practical ethics, and its roots in oral Yoruba traditions.Comment (from this Blueprint): By studying Olúwọlé, students can learn this week that African women philosophers have not worked on feminist issues alone. Olúwọlé allows one to learn about a different rationale than the commonly known Western one. This can nicely be juxtaposed with philosophers like Descartes or Kant. Olúwọlé's philosophy of rationality and the connection of this philosophy with Yoruba culture, esp. with Yoruba oral traditions of philosophy, allows to re-evaluate the (seemingly) undeniable evidence of Western philosophy. Furthermore, it also shows some commonalities that were denied in later Western philosophical history (for instance, that at the inception of Western philosophy we do find in Socrates another oral philosopher).
Olúwọlé, Sophie Bọsẹdé. Philosophy and Oral Tradition
1999, in Philosophy and Oral Tradition. Lagos: African Research Konsultancy (ARK)
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
From: Sophie Oluwole: Celebrating the Radical Spirit of African Philosophy, By Tunji Olaopa
In Philosophy and Oral Tradition (1997), Sophie Oluwole urges us to return to Africa’s oral tradition as the source of excavating an authentic foundation of Africa’s intellectual culture which the West has tried so hard to undermine and destroy. One argument that underlies the relevance of Africa’s oral tradition is that the traditional and cultural practices of the past must have been guided by some form of logic and rational principles which not only predate the Western scientific canon, but which cannot also be subsumed totally under it.
Comment (from this Blueprint): By studying Olúwọlé, students can learn this week that African women philosophers have not worked on feminist issues alone. Olúwọlé allows one to learn about a different rationale than the commonly known Western one. This can nicely be juxtaposed with philosophers like Descartes or Kant. Olúwọlé's philosophy of rationality and the connection of this philosophy with Yoruba culture, esp. with Yoruba oral traditions of philosophy, allows to re-evaluate the (seemingly) undeniable evidence of Western philosophy. Furthermore, it also shows some commonalities that were denied in later Western philosophical history (for instance, that at the inception of Western philosophy we do find in Socrates another oral philosopher).
Orlandi, Nicoletta. Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism
2011, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10 (2011), 307-323
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples.
Comment: Specialised further reading on nonconceptual content and representationalism.
Osborne, Catherine. Eros Unveiled: Plato and the God of Love
1994, Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Laura JimenezPublisher's note: This unique book challenges the traditional distinction between eros, the love found in Greek thought, and agape, the love characteristic of Christianity. Focusing on a number of classic texts, including Plato's Symposium and Lysis, Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics, and famous passages in Gregory of Nyssa, Origen, Dionysius the Areopagite, Plotinus, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, the author shows that Plato's account of eros is not founded on self-interest. In this way, she restores the place of erotic love as a Christian motif, and unravels some longstanding confusions in philosophical discussions of love.Comment: The author’s view represents a new approach to ancient views on eros and its place in the Christian tradition. It is suitable for undergraduate or postgraduate courses on Ethics and Ancient Philosophy. Perfect as a secondary reading for students working on Plato's Symposium and Lysis, or Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics.
Oshana, Mariana. Autonomy and the Partial-Birth Abortion Act
2011, Journal of Social Philosophy, 42 (1): 46-60.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordSummary: In this paper, Oshana argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to affirm the Partial-Birth Abortion Act was mistaken. She claims that the Partial-Birth Abortion Act cannot withstand the test of strict scrutiny, that the Act fails to respect the privacy rights of individuals, and that there are compelling reasons (based in autonomy) to allow partial-birth abortion up until the point of fetal viability. As such, she claims, the Act violates the integrity of law.Comment: This text would be excellent to use in a course focused on abortion, any course that covers the suite of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving the right to privacy, or a course that wishes to discuss and apply the doctrine of strict scrutiny. While it requires a significant amount of background knowledge (concerning the legislative history on abortion in the United States), it provides an excellent example of applying both the principle of autonomy and the principle of strict scrutiny.
Oshana, Marina. Personal Autonomy and Society
1998, Journal of Social Philosophy 29(1): 81–102.
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Added by: Simon FoktContent: Oshana argues against 'internalist' theories of autonomy that focus exclusively on psychological conditions internal to the agent - what goes on inside her head - and suggests instead that certain social relations must obtain between the agent and those around her for genuine autonomy to be possible.Comment: Oshana argues that personal autonomy is a socio-relational phenomenon partially constructed by external, social relations. She also offers an interesting and detailed critique of internalist accounts, which makes the text very useful in teaching on autonomy and free will in general. The text is best used as a further reading in undergraduate and a more central required reading in postgraduate teaching. It offers a good synopsis of Gerald Dworkin's influential conception of autonomy.
Overall, Christine. Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God
1985, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23(3): 3447-353.
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De CruzAbstract: An assumption in debates about the philosophical significance of miracles is that if a miracle (a violation of natural law or a permanently inexplicable event) were to occur, it would be evidence for the existence of the Christian God. The paper explores reservations by several philosophers about this connection between God and miracles, and presents arguments to show that if a miracle would occur there would be good reason to deny that God exists.Comment: Great text that would spark a lot of debate. Could be a core reading for a unit on miracles or on agnosticism/atheism. If the latter, this would be particularly useful if miracles had already been discussed. Could be discussed alongside Hume on Miracles.
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