Published in French in 1990, this book is among the later conceptualizations of postcolonial and racial relations. Glissant is a novelist, and his attention to politics operates through an interest in linguistics: studying creole languages, he exposes how colonized people transformed the tool of the master, leading to the creation of a new, creolized culture and expression. He reads the long-term effects of the slave trade, where people were forcibly taken from their cultural and linguistic milieu an put in another one, characterized by an extremely violent relation of subjection. In this context, he elaborates the notion of antillanité, as a French West Indies description of the unpredictable linking and blending of cultures and languages, extending and specifying the idea of négritude found in Césaire and Senghor in the 1930s. This complex analysis leads to two seemingly contradictory concepts: first, his idea of opacity argues in favor of untranslatability and of irreducible yet non-hierarchical differences. Second, his poetics of relation leads to an understanding of identity as an extension of the connection to the other. From there, he sketches a new definition of culture, taking into account power dynamics, which is also a departure from the idea of authenticity or autochtony. Against a binary reading of colonialist relations of power, Glissant explores the formation of identities through the process of creolization, where a new language is invented as a mean of resistance, thus undermining any possibility for a pure, uniform identity.

This work analyzes the contemporary conditions of culture and criticizes common definitions of identity. Bhabha makes use of continental philosophy, social sciences and literature (crediting Morrison, Salman Rushdie, and even Anish Kapoor), draws on Said and Spivak, and reads Fanon extensively—blending anti-colonial critique with post-structuralism. His main object is the long-term effects of colonialism on social identities and culture, even after the departure of the colonizers or the abolition of slavery. From an inquiry concerning the effects of the awareness of social positions and the political usages of identity, he finds that culture is characterized by hybridation and going beyond established limits. Against the idea that cultures are fixed traditions belonging to identified communities, Bhabha tries to explain how social meanings are an on-going, dynamic and relational process, underlining contradictions, ambivalence, and two of the main concepts of this book: hybridity (the mixed nature of culture) and mimicry (the adoption of ideas and values from other cultures). In his view, "[d]ifferences in culture and power are constituted through the social conditions of enunciation" (p. 242), meaning that culture needs to be seen as fragmented, unstable and sometimes antagonistic. Bhabha elaborates a definition of the boundary not as a limit, but as the site for theoretical production and artistic creation, exemplified by the proliferation of "post" in contemporary theory (poststructuralism, postmodernism, etc), which he understands as a movement of going beyond, pointing towards a constant invention of oneself.

Identity politics is everywhere, polarising discourse from the campaign trail to the classroom and amplifying antagonisms in the media. But the compulsively referenced phrase bears little resemblance to the concept as first introduced by the radical Black feminist Combahee River Collective. While the Collective articulated a political viewpoint grounded in their own position as Black lesbians with the explicit aim of building solidarity across lines of difference, identity politics is now frequently weaponised as a means of closing ranks around ever-narrower conceptions of group interests.

But the trouble, Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò deftly argues, is not with identity politics itself. Through a substantive engagement with the global Black radical tradition and a critical understanding of racial capitalism, Táíwò identifies the process by which a radical concept can be stripped of its political substance and liberatory potential by becoming the victim of elite capture -deployed by political, social and economic elites in the service of their own interests.

Táíwò’s crucial intervention both elucidates this complex process and helps us move beyond the binary of ‘class’ vs. ‘race’. By rejecting elitist identity politics in favour of a constructive politics of radical solidarity, he advances the possibility of organising across our differences in the urgent struggle for a better world.

Fanon (1925-1961) was born in the French West Indies and studied in France before moving to Algeria to join the independence struggle. In this text, originally published in French in 1952, he addresses the Black man's condition, and more particularly his subjectivity and experience in the colonial context of the French West Indies and of France in general, also drawing parallel with North Africa and Indochina. Black Skin, White Masks is both a minute and complex description of the violence of colonization and a sketch of a liberation from its effects. A psychiatrist by training, Fanon investigates the psychological impact of both racism and colonization, with a strong focus on inter-subjective relations, including the intersection of race and gender relations. He uses a large variety of resources: philosophy (a critical reading of Sartre, an elaboration of Hegel's slave-master dialectic, Leiris, Marcel, and contemporary linguistics) ; Marxism (materialism and alienation); psychiatry and psychoanalysis; the literary Négritude movement (Black Francophones writers who, starting in the 1930s, wrote about lived experience of blackness, displacement and colonialism). Its reception, though belated, has nevertheless made it one of the seminal works of postcolonial theory.

In this talk given in 1983 at the University of Illinois, Spivak criticizes a Western understanding of the political subject by examining how Third World subjects are perceived within Western discourse. She studies the way Western representations prevent the subaltern woman from making her own voice heard. Her critique depends on a definition of the subaltern, the “Other,” who is paradoxically both constituted and erased by Western theories, and is neither heard nor answered, leading Spivak to question their very possibility to speak. She specifically uses the history of British colonialism's relation to the Hindu practice of sati, the ritual self-immolation of a widow on her husband’s funeral pyre, which was read by the British as barbarism and deprived of the social signification it holds. Spivak highlights the contradictions of the so-called “civilizing mission” of colonialism, showing how women’s rights have been used by colonialism against the subalterns themselves, thereby robbing them of their own voices. Drawing critically on French theory (Derrida, Althusser, Deleuze, Foucault), Marxism (Marx, Benjamin, Gramsci) and other postcolonial scholars (Said), this landmark essay mobilizes historical documentation alongside critical theory to produce a seminal work of political and social philosophy. At the same time, Spivak offers a meta-philosophical enquiry, pointing to a major bias in the very constitution and discourse of the discipline.

I want to explore strategic expressions of ignorance against the background of Charles W. Mills's account of epistemologies of ignorance in The Racial Contract (1997). My project has two interrelated goals. I want to show how Mills's discussion is restricted by his decision to frame ignorance within the language and logic of social contract theory. And, I want to explain why Maria Lugones's work on purity is useful in reframing ignorance in ways that both expand our understandings of ignorance and reveal its strategic uses. I begin with Mills's account of the Racial Contract, and explain how it prescribes for its signatories an epistemology of ignorance, which Mills characterizes as an inverted epistemology. I briefly outline his program for undoing white ignorance and indicate that retooling white ignorance is more complex than his characterization suggests. Making this argument requires an abrupt shift from the white-created frameworks of social contract theory to Lugones's system of thinking rooted in the lives of people of color. So, the next section outlines Lugones's distinction between the logic of purity and the logic of curdling and explains its usefulness in addressing ignorance. With both accounts firmly in place the third section demonstrates how the Racial Contract produces at least two expressions of ignorance and explains how the logic of purity underlying the Contract shapes each expression in ways that limit possibilities for resistance. I don't mean to suggest that the social contract theory's love of purity invalidates Mills's work, only that this framework limits prospects for long-term change by neglecting the relationship between white ignorance and non-white resistance. The final sections explain how people of color use ignorance strategically to their advantage , and argue that examining ignorance through a curdled lens not only makes strategic ignorance visible, but also points to alternatives for retooling white ignorance.

According to a popular account, rationality is a kind of coherence of an agent’s mental states and, more specifically, a matter of fulfilling norms of coherence. For example, in order to be rational, an agent is required to intend to do what they judge they ought to and can do. This norm has been called ‘Enkrasia’. Another norm requires that, ceteris paribus, an agent retain their intention over time. This has been called ‘Persistence of Intention’. This paper argues that thus understood norms of rationality may at times conflict. More specifically, Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention may place demands on the agent that are impossible to fulfil. In these cases, the framework of requirements does not provide us with norms that make us rational. A rival account, according to which rationality is a kind of responsiveness to one’s available reasons, can overcome the problem.