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Abstract:
Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to accounts of perceptual content on which perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. With austere relationalists, I will argue that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational. But against austere relationalists, I will argue that it is fundamentally both relational and representational.Comment: This paper discusses two of the dominant positions regarding the content of perceptual experience. It can be used in an advanced course on philosophy of perception or as further reading.
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Added by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
This article starts with some general points about fear. After that, it spells out and discusses the thesis of motivational modularity. However, even though that thesis is plausible in cases of non-human fear, this is not so for human fear. This is why the article turns to the claim that fear comes with some specific desire instead. The last section discusses the thesis of motivational egoism. It argues that when we experience fear for someone else, the motivation involved is exactly as altruistic as when we feel compassion for that person.Comment: In this paper, Tappolet discusses some assumptions presupposed by some who resist a more enthusiastic conception on the rationality of emotions. She focuses mostly on fear, but goes through some general features of emotions. This chapter can be listed as recommended or secondary reading on sessions that discuss the motivational component of emotions or the rationality of emotions.
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Added by: David Harmon, Contributed by: David HarmonAbstract:
One of the most basic questions an ontology can address is: How many things, or substances, are there? A monist will say, ‘just one’. But there are different stripes of monism, and where the borders between these different views lie rests on the question, ‘To what does this “oneness” apply?’ Some monists apply ‘oneness’ to existence. Others apply ‘oneness’ to types. Determining whether a philosopher is a monist and deciphering what this is supposed to mean is no easy task, especially when it comes to those writing in the early modern period because many philosophers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries include God in their ontologies. In The Principles, Anne Finch Conway offers an ontology that is often described as being both ‘vitalist’ and ‘monist’. I take this to mean that, for Conway, all that exists is in some way alive and that if asked ‘How many things, or substances, are there?’ Conway would say, ‘Just one’. But to what does this ‘oneness’ apply? And where does the point of disagreement between Conway and her interlocutors, Hobbes, Spinoza, More, and Descartes lie? In this paper, I argue that determining the answer to this first question turns out to be quite difficult. Nevertheless, we can still make sense of the second.
Comment: The article delineates the bounds of an ongoing debate in scholarship over Anne Conway's ontology. It is thus useful as an introduction to one of the most thoroughly explored areas of Conway's metaphysics. The article also puts forward a textually-informed argument for a view which often features in subsequent contributions to the debate. For a course exploring the metaphysics of the early modern period, this article features as a good example of applying an analytic methodology and setting the terms of a historically-informed debate.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
This book is a companion to logical thought and logical thinking in China with a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective. It introduces the basic ideas and theories of Chinese thought in a comprehensive and analytical way. It covers thoughts in ancient, pre-modern and modern China from a historical point of view. It deals with topics in logical (including logico-philosophical) concepts and theories rooted in China, Indian and Western Logic transplanted to China, and the development of logical studies in contemporary China and other Chinese communities. The term “philosophy of logic” or “logico-philosophical thought” is used in this book to represent “logical thought” in a broad sense which includes thinking on logical concepts, modes of reasoning, and linguistic ideas related to logic and philosophical logic. Unique in its approach, the book uses Western logical theories and philosophy of language, Chinese philology, and history of ideas to deal with the basic ideas and major problems in logical thought and logical thinking in China. In doing so, it advances the understanding of the lost tradition in Chinese philosophical studies.Comment: This is an extensive volume that covers a large array of topics regarding logic in Chinese historical and contemporary philosophy. As such, some articles might be used in a course on Chinese philosophy, but others might be used in any course in the philosophy of logic which is concerned with cross-cultural considerations.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
Logical abductivism is the method which purports to use Inference to the Best Explantion (IBE) to determine the best logical theory. The present essay argues that this is not the case, since the method fails to meet the criteria requisite for the fruitful application of IBE. This occurs due to an intrinsic difficulty in choosing the appropriate evidence and theoretical virtues which guide theory revision in logic: one’s previous conception of logic influences both these choices. Logical abductivism fails, moreover, to select the best logical theory, exactly because a lack of agreement on theory and virtues for Logic. Rather than direct comparison between two options, a more suitable approach to theory revision in logic is piecemeal, because this method neither assumes nor needs a neutral ground from which to start revising theories.Comment: This is an accessible introduction to the contemporary debate regarding "abductivism about logic" (not to be confused with "abductive logic"). It might be included in any course on the epistemology of logic, particularly for anyone interested in so-called anti-exceptionalism about logic.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
We seem to have a good grasp of how the subject matters of truth-functional composites depends on their components: it’s simply fusion (Hawke in Australas J Philos 96:697–723, 2018, Fine in Philos Studies 177:129–171, 2020, Plebani and Spolaore in Philos Q 71:605–622, 2021, Plebani and Spolaore in Philos Stud 181:247–265, 2021, Berto in Topics of Thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2022). But what relation should the subject matter of subsentential components bear to the subject matter of the sentences they feature in, and what to say about the quantified sentences of first-order predicate logic? Given how well we seem to understand sentential subject matter in the context of propositional logic, I propose a reduction of the subject matter of subsentential components and of quantified sentences to the subject matter of quantifier-free sentences. I argue that the view squares with the Fregean intuitions that gave rise to the construction of first-order logic as we know it today, motivating its adequacy as a theory of subject matter for first-order languages. I then show that this first-order aboutness theory has predictive and explanatory power, leading us to accept a modified version of Yablo’s (Aboutness, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014) principle of immanent closure, as well as a new conception of arbitrary objects/reference. Finally, I propose some potential developments and restrictions.Comment: This paper is a useful example of the kind of work being done in contemporary aboutness theory and its associated formal tools, and hence might be referenced in any intermediate/advanced course on such topics.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
“Logic and African Philosophy: Seminal Essays on African Systems of Thought” aims to put African intellectual history in perspective, with focus on the subjects of racism, logic, language, and psychology. The volume seeks to fill in the gaps left by the exclusion of African thinkers that are frequent in the curricula of African schools concerning history, sociology, philosophy, and cultural studies. The book is divided into four parts that are preceded by an introduction to link up the essays and emphasise their sociological implications. Part one is comprised of essays that opened the controversy of whether logic can be found in traditional African cultures as well as other matters like the nature of the mind and behaviour of African peoples. The essays in part two are centred on the following question: are the laws of thought present in African languages and cultures? Part three brings together essays that sparkle the debate on whether there can be such a thing as African logic, which stems from the discussions in part two. Part four is concerned on the theme of system-building in logic; contributions are written by members of the budding African philosophy movement called the “Conversational School of Philosophy” based at the University of Calabar, and the main objective of their papers is to formulate systems of African logic.Comment: This collection provides a useful introduction to a number of different perspectives regarding formal logic and deductive reasoning in African thinkers and African philosophy. The articles included in this collection are varied and cover a number of different questions concerning logic. They might accordingly be included not only in a course on African philosophy, but also perhaps a general philosophy of logic class in which logical pluralism, the formality of logic, and other related issues are addressed.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
"It must be the desire of every reasonable person to know how to justify a contention which is of sufficient importance to be seriously questioned. The explicit formulation of the principles of sound reasoning is the concern of Logic". This book discusses the habit of sound reasoning which is acquired by consciously attending to the logical principles of sound reasoning, in order to apply them to test the soundness of arguments. It isn’t an introduction to logic but it encourages the practice of logic, of deciding whether reasons in argument are sound or unsound. Stress is laid upon the importance of considering language, which is a key instrument of our thinking and is imperfect.Comment: This is a short introduction to critical thinking, with some (light) discussion of formal logic and linguistic and epistemological considerations. It is notable in that Stebbing uses a number of applied examples and provides a unified discussion of practical and theoretical reasoning. It could easily be incorporated into a syllabus on critical thinking, introductory epistemology, or (in)formal reasoning.
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Liberalism’s promise of equal rights has historically been denied to blacks and other people of color. Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism argues that rather than being irrelevant to the workings of self-conceived liberal polities today, this history of denial and its current legacy should be regarded as continuing to shape liberalism in fundamental ways. As feminists have conceptualized the dominant form of liberalism as a patriarchal liberalism, this book suggests seeing it as a racialized liberalism. Accordingly, the chapters look at racial liberalism, past and present: “white ignorance” as a guilty ignoring of reality that facilitates ongoing white racial domination; Immanuel Kant’s role as the most important liberal theorist of both personhood and sub-personhood; the centrality of racial exploitation to the economy of the United States; and the evasion of the realities of white supremacy and the need for corrective racial justice in John Rawls’s hugely influential “ideal theory” framing of the derivation of principles of social justice. Nonetheless, the book argues that a deracialized liberalism is both possible and desirable. But it will be necessary to reconstruct liberalism on a new foundation that self-consciously takes its unacknowledged racial history into account.
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, Contributed by: DRL Anniversary ConferenceAbstract:
Synopsis generated from the paper: In this conference address, Ben Kies argues that the Non-European Unity Movement must take the Ten-Point Programme as its real basis of unity, not as a distant ideal or a paper pledge. He reviews how the programme was adopted through the 1943–44 unity conferences, and how it already marked a break with the South African Indian Congress leadership. He answers four misunderstandings: that accepting the programme ends one’s duty; that it licenses immediate adventurism; that it is only a long-term goal needing a separate short-term “bread-and-butter” policy of compromise; and that theory does not matter compared with action. Against these, he insists the programme is both means and end: day-to-day struggles must demand its points as a minimum, and reforms come as by-products of that militant demand. The preamble, he stresses, teaches that Non-European oppression is deliberate ruling-class design, not Christian misunderstanding; that full equal citizenship is the only solution; that segregation must be fought inside Non-European ranks as well as outside; that the movement is anti-segregation, not anti-European, and must keep the door open to white workers as eventual allies; and that the lack of political rights is the root of landlessness, labour colour bars, poor education, and related disabilities, so the political fight for full democratic rights must be central. The ten points themselves are the shared minimum demands of African, Coloured, and Indian oppressed. Accepting the programme in letter and implication is the test of genuine unity and the main way to break racial barriers among Non-Europeans.