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El Kassar, Nadja. What Ignorance Really Is. Examining the Foundations of Epistemology of Ignorance
2018, In Social Epistemology, 32(5), pp. 300-310.
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Added by: Olivia Maegaard NielsenAbstract:
Recent years have seen a surge in publications about the epistemology of ignorance. In this article, I examine the proliferation of the concept ignorance that has come with the increased interest in the topic. I identify three conceptions of ignorance in the current literature: (1) ignorance as lack of knowledge/true belief, (2) ignorance as actively upheld false outlooks and (3) ignorance as substantive epistemic prac- tice. These different conceptions of ignorance are as of yet unacknowledged but are bound to impede epistemology of ignorance and, therefore, need to be uncovered. After discussing three unsuccessful ways of dealing with these varying conceptions, I put forward an integrated conception of ignorance that is more adequate for serving as the foundation of epistemology of ignorance. Introducing an alternative conception of ignorance provides us with a foundation for both epistemological and more broadly philosophical work on ignorance.
Comment: The text provides a great overview over different positions in the epistemologies of ignorance, while also discussing and comparing the different positions. It presupposes some background knowledge on the distinction between the new view and standard view of ignorance, for example. This makes it unsuitable for beginners, but since it is a relatively easy (and short) read that roughly outlines different positions, it would be helpful to add in a seminar/reading group, following a first introduction to the three positions that El Kassar presents: The standard/new view (e.g. Peels), the agential conception of ignorance (Mills/Medina), and the structural conception of ignorance (Alcoff). El Kassar's text would be helpful to contextualize the different positions, since she ends up suggesting a conception that integrates all three. This and other of her texts also engage in an ongoing discussion with Rik Peels that might be interesting to discuss with students.
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Explaining Religion: Notes Toward a Research Agenda
2009, In: S.A. Levin (Hg.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good. Springer Physica-Verlag.
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, Contributed by: Tammo LossauAbstract:
I begin by arguing that our model of religion is often based on Christianity. A Christian model of religion is going to look for gods and creeds, churches, priests, prayer, collective worship, moral codes, each of which is absent in some of the things we might want to call religions. And it may well ignore dietary and sumptuary rules or cult for ancestors, which are important in some of them. Religion is a paradigm of what Wittgenstein taught us to call a “family-resemblance” concept: each religion, like each member of a family, is like every other, in some respect, but there are few, if any, characteristics they all share. So the first thing we need to do in trying to decide what it is we're explaining is disaggregate the elements that come together in Christianity; if we find that they usually come together that will be one of the things that we need to explain. What then are the questions worth focusing on? I think that, from an evolutionary point of view, it will be two families of issues. First will be the social and the cognitive features of religions that make their explanation challenging. A second family of issues worth exploring, once we have identified these components, is how they fit together. Why, for example does belief in invisible beings go with rituals dealing with disaster? Why does agreement in creeds go with creating powerful social groups that last across the generations? When one finds broad patterns across many societies there are usually two natural types of explanation that spring to mind. One is that the pattern reflects shared solutions to common problems, independently discovered: evolutionary homology, as it were. The other is diffusion from common sources: in a word, copying. I suspect that much of what is share in the organization of religions globally today is the result of diffusion. But, of course, why some patterns diffuse successfully and others don't is itself something that needs explaining.Comment: The discussion of whether there is a coherent concept of religion spanning all the various traditions that are usually classified as religious is a good setup for classes on philosophy of religion. Appiah also gave a TED-Talk ("Is religion good or bad? (This is a trick question)"), in which he explains the core ideas but ends up with a different conclusion. Namely, he argues in the talk that the concept of religion is defective - contrary to the paper, where he promotes a "cluster concept" understanding of religion. Which of these conclusions is more plausible is a good discussion question.
Atencia-Linares, Paloma. Fiction, Non-fiction and Deceptive Photographic Representation
2012, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
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Added by: Clotilde TorregrossaAbstract:
In this article, I explore some issues regarding the fictional capacity of photographs and their classification as fiction or nonfiction. In particular, I address the debate on the purported “fictional incompetence” of photography, whether photographs can or cannot represent ficta. In this debate, I side with theorists who defend the view that photographs can indeed represent fictive entities or ficta, but I offer an alternative argument: I claim that photographs can indeed represent ficta by photographic means, something that most theorists have denied. Then I consider some possible objections to my view and try to offer responses. Finally, I question whether representing fictive entities or events is all that is needed for a photograph to be fictional. In this context, I suggest what I take to be the correct way to classify deceptive photographs.Comment: It's useful for an introductory module on Aesthetics or on Epistemology (fiction, deception). It's easy to read and with photos and brings forward cases that connect well with frequently discussed issues related to deceptive images.
Mama, Amina. Inventing Black Identity
1995, in Beyond the Masks. Race, Gender and Subjectivity. 1st ed. London: Taylor & Francis Group
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
Psychology has had a number of things to say about black and coloured people, none of them favourable, and most of which have reinforced stereotyped and derogatory images. Beyond the Masks is a readable account of black psychology, exploring key theoretical issues in race and gender. In it, Amina Mama examines the history of racist psychology, and of the implicit racism throughout the discipline. Beyond the Masks also offers an important theoretical perspective, and will appeal to all those involved with ethnic minorities, gender politics and questions of identity.Comment (from this Blueprint): The study of Amina Mama allows for the development of an understanding of black women's multiple subjectivities and their experience of racism and sexism, while at the same time showing that the black individual cannot be defined only via racism. She unveils the absurd effects of anti-black thought in psychology and how black psychologists have worked on developing non-racist theories of black identity.
Ipadeola, Abosede Priscilla. African Women, Illogicality and Epistemic Tyranny
2022, in Feminist African Philosophy. Women and the Politics of Difference. 1st ed. London: Routledge
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
The book argues that women's perspectives and gender issues must be mainstreamed across African philosophy in order for the discipline to truly represent the thoughts of Africans across the continent. African philosophy as an academic discipline emerged as a direct challenge to Western and Eurocentric hegemonies. It sought to actualize the project of decolonization and to contribute African perspectives to global discourses. There has, however, been a dominance of male perspectives in this field of human knowledge. This book argues that African philosophy cannot claim to have liberated people of African descent from marginalization until the androcentric nature of African philosophy is addressed. Key concepts such as Ujamaa, Negritude, Ubuntu, Consciencism, and African Socialism are explored as they relate to African women's lives or as models of inclusion or exclusion from politics. In addition to offering a feminist critique of African philosophy, the book also discusses topics that have been consistently overlooked in African philosophy. These topics include sex, sexuality, rape, motherhood, prostitution, and the low participation of women in politics. By highlighting the work of women feminist scholars such as Oyeronke Oyewumi, Nkiru Nzegwu, Ifi Amadiume, Amina Mama, and Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, the book engages with African philosophy from an African feminist viewpoint. This book will be an essential resource for students and researchers of African philosophy and gender studies.Comment (from this Blueprint): Ipadeola's work not only addresses the problem of the marginalization of African women philosophers but also allows us to understand that this problem has a massive impact on philosophy itself. Students can find in these two chapters (1) a solid overview of the androcentric problem and (2) an epistemological approach to how to solve not only the androcentric problem, but the problem of suppressive thought in general by claiming that whatever is used to suppress can no longer be understood as knowledge but as not-knowledge. This not-knowledge lacks any argumentative power. This is one of the most ingenious recent African ideas in philosophy.
Edet, Mesembe Ita. Women in the History of African Philosophy and the Imperative of ‘Her-Storical’ Perspective in the Contemporary African Philosophy
2018, in Chimakonam, J. and du Toit, L. (eds.), African Philosophy and the Epistemic Marginalization of Women. London, New York: Routledge
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
The points this chapter labors to make are straight and simple. First, the documented reflections of women in contemporary African philosophy, of individuals such as Sophie Oluwole, Anke Graness, Wangari Maathai, Nkiru Nzegwu, Ebunoluwa Oduwole, Betty Wambui, Gail Presbey, and Louise du Toit, are impossible to deny or to ignore; the heritage they (and other female thinkers on the African condition, too numerous to do justice to here) have bequeathed to African philosophy and the world deserves the recognition denied it for so long, and current African philosophical historiography must remediate this epistemic injustice. Furthermore, I maintain that concepts are crucial in philosophical discourse, and this work has thrown up fresh concepts and keywords such as ‘his-story’, ‘her-story’, ‘her-storycide’, ‘her-storicity’, and ‘Afro-herstoricism’. These concepts are pregnant with implications, consequences, and creative possibilities for African philosophy and her place in the philosophical world. These concepts encapsulate the idea that women’s lives, experiences, deeds, contributions, voices, perceptions, representations, struggles, problems, expectations and participation in human affairs have been too long neglected or undervalued in standard historical narratives, and that serious cognizance must be taken of the creative works that women have produced in the development of knowledge and how these have affected the philosophic temper. Contemporary African philosophy cannot run away from honoring its ‘debts and duties’ to women in African philosophy.Comment (from this Blueprint): Introducing the problem of women's marginalization in African philosophy via a rich historical exposition and explanation of new concepts such as his-story, her-story, her-storycide, her-storicity, and Afro-herstoricism.
Ipadeola, Abosede Priscilla. African Philosophy and the Shackles of Androcentrism
2022, in Feminist African Philosophy. Women and the Politics of Difference. 1st ed. London: Routledge
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
The book argues that women's perspectives and gender issues must be mainstreamed across African philosophy in order for the discipline to truly represent the thoughts of Africans across the continent. African philosophy as an academic discipline emerged as a direct challenge to Western and Eurocentric hegemonies. It sought to actualize the project of decolonization and to contribute African perspectives to global discourses. There has, however, been a dominance of male perspectives in this field of human knowledge. This book argues that African philosophy cannot claim to have liberated people of African descent from marginalization until the androcentric nature of African philosophy is addressed. Key concepts such as Ujamaa, Negritude, Ubuntu, Consciencism, and African Socialism are explored as they relate to African women's lives or as models of inclusion or exclusion from politics. In addition to offering a feminist critique of African philosophy, the book also discusses topics that have been consistently overlooked in African philosophy. These topics include sex, sexuality, rape, motherhood, prostitution, and the low participation of women in politics. By highlighting the work of women feminist scholars such as Oyeronke Oyewumi, Nkiru Nzegwu, Ifi Amadiume, Amina Mama, and Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, the book engages with African philosophy from an African feminist viewpoint. This book will be an essential resource for students and researchers of African philosophy and gender studies.Comment (from this Blueprint): Ipadeola's work not only addresses the problem of the marginalization of African women philosophers but also allows us to understand that this problem has a massive impact on philosophy itself. Students can find in these two chapters (1) a solid overview of the androcentric problem and (2) an epistemological approach to how to solve not only the androcentric problem, but the problem of suppressive thought in general by claiming that whatever is used to suppress can no longer be understood as knowledge but as not-knowledge. This not-knowledge lacks any argumentative power. This is one of the most ingenious recent African ideas in philosophy.
Olúwọlé, Sophie Bọsẹdé. The Rational Basis of Yoruba Ethical Thinking
1992, in Witchcraft, Reincarnation and the God-Head (Issues in African Philosophy). Lagos: Excel Publishers
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
An explanation of the Yoruba understanding of rationality, its immediate connection to practical ethics, and its roots in oral Yoruba traditions.Comment (from this Blueprint): By studying Olúwọlé, students can learn this week that African women philosophers have not worked on feminist issues alone. Olúwọlé allows one to learn about a different rationale than the commonly known Western one. This can nicely be juxtaposed with philosophers like Descartes or Kant. Olúwọlé's philosophy of rationality and the connection of this philosophy with Yoruba culture, esp. with Yoruba oral traditions of philosophy, allows to re-evaluate the (seemingly) undeniable evidence of Western philosophy. Furthermore, it also shows some commonalities that were denied in later Western philosophical history (for instance, that at the inception of Western philosophy we do find in Socrates another oral philosopher).
Amadiume, Ifi. Gender and the Economy
1987, in Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London/New Jersey: Zed Books
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
In 1987, more than a decade before the dawn of queer theory, Ifi Amadiume published the groundbreaking 'Male Daughters, Female Husbands' to critical acclaim. This compelling, enduring, and highly original book argues that gender, as constructed in Western feminist discourse, did not exist in Africa before the colonial imposition of a dichotomous understanding of sexual difference. Amadiume examines the African societal structures that enabled people to achieve power within fluid masculine and feminine roles. At a time when gender and queer theory is viewed by many as overly focused on identity politics, this apt text not only warns against the danger of projecting Western notions of difference onto other cultures, but also questions the very concept of gender itself.Comment (from this Blueprint): Amadiume explains the institutional and ideological power of women in the pre-colonial 19th century, the downfall of this power during colonialism, and the continuation of women's marginalization in society. This study allows to develop an understanding of the highly complex sex/gender understanding in African (here: Igbo) societies. It will show that the Western understanding of sex and gender might be fruitfully applicable for certain (Western) societies, but is only of limited (if not detrimental) use within African spaces. The book is thus not only a lesson in African philosophy, African feminism, or Igbo thought, it also teaches an important caveat with regard to the cultural relativity of concepts (like sex and gender).
Olúwọlé, Sophie Bọsẹdé. Philosophy and Oral Tradition
1999, in Philosophy and Oral Tradition. Lagos: African Research Konsultancy (ARK)
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
From: Sophie Oluwole: Celebrating the Radical Spirit of African Philosophy, By Tunji Olaopa
In Philosophy and Oral Tradition (1997), Sophie Oluwole urges us to return to Africa’s oral tradition as the source of excavating an authentic foundation of Africa’s intellectual culture which the West has tried so hard to undermine and destroy. One argument that underlies the relevance of Africa’s oral tradition is that the traditional and cultural practices of the past must have been guided by some form of logic and rational principles which not only predate the Western scientific canon, but which cannot also be subsumed totally under it.
Comment (from this Blueprint): By studying Olúwọlé, students can learn this week that African women philosophers have not worked on feminist issues alone. Olúwọlé allows one to learn about a different rationale than the commonly known Western one. This can nicely be juxtaposed with philosophers like Descartes or Kant. Olúwọlé's philosophy of rationality and the connection of this philosophy with Yoruba culture, esp. with Yoruba oral traditions of philosophy, allows to re-evaluate the (seemingly) undeniable evidence of Western philosophy. Furthermore, it also shows some commonalities that were denied in later Western philosophical history (for instance, that at the inception of Western philosophy we do find in Socrates another oral philosopher).