Latest additions
Friedell, David, Liao, Shen-yi. How Statues Speak
2022, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 80(4): 444-452
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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai & Chong-Ming LimAbstract:
We apply a familiar distinction from philosophy of language to a class of material artifacts that are sometimes said to “speak”: statues. By distinguishing how statues speak at the locutionary level versus at the illocutionary level, or what they say versus what they do, we obtain the resource for addressing two topics. First, we can explain what makes statues distinct from street art. Second, we can explain why it is mistaken to criticize—or to defend—the continuing presence of statues based only on what they represent. Both explanations are driven by the same core idea: the significance of statues arises primarily from what they do, and not what they say.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper can be used for discussions of the structure of commemorative speech within speech act theory.
Stemplowska, Zofia. The Rhodes Statue: Honour, Shame and Responsibility
2021, The Political Quarterly, 92(4): 629-637
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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai & Chong-Ming LimAbstract:
Oriel College persists in displaying a statue of Cecil Rhodes, despite his role in British colonialism and despite opposition from the Rhodes Must Fall movement. This article considers arguments in support of Oriel's position—including three versions of the charge that removing the statue might distort history—and show that they all fail. I argue that the conclusion that the statue should be removed, despite possible costs and complexity, follows once we realise that the statue makes demands on our attention and once we correctly understand that the descendants of those previously oppressed by Rhodes and who are currently subject to racism have a special insight, standing and claim to shape the environment in which they study, work and live.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper can be used for discussions on how we should respond to competing demands on our attention in the context of commemorations.
Shapshay, Sandra. What Is the Monumental?
2021, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 79(2): 145-160
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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai & Chong-Ming LimAbstract:
The aesthetic category of the sublime has been theorized (especially in the Kantian tradition) as integrally intertwined with the moral. Paradigmatic experiences of the sublime, such as gazing up at the starry night sky, or out at a storm-whipped sea, lead in a moral or religious direction depending on the cognitive stock brought to the experience, since they typically involve a feeling of awe and reflection on the peculiar situation of the human being in nature. The monumental is a similar aesthetic category, integrally intertwined with the political, but, by contrast, has garnered almost no attention from aestheticians. My main goal in this paper is to sketch a theory of ‘the monumental’ as an aesthetic category—one that is a species of the sublime but differs qualitatively from the natural/environmental sublime in significant ways, and thus merits a distinctive label. In doing so, I aim to shed light on the nature and power of monuments specifically, and to begin to address a lacuna in our understanding of a long-standing and culturally important form of public art.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper can be used for discussions of whether the 'monumental' is a unique aesthetic category, especially in relation to the sublime.
Lai, Ten-Herng. Political Vandalism as Counter‐Speech: A Defence of Defacing and Destroying Tainted Monuments
2020, European Journal of Philosophy, 28(3): 602-616
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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai & Chong-Ming LimAbstract:
Tainted political symbols ought to be confronted, removed, or at least recontextualized. Despite the best efforts to achieve this, however, official actions on tainted symbols often fail to take place. In such cases, I argue that political vandalism—the unauthorized defacement, destruction, or removal of political symbols—may be morally permissible or even obligatory. This is when, and insofar as, political vandalism serves as fitting counter-speech that undermines the authority of tainted symbols in ways that match their publicity, refuses to let them speak in our name, and challenges the derogatory messages expressed through a mechanism I call derogatory pedestalling: the glorification or honoring of certain individuals or ideologies that can only make sense when members of a targeted group are taken to be inferior.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper can be used for discussions of how defacing objectionable commemorations can transform their speech.
Dixon, Daisy. Artistic (Counter) Speech
2022, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 80(4): 409-419
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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai & Chong-Ming LimAbstract:
Some visual artworks constitute hate speech because they can perform oppressive illocutionary acts. This illocution-based analysis of art reveals how responsive curation and artmaking undermines and manages problematic art. Drawing on the notion of counterspeech as an alternative tool to censorship to handle art-based hate speech, this article proposes aesthetic blocking and aesthetic spotlighting. I then show that under certain conditions, this can lead to eventual metaphysical destruction of the artwork; a way to destroy harmful art without physically destroying it.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper can be used for discussions of how artistic interventions can constitute counter-speech to commemorative speech.
Burch-Brown, Joanna. Should Slavery’s Statues be Preserved? On Transitional Justice and Contested Heritage
2022, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 39(5): 807-824
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Added by: Ten-Herng Lai & Chong-Ming LimAbstract:
What should we do with statues and place-names memorializing people who committed human-rights abuses linked to slavery and postslavery racism? In this article, I draw on UN principles of transitional justice to address this question. I propose that a successful approach should meet principles of transitional justice recognized by the United Nations, including affirming rights to justice, truth, reparations, and guarantees of nonrecurrence of human rights violations. I discuss four strategies for handling contested heritage, examining strengths and weaknesses of each strategy. Examples from Bristol, England, highlight common challenges and positive lessons.Comment (from this Blueprint): This paper deploys principles of transitional justice to review the payoffs of different approaches to objectionable commemorations.
Maibom, Heidi. The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works
2022,
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Added by: Jimena ClavelPublisher’s Note:
The Space Between argues that empathy makes us less, not more, biased, contrary to what many seem to think. How? The fact is that a person sits in the center of a web of relationships with her body, her environment, her interests, and other people. These relationships shape how she thinks about herself and the world around her, what she needs, what she wants, and what she values. This is a perspective. We each have one. It represents the significance of the world to us. At the same time, it ignores what matters to others and how or what we are to them. Taking another person’s perspective is a way of reorienting that egocentric image so that it centers on someone else. Relying on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, philosopher Heidi Maibom argues that although a perspective is unique to a person in some ways, it nonetheless possesses characteristics common to all perspectives. This commonality enables us to use our own first-person perspective to represent what matters to others, by imagining that we are at the center of their web of relationships. It also helps reveal who we actually are. It is this form of shifting perspectives that is at the core of impartiality, Maibom argues, and not the cold, scientific eye of so-called objectivity. Why? Because perspectives are ineliminable. A point of view is always a point of view, only an “objective” one leaves out many of the things that matter to human beings.Comment: This book discusses what empathy is, as well as its value in the face of a series of criticisms that have been advanced against it. It can be used in a course on moral psychology, philosophy of imagination, or philosophy of emotions to discuss empathy.
Gangopadhyay, Nivedita. Experiential Blindness Revisited: In Defence of a Case of Embodied Cognition
2010, Cognitive Systems Research 11(4): 396-407.
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Added by: Jimena Clavel, Contributed by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
The sensorimotor theory (Noë, 2004, Noë, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed “experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams and Aizawa, 2008, Aizawa, 2007) that the cases described by Noë as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noë’s sensorimotor theory they do not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content.
Comment: The paper discusses the sensorimotor theory of perception. It can be used as further reading in an advanced course in philosophy of mind or philosophy of perception.
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Explaining Emotions
1978, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 75, issue 3
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Added by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
Sometimes our emotions change straightaway when we learn that what we believed is not true. The grieving husband recovers when he learns that, because she missed her plane, his wife did not die in the fatal plane crash. But often changes in emotions do not appropriately follow changes in belief. Their tenacity, their inertia, suggests that there is akrasia of the emotions; it reveals the complex structure of their intentionality.'Comment: In this paper, Rorty discusses the complexity of the intentionality of emotions by focusing on the phenomenon of akrasia. The paper can be included in a session on the recalcitrance of emotions or on the intentionality of emotions. The paper can be listed as recommended reading for an advance undergraduate course or as mandatory for a graduate course.
Robinson, Jenefer. Startle
1995, The Journal of Philosophy, XCII, No. 2
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Added by: Jimena ClavelAbstract:
Philosophers tend to take very sophisticated and culture bound emotions as their paradigms for emotion in general. So Gilbert Ryle discusses an interest in symbolic logic; William Lyons discusses being awestruck by the beauty of a golden eagle; Patricia Greenspan talks about being warily suspicious of an insurance salesman; and Robert Gordon talks about being embar rassed about the publicity for one's wedding.' Psychologists, on the other hand, tend to stick to very different examples; several of them have studied the startle reaction as an example of an emo tion, a suggestion most philosophers would consider laughable. I shall argue that startle does belong on the spectrum of emotional response, and that indeed, if we abstract from the startle response, we can come up with a useful model of emotional response in general.Comment: This paper develops a non-cognitive theory of emotions. Robinson begins with a characterization of 'startle' as an emotional reaction. She then generalizes from these characteristics to a more general theory of emotions and emotional reactions. The paper is a helpful introduction to non-cognitive theories of emotions. It is a nice piece to contrast cognitive and non-cognitive theories that focuses on a specific emotion.