McLean, Sheila. A Patient’s Right to Know: Information Disclosure, the Doctor and the Law
1995, Aldershot: Dartmouth.
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Added by: Simon FoktPublisher’s Note:
Comment: This volume addresses issues concerning the rights of patients. Particular issues examined include the patient's right to consent to or refuse treatment, and issues related to valid consent and its dependence on information, including full details regarding the risks associated with a particular course of treatment. Useful as further reading in applied ethics classes, or in any moral or political philosophy teaching related to consent. Additionally, can be useful in discussions on the differences and similarities between the moral and legal approaches to the issue of consent.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time
2018, Lexington Books
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández VillarrealPublisher’s Note:
This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the î and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In the preface and conclusion, McLeod introduces some relevant methodological aspects that must be considered in order to understand Mayan philosophy. The first one, is that of the nature of the sources from which we can reconstruct Mayan philosophical thought that are available to use. Unlike the source of Ancient Mexica intellectual culture which are relatively abundant, the availability of Mayan sources is more limited. The second one, is about the nature of Mayan language: written Maya consists of pictograms which represent both ideograms or glyphs and syllabic sounds. The author also discusses the fact that some forms of Mayan languages and Mayan peoples are alive. Finally, this section of McLeod’s book also discusses the philosophical concepts of truth and personhood.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time
2018, Lexington Books
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment (from this Blueprint): McLeod begins by asking whether, for ancient Mayans, the name of rulers or gods is a case of proper names or of function names, i.e. a description of a role. He is interested in a Mayan view discussed in previous chapters according to which the attributes of e.g. an exemplary ruler are attached to the role they fulfilled. For McLeod, the Mayan view is partly supported by their metaphysical views on the self. As preamble to his discussion of the Mayan notion of personhood, McLeod provides some comparison between the Mayan view of the self to that of other traditions. He refers, too, to the sacrality of objects discussed in the previous session. McLeod, then, moves on to discuss the ideas that Mayan personhood can be collective and that someone’s essence can extend to material artifacts. The text also includes a discussion of the Mayan notion of substitution (k’ex), the act in which someone took the essence of a god.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya. Lords of Time
2018, Lexington Books
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
McPherson, Lionel K.. Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?
2007, Ethics 117(3): 524-546.
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Added by: Helen MorleyIntroduction: Many people, including philosophers, believe that terrorism is necessarily and egregiously wrong. I will call this “the dominant view.” The dominant view maintains that terrorism is akin to murder. This forecloses the possibility that terrorism, under any circumstances, could be morally permissible—murder, by definition, is wrongful killing. The unqualified wrongness of terrorism is thus part of this understanding of terrorism. I will criticize the dominant view. Some philosophers have argued that terrorism might not be impermissible on either a rights‐based or a consequentialist analysis. But I will not pursue the question of whether terrorism could ever be justifiable. Rather, I will argue that the dominant view’s condemnatory attitude toward terrorism as compared to conventional war cannot be fully sustained. I propose that a version of the argument that terrorists do not have adequate authority to undertake political violence—and not the prominent argument that noncombatants should be immune from deliberate use of force against them—is the most plausible basis for finding terrorism objectionable.Comment: McPherson challenges the view that there is something distinctively wrong about terrorism as compared to conventional warfare. In addition to a discussion on terrorism it presents challenges to traditional interpretations of just war theory.
McRae, James. Cutting the cat in one: Zen Master Dōgen on the moral status of nonhuman animals
2014, In Neil Dalal and Chloë Taylor (eds.) Asian Perspectives on Animal Ethics. London: Routledge
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Added by: Björn FreterAbstract:
Dōgen’s ethics of nonhuman animals is grounded in wisdom of interdependent arising, which produces a sense of compassion for all beings, including nonhuman animals. While there are rules and precepts that prohibit the killing of living beings—human and nonhuman alike—the precepts are not unbreakable universal laws, but rather guidelines that promote the cultivation of the twin virtues of wisdom and compassion, which are the real ground of ethical conduct in Zen. Though all beings are part of the same karmic cycle of rebirth, human beings have a special soteriological status as thinking, moral beings, which means only we are capable of realizing enlightenment. This results in an ethic that is somewhat weaker than the strong animal rights view: while causing suffering to sentient beings is wrong, it may be done on those rare occasions when it promotes the awakening of human beings. This means that eating meat or using animals for medical testing might be justified, so long as there is no reasonable alternative available that would minimize suffering and maximize awakening more effectively. Even though skillful means might be used to justify violations of the precepts against killing, Dōgen argues that the only time a bad unintended consequence is justified is when the agent’s motive is pure and there is no better option. Zen prompts us to continually reevaluate the ways in which we both perceive and conceive the world. The purpose of a kōan is to discourage our everyday ways of thinking and push us to a higher level of understanding grounded in interdependent arising. Often, we choose to harm sentient beings, not because we have no other choice, but because we lack the imagination to create alternative solutions that minimize suffering to the greatest possible extent. The law of karma is always in effect: the infliction of wanton suffering upon sentient beings will become an impediment to one’s awakening.Comment (from this Blueprint): Introduction into Dōgen’s ethics of nonhuman animals based on the wisdom of interdependent arising producing a sense of compassion for all beings, including nonhuman animals.
McShane, Katie. Neosentimentalism and Environmental Ethics
2011, Environmental Ethics, 33 (1): 5-23.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordAbstract: Neosentimentalism provides environmental ethics with a theory of value that might be particularly useful for solving many of the problems that have plagued the field since its early days. In particular, a neosentimentalist understanding of value offers us hope for making sense of (1) what intrinsic value might be and how we could know whether parts of the natural world have it; (2) the extent to which value is an essentially anthropocentric concept; and (3) how our understanding of value could be compatible with both a respectable naturalism and a robust normativity.Comment: This reading is could be used well as a response to Rolston or Callicott's versions of environmental value. The article also covers a number of problems endemic to formal value theory (especially a neosentimentalist theory of the nature of value). It would work best in an upper level undergraduate course on value theory or environmental ethics.
McSweeney, Michaela Markham. Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic
2019, Philosophy Compass. 14:e12563.
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘ One True Logic ’ ; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world; and third, that the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.
Comment: The paper provides a simple, lucid argument for why many metaphysical views are committed to what the author calls metaphysical logical realism. For the purpose of discussion, it may be paired with an attempt to resist the commitment. More generally, it might be helpful as a survey of logical commitments of metaphysical views.
McTernan, Emily. How to Make Citizens Behave: Social Psychology, Liberal Virtues, and Social Norms
2014, Journal of Political Philosophy 22(1): 84-104.
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Added by: Carl FoxAbstract: It is widely conceded by liberals that institutions alone are insufficient to ensure that citizens behave in the ways required for a liberal state to flourish, be stable, or function at all. A popular solution proposes cultivating virtues in order to secure the desired behaviours of citizens, where institutions alone would not suffice. A range of virtues are proposed to fill a variety of purported gaps in the liberal political order. Some appeal to virtues in order to secure state stability; Rawls, for instance, claims that ‘citizens must have a sense of justice and the political virtues that support political and social institutions’ in order to ensure an ‘enduring society’. For Galston, citizens must possess a range of virtues in order for the state to function, including the virtues of courage, independence, tolerance, willingness to engage in public discourse, and law-abidingness.Comment: Challenges the relevance of debates about virtue for liberals concerned with stability and argues that they would be better advised to look to social norms for assistance. Raises some interesting questions for proponents of liberalism and does a nice job of envisioning the instrumental potential of social norms for political theorists. Very useful further reading for anyone interested in (or writing on) either stability or social norms.
McWeeny, Jennifer. Princess Elisabeth and the Mind-Body Problem
2011, in Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 297-300.
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Added by: Alison Stone, Contributed by: Simon FoktIntroduction: The mind – body problem exposes the inconsistencies that arise when mind and body are conceived as ontologically distinct entities. Human experience clearly shows that our minds interact with our bodies. Philosophers who reject the identity of mind and body or mind and brain face the task of explaining these relations by illuminating the precise manner in which the mind moves the body and the body affects the mind. It is unsurprising, then, that the mind – body problem was first articulated as a response to René Descartes’ dualistic philosophy [...]Comment: A very short piece that sets out Elisabeth's core criticisms of Descartes' mind/body dualism. Useful bibliography included. Can be used as part of a week's reading on Descartes, Cartesian dualism, and/or Elisabeth's responses to Descartes.
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