Knobe, Joshua. Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences
2019, Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56(2), 29-36
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract:
Within the existing metaphilosophical literature on experimental philosophy, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the claim that there are large differences in philosophical intuitions between people of different demographic groups. Some philosophers argue that this claim has important metaphilosophical implications; others argue that it does not. However, the actual empirical work within experimental philosophy seems to point to a very different sort of metaphilosophical question. Specifically, what the actual empirical work suggests is that intuitions are surprisingly robust across demographic groups. Prior to empirical study, it seemed plausible that unexpected patterns of intuition found in one demographic group would not emerge in other demographic groups. Yet, again and again, empirical work obtains the opposite result: that unexpected patterns found in one demographic group actually emerge also in other demographic groups. I cite 30 studies that find this sort of robustness. I then argue that to the extent that metaphilosophical work is to engage with the actual findings from experimental philosophy, it needs to explore the implications of the surprising robustness of philosophical intuitions across demographic differences.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this paper, Joshua Knobe challenges the widespread view that philosophical intuitions are variable across the demographic groups. Instead, he argues that the actual results show that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across demographic groups.
Knobe, Joshua. Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across Both Demographic Groups and Situations
2021, Filozofia Nauki 29 (12), 11-76
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract:
In the early years of experimental philosophy, a number of studies seemed to suggest that people’s philosophical intuitions were unstable. Some studies seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across demographic groups; others seemed to suggest that philosophical intuitions were unstable across situations. Now, approximately two decades into the development of experimental philosophy, we have much more data concerning these questions. The data available now appear to suggest that philosophical intuitions are actually quite stable. In particular, they suggest that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across both demographic groups and situations.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this comprehensive paper, Knobe further unpacks his claim about the stability of intuitions across demographic differences. He scrutinizes some of the studies invoked by Stich & Machery, and argues that many of them do indeed provide evidence of stability.
Kochiras, Hilarie. Locke’s Philosophy of Science
2009, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: This article examines questions connected with the two features of Locke's intellectual landscape that are most salient for understanding his philosophy of science: (1) the profound shift underway in disciplinary boundaries, in methodological approaches to understanding the natural world, and in conceptions of induction and scientific knowledge; and (2) the dominant scientific theory of his day, the corpuscular hypothesis. Following the introduction, section 2 addresses questions connected to changing conceptions of scientific knowledge. What does Locke take science (scientia) and scientific knowledge to be generally, why does he think that scientia in natural philosophy is beyond the reach of human beings, and what characterizes the conception of human knowledge in natural philosophy that he develops? Section 3 addresses the question provoked by Locke's apparently conflicting treatments of the corpuscular hypothesis. Does he accept or defend the corpuscular hypothesis? If not, what is its role in his thought, and what explains its close connection to key theses of the Essay? Since a scholarly debate has arisen about the status of the corpuscular hypothesis for Locke, Section 3 reviews some main positions in that debate. Section 4 considers the relationship between Locke's thought and that of a figure instrumental to the changing conceptions of scientific knowledge, Isaac NewtonComment: Perfect as an introduction for undergraduates to Locke's philosophy of science. It is a really good overview article.
Kochiras, Hilarie. Belief Contexts and Epistemic possibility
2006, Principia 10(1): 1-20.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Although epistemic possibility figures in several debates, those debates have had relatively little contact with one another. G. E. Moore focused squarely upon analyzing epistemic uses of the phrase, 'It's possible that p', and in doing so he made two fundamental assumptions. First, he assumed that epistemic possibility statements always express the epistemic position of a community, as opposed to that of an individual speaker. Second, he assumed that all epistemic uses of 'It's possible that p' are analyzable in terms of knowledge, not belief. A number of later theorists, including Keith DeRose, provide alternative accounts of epistemic possibility, while retaining Moore's two assumptions. Neither assumption has been explicitly challenged, but Jaakko Hintikka's analysis provides a basis for doing so. Drawing upon Hintikka's analysis, I argue that some epistemic possibility statements express only the speaker's individual epistemic state, and that contra DeRose, they are not degenerate community statements but a class in their own right. I further argue that some linguistic contexts are belief- rather than knowledge-based, and in such contexts, what is possible for a speaker depends not upon what she knows, but upon what she believes.Comment: Useful as a further reading for postgraduate courses in epistemology. Previous knowledge of the Moorean account and David Lewis' work on shifting contexts is required for a better understanding of this paper.
Kok-Chor Tan. Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism About us
2004, Cambridge University Press.
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Added by: Simon FoktPublisher's Note: The cosmopolitan idea of justice is commonly accused of not taking seriously the special ties and commitments of nationality and patriotism. This is because the ideal of impartial egalitarianism, which is central to the cosmopolitan view, seems to be directly opposed to the moral partiality inherent to nationalism and patriotism. In this book, Kok-Chor Tan argues that cosmopolitan justice, properly understood, can accommodate and appreciate nationalist and patriotic commitments, setting limits for these commitments without denying their moral significance. This book offers a defense of cosmopolitan justice against the charge that it denies the values that ordinarily matter to people, and a defence of nationalism and patriotism against the charge that these morally partial ideals are fundamentally inconsistent with the obligations of global justice. Accessible and persuasive, this book will have broad appeal to political theorists and moral philosophers.Comment: This book touches on a number of very topical issues and is a great way to show philosophy's practical application in introductory courses. Particularly useful will be Chapter 2 which sets out the need for cosmopolitan justice and discusses the difference between the duties of aid and global justice. Chapters 5, 'Nationalism and cosmopolitanism', and 7, 'The limits of patriotism', are likely to divide opinions and thus can provide excellent grounds for class debate and discussion. All those and other chapters are very topical and can be discussed with reference to examples from current politics.
Kólá Abímbólá. A critique of Methodological Naturalism
2006, Science in Context, 19(2): 191-213.
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Larry Laudan defends "methodological naturalism" - the position that scientific methodology can be fully empirical and be subject to radical change without sacrificing the rationality of science. This view has two main components: (a) the historical claim that just as substantive science has changed and developed in response to new information and evidence, so have the basic rules and methods which guide theory appraisal in science changed in response to new information about the world; and (b) the philosophical claim that all aspects of science are in principle subject to radical change and evolution in the light of new information about the world. In this paper, the athor argues that one main historical example used by Laudan, namely, the scientific revolution that accompanied the change from the corpuscular to the wave theory of light, does not in fact support the view that there have been radical methodological changes in the history of science.Comment: Interesting paper about the question of methodological changes in the history of science. Its clarity makes it suitable for undergraduate courses in philosophy of science.
Kolbrener, William, Michelson, Michal (eds.). Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith
2007, Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
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, Contributed by: DRL Anniversary ConferenceAbstract:
Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith includes essays from diverse disciplinary perspectives to consider the full range of Astell's political, theological, philosophical, and poetic writings. The volume does not eschew the more traditional scholarly interest in Astell's concerns about gender; rather, it reveals how Astell's works require attention not only for their role in the development of early modern feminism, but also for their interventions on subjects ranging from political authority to educational theory, from individual agency to divine service, and from Cartesian ethics to Lockean epistemology. Given the vast breadth of her writings, her active role within early modern political and theological debates, and the sophisticated complexity of her prose, Astell has few parallels among her contemporaries. Mary Astell: Reason, Gender, Faith bestows upon Astell the attention which she deserves not merely as a proto-feminist, but as a major figure of the early modern period.
Kongzi (Confucius). Analects (Selections)
2005, In: Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Second Edition). Edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden. Hackett.
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Added by: Chris Blake-TurnerSummary: Selections from the Analects of Kongzi (Confucius), a foundational text in Chinese philosophy. It is split into twenty books recounting things that the Master (Kongzi) and his disciples said and did. Much of the rest of Chinese philosophy owes a debt, more or less explicit, to this work. Kongzi seeks the cultivation of virtue through ritual, so that worthy persons will occupy positions of power and influence. Society will thereby return to some of the splendor of the bygone ages of the legendary Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors, as well as the more recent Xia, Shang, and Western Zhou dynasties.Comment: The selections are best read in their entirety, as the work is holistic and difficult to interpret piecemeal. (So reading the whole text is better still!) It's helpful to stress Kongzi's particularism, as this makes sense of seemingly contradictory pronouncements he makes in different contexts. But if you're looking to incorporate some Classical Chinese philosophy in a course without space for the whole thing, the selections from Book One include many key Confucian themes: ritual, the ideal of a junzi or gentleman, virtue, filial piety, and the appeal to tradition. Either way, it's probably wise to give students some historical context to help understand the appeal of harking back to older traditions.
König-Pralong, Catherine. La Colonie Philosophique: Écrire l’histoire de la philosophie aux XVIIIe-XIXe siècles
2019, Paris: Éditions EHESS.
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, Contributed by: DRL Anniversary ConferenceAbstract:
L’histoire de la philosophie est une invention des Lumières. En Allemagne comme en France, cette discipline nouvelle a contribué à façonner l’imaginaire occidental moderne en opérant une double colonisation savante de la pensée. Colonisation du temps, d’une part: l’Européen est considéré dorénavant comme le fruit d’une histoire longue de la pensée qui, grâce aux révolutions scientifique et morale, aboutit à l’âge de la raison, de l’autonomie et de la modernité. Colonisation de l’espace, d’autre part : les historiens de la philosophie, à l’instar des ethnologues ou des linguistes, distinguent désormais l’Europe des autres « cultures», qui deviennent le terrain des enquêtes empiriques. L’Europe est ainsi devenue, par le discours de l’histoire de la philosophie aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, le territoire exclusif de la rationalité analytique et réflexive. La colonie philosophique propose une enquête interdisciplinaire sur ce tournant aux conséquences profondes pour la fabrique du monde contemporain. --- The history of philosophy is an invention of the Enlightenment. In Germany as in France, this new discipline helped to shape the modern Western imagination by carrying out a twofold scholarly colonisation of thought. Colonisation of time, on the one hand: the European is now seen as the fruit of a long history of thought which, thanks to the scientific and moral revolutions, led to the age of reason, autonomy and modernity. Colonisation of space, on the other hand: historians of philosophy, like ethnologists and linguists, now distinguish Europe from other 'cultures', which become the terrain of empirical investigation. Europe thus became, through the discourse of the history of philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the exclusive territory of analytical and reflexive rationality. La colonie philosophique offers an interdisciplinary investigation into this turning point, which has far-reaching consequences for the making of the contemporary world.
Kornegay, R. Jo. Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics and Abortion: Abortion Ethics without Metaphysics
2011, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14(1): 51-71.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: This essay explicates and evaluates the roles that fetal metaphysics and moral status play in Rosalind Hursthouse's abortion ethics. It is motivated by Hursthouse's puzzling claim in her widely anthologized paper Virtue Ethics and Abortion that fetal moral status and (by implication) its underlying metaphysics are in a way, fundamentally irrelevant to her position. The essay clarifies the roles that fetal ontology and moral status do in fact play in her abortion ethics. To this end, it presents and then develops her fetal metaphysics of the potential and actual human being, which she merely adumbrates in her more extensive treatment of abortion ethics in her book Beginning Lives. The essay then evaluates her fetal ontology in light of relevant research on fetal neural and psychological development. It concludes that her implied view that the late-stage fetus is an actual human being is defensible. The essay then turns to the analysis of late-stage abortions in her paper and argues that it is importantly incomplete.Comment: This paper provides a detailed analysis and critique of Rosalind Hursthouse's argument in 'Virtue Ethics and Abortion'. As Hursthouse's paper is frequently taught, this article would provide a good counterpoint to it. This dialogue could form part of an examination of the practical application of virtue ethics, or as part of an examination of the applied ethics of abortion from alternative ethical perspectives. This paper is suitable for undergraduate or graduate teaching.
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