Galgut, Elisa. Hume’s Aesthetic Standard
2012, Hume Studies 38 (2):183-200
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: AnonymousAbstract:
In his famous essay “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume seeks to reconcile two conflicting intuitions—the intuition that there is a great variety of taste, on the one hand, and the intuition that there is an artistic standard based on taste that has stood the test of time, on the other—by appealing to the joint verdict of his “true judges” or “ideal critics.” But Hume’s critics have themselves been the objects of criticism as not providing an adequate basis on which to establish a normative aesthetic standard based on taste. In this paper, I defend an interpretation of Hume’s ideal critics as akin to judges in certain common law traditions, and I argue that Hume does satisfactorily resolve conflicting intuitions about the nature of taste.Comment: This paper offers a reading of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste" that examines the role of the 'true judges'
Galgut, Elisa. Raising the Bar in the Justification of Animal Research
2015, Journal of Animal Ethics 5 (1):5-19
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: AnonymousAbstract:
Animal ethics committees (AECs) appeal to utilitarian principles in their justification of animal experiments. Although AECs do not grant rights to animals, they do accept that animals have moral standing and should not be unnecessarily harmed. Although many appeal to utilitarian arguments in the justification of animal experiments, I argue that AECs routinely fall short of the requirements needed for such justification in a variety of ways. I argue that taking the moral status of animals seriously—even if this falls short of granting rights to animals—should lead to a thorough revision or complete elimination of many of the current practices in animal experimentation.Comment: This paper can be used in a course on animal research ethics.
Galgut, Elisa. A Critique of the Cultural Defense of Animal Cruelty
2019, Journal of Animal Ethics 9 (2):184
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: AnonymousAbstract:
I argue that cultural practices that harm animals are not morally defensible: Tradition cannot justify cruelty. My conclusion applies to all such practices, including ones that are long-standing, firmly entrenched, or held sacred by their practitioners. Following Mary Midgley, I argue that cultural practices are open to moral scrutiny, even from outsiders. Because animals have moral status, they may not be harmed without good reason. I argue that the importance of religious or cultural rituals to adherents does not count as a sufficiently good reason to harm or kill animals, since rituals are inherently symbolic, and cultures are able to adapt and change, making adherence to cruel traditions unnecessary.Comment: This paper can be used in a class on animal ethics / rights. It argues that rituals involving harm or cruelty to animals are not justifiable. The paper can be used in a discussion on animal rights issues and multi-culturalism.
Garavaso, Pieranna. The Woman of Reason: On the Re-appropriation of Rationality and the Enjoyment of Philosophy
2015, Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science, pp.185-202.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
This paper starts out from two feminist criticisms of classical logic, namely Andrea Nye’s general rejection of logic and Val Plumwood’s criticism of the standard notion of negation in classical logic. I then look at some of Gottlob Frege’s reflections on negation in one of his later Logical Investigations. It will appear clear that Frege’s notion of negation is not easily pegged in the general category of ‘Otherness’ that Plumwood uses to characterize negation in classical logic. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the claim that the adversarial method of argumentation in philosophy is hostile to feminist goals and perhaps responsible for the low numbers of women engaged in academic philosophy. Against this hypothesis, I claim that a more naturalistic perspective on logic can avoid essentialism and provide a feminist friendly and pluralist view of logic, human reasoning, and philosophical argumentation.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Garcia, Jorge L. A.. Health versus Harm: Euthanasia and Physicians’ Duties
2007, Journal of Medicine and Philsophy, 31 (1): 7-24.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Rochelle DuFordAbstract: This essay rebuts Gary Seay's efforts to show that committing euthanasia need not conflict with a physician's professional duties. First, I try to show how his misunderstanding of the correlativity of rights and duties and his discussion of the foundation of moral rights undermine his case. Second, I show aspects of physicians' professional duties that clash with euthanasia, and that attempts to avoid this clash lead to absurdities. For professional duties are best understood as deriving from professional virtues and the commitments and purposes with which the professional as such ought to act, and there is no plausible way in which her death can be seen as advancing the patient's medical welfare. Third, I argue against Prof. Seay's assumption that apparent conflicts among professional duties must be resolved through 'balancing' and argue that, while the physician's duty to extend life is continuous with her duty to protect health, any duty to relieve pain is subordinate to these. Finally, I show that what is morally determinative here, as throughout the moral life, is the agent's intention and that Prof. Seay's implicitly preferred consequentialism threatens not only to distort moral thinking but would altogether undermine the medical (and any other) profession and its internal ethics.Comment: This text will mostly be of use to advanced students (or courses) focusing on the ethics of physician assisted suicide or euthanasia. It presents a detailed rebuttal to Seay's "Euthanasia and Physicians' Moral Duties," so it will be of most use to students who have read Seay's text or are deeply familiar with defenses of euthanasia based in consequentialist moral reasoning.
Gardiner, Georgi. In Defence of Reasonable Doubt
2017, Journal of Applied Philosophy 34(2): 221–41.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
In criminal trials the state must establish, to a particular standard of proof, the defendant's guilt. The most widely used and important standard of proof for criminal conviction is the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt' standard. But what legitimates this standard, rather than an alternative? One view holds the standard of proof should be determined or justified – at least in large part – by its consequences. In this spirit, Laudan uses crime statistics to estimate risks the average citizen runs of being violently victimised and falsely convicted. He argues that since the former risk is higher, and the aggregate harms are worse, the standard of proof should be substantially lowered. He presents a formula for calculating the preferred standard. In this article I outline various ways Laudan's uses of crime statistics are flawed, and explain how he substantially overestimates risks of victimhood and underestimates costs of false convictions. I also explain why his formula is mistaken, and illuminate consequences Laudan neglects. I conclude that, even if consequences determine the appropriate standard of proof, Laudan's arguments fail to show the standard is too high. I conclude by suggesting that the inadequacies of Laudan's reasoning might be good news for consequence-based justifications of the standard of proof.Comment: You could assign Larry Laudan (2011), ‘The Rules of Trial, Political Morality and the Costs of Error’ in Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, pp. 195–227, followed by this essay as it provides a direct critique of the former. It shows how dangerous poorly reasoning with numbers can be. Students and teachers do not need to know any statistics or crime data for this essay.
Gardiner, Georgi. Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment
2018, In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer, 169–95.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the firm are administrative assistants—motivate moral encroachment. I then describe weaknesses of moral encroachment. Finally I explain how we can countenance the moral properties of such beliefs without endorsing moral encroachment, and I argue that the moral status of such beliefs cannot be evaluated independently from the understanding in which they are embedded.Comment: Best paired with something by Rima Basu. Potential debate questions include whether moral factors affect whether you should withhold belief about people.
Gardiner, Georgi. We Forge the Conditions of Love
2023, In Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Linguistic Luck: Safeguards and Threats to Linguistic Communication. Oxford University Press, pp. 279–314.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
This essay is not about what love is. It is about what self-ascriptions of love do. People typically self-ascribe romantic love when a nexus of feelings, beliefs, attitudes, values, commitments, experiences, and personal histories matches their conception of romantic love. But what shapes this conception? And (how) can we adjudicate amongst conflicting conceptions? Self-ascriptions of love do not merely describe the underlying nexus of attitudes and beliefs. They also change it. This essay describes how conceptions of love affect romantic experience. I limn distinctions between love and obsessive infatuation and explore ways language can cultivate queer romantic preferences. Since conceptions of love are shaped, often implicitly, by terms available in one’s linguistic community, the resulting nexus of concepts and conceptions manifests linguistic luck. I suggest ways we might sculpt the language of love to better understand—and change—ourselves. Love can help us flourish and so can our “love” language.
Comment: This paper discusses controversial ideas that may apply to student's lived experience of love, infatuation, and sexuality. The essay can be taught in two parts: Sections 1-7 for one lesson, and sections 8-13 for the following lesson. Sections 5 & 6 (on sexuality) can be skipped or given their own lesson. Those sections are especially controversial and can be used to ceate an in-class debate. Gardiner has a webpage, podcasts, and cheat sheet for teaching this essay. (See her website.)
Gardiner, Georgi. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof
2019, Philosophy & Public Affairs 47(3): 288–318.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.Comment: This can introduce upper-level epistemology students to the relevant alternatives theory. For epistemology training, it pairs well with David Lewis "Elusive Knowledge" or (for a more applied approach) can also be paired with an essay on the proof paradox.
Gardiner, Georgi, Smith, Jacob. Opacity of Character: Virtue Ethics and the Legal Admissibility of Character Evidence
2021, Philosophical Issues 31(1): 334–354
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
Many jurisdictions prohibit or severely restrict the use of evidence about a defendant’s character to prove legal culpability. Situationists, who argue that conduct is largely determined by situational features rather than by character, can easily defend this prohibition. According to situationism, character evidence is misleading or paltry. Proscriptions on character evidence seem harder to justify, however, on virtue ethical accounts. It appears that excluding character evidence either denies the centrality of character for explaining conduct—the situationist position—or omits probative evidence. Situationism is, after all, presented as antithetical to virtue ethics. This essay provides a virtue ethical defense of character evidence exclusion rules. We show that existing virtue ethical rebuttals to situationism themselves support prohibitions on character evidence; even if behavior arises from stable character traits, character evidence should be prohibited. In building our case, we provide a taxonomy of kinds of character judgment and reconcile the ubiquity and reasonableness of character judgments in ordinary life with the epistemic legitimacy of character evidence prohibitions in law.Comment: Students (and teachers) don’t need to know any evidence law for this essay. Serves as a useful prep for law school applications. Gardiner has a "cheat sheet" on her website for teaching this essay.
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!