Beebee, Helen. Necessary Connections and the Problem of Induction
2011, Noûs 45(3): 504-527.
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Added by: Laura JimenezSummary: In this paper Beebee argues that the problem of induction, which she describes as a genuine sceptical problem, is the same for Humeans than for Necessitarians. Neither scientific essentialists nor Armstrong can solve the problem of induction by appealing to IBE (Inference to the Best Explanation), for both arguments take an illicit inductive step.Comment: This paper describes in a comprehensible way Armstrong's and the Humean approaches to the problem of induction. Ideal for postgraduate philosophy of science courses, although it could be a further reading for undergraduate courses as well.
Beebee, Helen. Hume on Causation
2006, Routledge
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Added by: Laura JimenezPublisher’s Note:
Hume on Causation is the first major work dedicated to Hume’s views on causation in over fifteen years, and it argues that Hume does not subscribe to any of these three views. It places Hume’s interest in causation within the context of his theory of the mind and his theory of causal reasoning, arguing that Hume’s conception of causation derives from his conception of the nature of the inference from causes to effects.Comment: This book serves as an excellent introduction to, and critical survey of, Hume's views on causation. It will be useful in undergraduate and postgraduate courses which cover Hume's views. Chapter 1 "Hume's Targets" gives historical context to Hume's views and would work well as further reading in a week covering Hume and causation. The other chapters focus on specific interpretations or aspects of Hume's work and thus could be more useful in a postgraduate course on Hume, or causation. This will also be of course to postgraduate students who want to research Hume and/or causation.
Bennett, Karen. Mental Causation
2007, Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: Concerns about 'mental causation' are concerns about how it is possible for mental states to cause anything to happen. How does what we believe, want, see, feel, hope, or dread manage to cause us to act? Certain positions on the mind-body problem - including some forms of physicalism - make such causation look highly problematic. This entry sketches several of the main reasons to worry, and raises some questions for further investigation.Comment: This would serve as a very useful introductory/survey text, fitting well in the early weeks of a undergraduate course in the philosophy of mind, since it contains a nice discussion of dualism and functionalism. It would also work well as part of an undergraduate course in metaphysics if such a course were to include a week on the mind-body problem, causation, or an overview of key positions in the philosophy of mind.
Bennett, Karen. Two Axes of Actualism
2005, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3, pp. 297-326
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Added by: Christopher James MastermanAbstract:
Actualists routinely characterize their view by means of the slogan, “Everything is actual.” They say that there aren’t any things that exist but do not actually exist—there aren’t any “mere possibilia.” If there are any things that deserve the label ‘possible world’, they are just actually existing entities of some kind—maximally consistent sets of sentences, or maximal uninstantiated properties, or maximal possible states of affairs, or something along those lines. Possibilists, in contrast, do think that there are mere possibilia, that there are things that are not actual. They think that more exists than what actually exists. All I have done so far, though, is rephrase the slogan in various ways. To say that everything is actual is precisely to say that there are no things that do not actually exist, which is precisely to say that there are no mere possibilia, and which is also precisely to say that we cannot sep- arately quantify over what exists and what is actual. These claims all amount to the same thing. But what is that, exactly? What on earth does it mean to say that everything is actual, that there are no mere possibilia, and so on? What does the actualist slogan really come to? I think the literature is far from clear on this point, and that people work themselves into unnecessary muddles because of it. Indeed, certain confusions that I shall discuss in the first half of this article seem to be on the rise. It is high time to lay out the issues and the choice points as clearly as possible. There are two primary choices to be made; there are two axes along which versions of actualism can vary. One choice has to do with how to treat claims about things that merely could exist. The other choice has to do with the modal status of the view and of how we should think about the “actual” in actualism. I make no claim that the positions I will eventually endorse are star- tlingly new. I think that most people will agree with the decisions I make at both choice points and will in fact find some bits of this essay obvious. But not everyone agrees with my decisions, and it has been my experience that people differ remarkably about which bits they find obvious—a fact I find rather telling. My goal, then, is to show that the two axes are there and to clarify the consequences of the choices.
Comment: Although this is not intended primarily as an overview of actualism, it serves well to introduce the topic in a focused and clear way. It would be a good alternative to the SEP entry 'The Possible-Actualism Debate', for instance. It requires very little previous knowledge of actualism, possibilism, or modal metaphysics more broadly. It would be perfect for an introductory undergraduate course on modal metaphysics, or a broader metaphysics course which included metaphysics of modality.
Bennett, Karen. Proxy ”Actualism”
2006, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 263-294.
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Added by: Christopher James MastermanAbstract:
Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have recently proposed a new form of actualism. I characterize the general form of their view and the motivations behind it. I argue that it is not quite new – it bears interesting similarities to Alvin Plantinga’s view – and that it definitely isn’t actualist.
Comment: This article presupposes knowledge of actualism vs. possibilism debate, as well as some familiarity with quantified modal logic. It would be best to incorporate this text alongside Linsky and Zalta's 'In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic' (1994). It is a perfect text for a more advanced undergraduate course on modal metaphysics or a masters course, particularly if you were wanting to spend more than a single week on actualism vs. possibilism.
Bennett, Karen. There is no special problem with metaphysics
2016, Philosophical Studies 173 (1):21-37
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Naomi Osorio-KupferblumAbstract: I argue for the claim in the title. Along the way, I also address an independently interesting question: what is metaphysics, anyway? I think that the typical characterizations of metaphysics are inadequate, that a better one is available, and that the better one helps explain why metaphysics is no more problematic than the rest of philosophyComment: As well as a defence of metaphysics, this paper addresses questions about the role metaphysics should play in analytic philosophy, i.e., provide the toolbox for the other disciplines. It is accessibly written, though the topic of the paper is quite niche. As such, it would work best in a masters course on metaphysics or metametaphysics; but it could be included as supplementary reading in an advanced undergraduate course on metaphysics.
Bokulich, Alisa. Distinguishing Explanatory from Nonexplanatory Fictions
2012, Philosophy of Science 79(5): 725-737.
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Added by: Jamie CollinAbstract: There is a growing recognition that fictions have a number of legitimate functions in science, even when it comes to scientific explanation. However, the question then arises, what distinguishes an explanatory fiction from a nonexplanatory one? Here I examine two cases - one in which there is a consensus in the scientific community that the fiction is explanatory and another in which the fiction is not explanatory. I shall show how my account of "model explanations" is able to explain this asymmetry, and argue that realism - of a more subtle form - does have a role in distinguishing explanatory from nonexplanatory fictions.Comment: This would be useful in a course on the philosophy of science or the philosophy of fiction. It is particularly useful for teaching, as it is cutting edge in the philosophy of science but not particularly technical.
Briggs, Ray. The Metaphysics of Chance
2010, Philosophy Compass 5(11): 938-952.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty?eight?year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: are there objective chances at all, and if so, are there non?chancy facts on which they supervene? Third, can chance be reconciled with determinism, and if so, how?Comment: A nice introduction to the Metaphysics of Chance, suitable for an intermediate metaphysics course. Could also be a good bridge into a determinism or decision theory course element. Requires prior knowledge of some concepts e.g. token/type distinction and supervenience - but could also be a good way to learn what these are. Alternatively, a particular section of the article could be set (e.g. the final section on whether chance can be reconciled with determinism).
2016, Philosophy of Science 83(1): 60--81
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract: Social scientists report difficulties in drawing out testable predictions from the literature on intersectionality theory. We alleviate that difficulty by showing that some characteristic claims of the intersectionality literature can be interpreted causally. The formal-ism of graphical causal modeling allows claims about the causal effects of occupying intersecting identity categories to be clearly represented and submitted to empirical test-ing. After outlining this causal interpretation of intersectional theory, we address some concerns that have been expressed in the literature claiming that membership in demo-graphic categories can have causal effects.Comment: This text contains a summary of some key concepts in intersectionality theory and a discussion of how they have been used in empirical sociological research, as well as an introduction to methods of causal statistical inference. Students needing an introduction to any of these things could therefore benefit from this text. It also contains arguments about the permissibility of using demographic categories as the basis of causal claims that may be interesting matters of dispute or discussion for students of the philosophy of race.
Brison, Susan J.. Outliving oneself: trauma, memory, and personal identity
2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 313-328
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Added by: Adriana Alcaraz Sanchez and Jodie RussellAbstract:
"How can one die in Vietnam or fail to survive a death camp and still live to tell one's story? How does a life- threatening event come to be experienced as self- annihilating? And what self is it who remembers having had this experience?" By examining the lived experience of survivors from traumatic events, Brison sets to explore what exactly "the self" is. According to Brison, the self is "both autonomous and socially dependent", which makes it prone to be disrupted by traumatic events, but also, can be healed through safe and healthy relationships.Comment (from this Blueprint): Trigger warning: This article discusses accounts of trauma, including descriptions of an event of sexual assault that occurred to the author, as well as its aftermath. If used in a syllabi, this text should be presented as "optional" and students should be warned about its sensitive nature. A brief notice of TW should also be presented a the beginning of a session where the text is discussed. Also note that the suggested prompted questions for guiding reading of this article, as well as prompting discussion, also treat sensitive topics. Susan Brison provides a compelling argument about the embodied nature of the self by examining how traumatic events can have an impact on our personal identity and highly disrupt our personhood. Brison defends a relational account of the self in which the self is constructed through our interactions with others, and at the same time, affected by those interactions, making it vulnerable. By drawing first-hand from her own experience with trauma, Brison shows the importance of integrating lived experiences in the development of philosophical accounts.
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