-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: The project of explaining intentional phenomena in terms of nonintentional phenomena has become a central task in the philosophy of mind.' Since intentional phenomena like believing, desiring, intending have content essentially, the project is one of showing how semantic properties like content can be reconciled with nonsemantic properties like cause. As Jerry A. Fodor put it, The worry about representation is above all that the semantic (and/or the intentional) will prove permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order; for example that the semantic/intentional properties of things will fail to supervene upon their physical properties.Balog, Katalin. Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content2009, Synthese, 170, 311-320-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: Proponents of non-conceptual content have recruited it for various philosophical jobs. Some epistemologists have suggested that it may play the role of “the given” that Sellars is supposed to have exorcised from philosophy. Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske) have suggested that it plays an important role in the project of naturalizing semantics as a kind of halfway between merely information bearing and possessing conceptual content. Here I will focus on a recent proposal by Jerry Fodor. In a recent paper he characterizes non-conceptual content in a particular way and argues that it is plausible that it plays an explanatory role in accounting for certain auditory and visual phenomena. So he thinks that there is reason to believe that there is non-conceptual content. On the other hand, Fodor thinks that non-conceptual content has a limited role. It occurs only in the very early stages of perceptual processing prior to conscious awareness. My paper is examines Fodor’s characterization of non-conceptual content and his claims for its explanatory importance. I also discuss if Fodor has made a case for limiting non-conceptual content to non-conscious, sub-personal mental states.
Comment: Useful discussion of Fodor's view on non-conceptual content; I use the Fodor piece as main reading, and this as further reading.
Bechtel, William P., Jennifer Mundale. Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states1999, Philosophy of Science 66 (2): 175-207.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions.Comment: One of the better arguments against multiple realizability. Could be used in any philosophy of mind course where that claim arises as a demonstration of how it could be challenged. A good deal of discussion about neuroscientific practices and methods, but not excessively technical.
Boden, Margaret A.. Intentionality and physical systems1970, Philosophy of Science 32 (June):200-214.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Intentionality is characteristic of many psychological phenomena. It is commonly held by philosophers that intentionality cannot be ascribed to purely physical systems. This view does not merely deny that psychological language can be reduced to physiological language. It also claims that the appropriateness of some psychological explanation excludes the possibility of any underlying physiological or causal account adequate to explain intentional behavior. This is a thesis which I do not accept. I shall argue that physical systems of a specific sort will show the characteristic features of intentionality. Psychological subjects are, under an alternative description, purely physical systems of a certain sort. The intentional description and the physical description are logically distinct, and are not intertranslatable. Nevertheless, the features of intentionality may be explained by a purely causal account, in the sense that they may be shown to be totally dependent upon physical processes.Comment:
Brogaard, Berit. The Self-Locating Property Theory of Color2015, Minds & Machines 25: 133-147.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: The paper reviews the empirical evidence for highly significant variation across perceivers in hue perception and argues that color physicalism cannot accommodate this variability. Two views that can accommodate the individual differences in hue perception are considered: the self-locating property theory, according to which colors are self-locating properties, and color relationalism, according to which colors are relations to perceivers and viewing conditions. It is subsequently argued that on a plausible rendition of the two views, the self-locating theory has a slight advantage over color relationalism in being truer to the phenomenology of our color experiences
Comment: Idiosyncratic but interesting theory of colour perception. Background reading.
Chen, Xunwu. The problem of mind in Confucianism2016, Asian Philosophy 26 (2):166-181-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
This essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.Comment (from this Blueprint): During the Warring States period, the rulers of several powerful states began declaring themselves kings, a title traditionally reserved for the Zhou dynasty's ruler. The period culminated in 221 B.C.E. when the king of Qin unified China and declared himself the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty. This era was marked by constant conflict, with the general populace frequently facing threats of death and starvation. In their struggle for survival, state rulers sought out talented individuals and innovative solutions to address these problems. As a result, ancient Chinese philosophy emerged with a strong focus on solving social and political issues, leading to a flourishing of ideas and thoughts. One significant development during this time was the establishment of the Confucian School by Confucius, further advanced by thinkers like Mengzi (Mencius) and Xunzi. Confucianism, which emphasises pedagogy and includes several classical texts central to its study, became the dominant ideology during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.). Confucians were concerned with restoring political order and achieving moral transformation in society through self-cultivation and the preservation of family relations. They advocated for top-down social reform, believing that the ruler should serve as a moral exemplar for the people. Socially and politically conservative, Confucians idealised the sage kings of antiquity and viewed history not as a progression but as a decline into degeneration and corruption. They believed the masses could be transformed through rites (codes of propriety that shape external behaviour) and music (which affects internal emotions and feelings). The ultimate goal was to cultivate the virtue of 'Ren' (humanity). The Confucian approach to the philosophy of mind must therefore be situated within this context of their broader concerns in cultivating moral virtues and transforming society. For Confucians, the human mind is primarily characterised not by cognitive or affective functions, but by aspects of the ‘original mind’ that are essential for making correct moral responses.
Drayson, Zoe. What is Action-Oriented Perception?2017, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 15th International Congress (College Publications, 2017).-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: Contemporary scientific and philosophical literature on perception often focuses on the relationship between perception and action, emphasizing the ways in which perception can be understood as geared towards action or ‘action-oriented’. In this paper I provide a framework within which to classify approaches to action-oriented perception, and I highlight important differences between the distinct approaches. I show how talk of perception as action-oriented can be applied to the evolutionary history of perception, neural or psychological perceptual mechanisms, the semantic content or phenomenal character of perceptual states, or to the metaphysical nature of perception. I argue that there are no straightforward inferences from one kind of action-oriented perception to another. Using this framework and its insights, I then explore the notion of action-oriented perceptual representation which plays a key role in some approaches to embodied cognitive science. I argue that the concept of action-oriented representation proposed by Clark and Wheeler is less straightforward than it might seem, because it seems to require both that the mechanisms of perceptual representation are action-oriented and that the content of these perceptual representations are action-oriented. Given that neither of these claims can be derived from the other, proponents of action-oriented representation owe us separate justification for each claim. I will argue that such justifications are not forthcoming in the literature, and that attempts to reconstruct them run into trouble: the sorts of arguments offered for the representational mechanisms being action-oriented seem to undermine the sorts of arguments offered for the representational content being action-oriented, and vice-versa.
Comment: Useful background reading concerning perception and action; cover enactivism, but also other perception/action issues
Egan, Frances. Representationalism2012, In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, OUP, 250-272.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of representation.Comment: A very good overview of representationalism. Suitable for a preliminary introduction to the topic.
Egan, Frances. Computational models: a modest role for content2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(3): 253-259.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Comment: Good paper about the relation of representation and content to computation. Best suited to higher-level courses on the subject.
Egan, Frances. Wide Content2009, In A. Beckerman, B. McLaughlin & S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Giada Fratantonio, Nick Novelli
Summary: The author presents an overview of the main argument in favour and against content externalism, namely, roughly put, the thesis that the content of our thought is partly individuated by feature of the external environment. After providing a good survey of the debate, the author argues that the content that individuates a subject's thought in the explanation of her behavior is wide.Comment: The first half of the paper is very useful as an introduction on the topic of semantic and content externalism in the philosophy of mind. The remainder is an interesting and well-presented argument in favour of wide content. The first part could be used on its own for an overview of the debate; the remainder could be used for a more in-depth discussion of the positions and the arguments for them, or could serve as an option for a student essay topic.
Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
-
-
-
This site is registered on Toolset.com as a development site. -
-
-
-
-
-
Baker, Lynne Rudder. On a causal theory of content
1989, Philosophical Perspectives 3:165-186.
Comment: This paper provides a clear reconstruction and evaluation of Jerry Fodor's causal theory of content. It is helpful as primary and further reading in an undergraduate philosophy of mind course to discuss the problem of the naturalization of content.