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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Fileva, Iskra. Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance2023, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):722-735.-
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Ethan LandesAbstract:
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative.
Comment: The paper would offer a good overview of the current state of the moral testimony literature, specifically focusing on moral arguments against moral testimony. The paper moves through the literature quickly and breezily, explaining the key positions then offering a counterargument. It requires minimal knowledge of the literature, although it does presuppose some familiarity with what testimony is meant to be.
Pateman, Carole. Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic Income2004, Politics and Society 32 (1):89-105-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
If the focus of interest is democratization, including women’s freedom, a basic income is preferable to stakeholding. Prevailing theoretical approaches and conceptions of individual freedom, free-riding seen as a problem of men’s employment, and neglect of feminist insights obscure the democratic potential of a basic income. An argument in terms of individual freedom as self-government, a basic income as a democratic right, and the importance of the opportunity not to be employed shows how a basic income can help break both the link between income and employment and the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment, and citizenship.
Comment: This paper explores questions as the intersection of feminism and the basic income literature, offering one of the central cases made in support of basic income by feminists: that a basic income, especially with compared with other forms of stakeholding, has the potential to advance democratization more generally, and women's freedom specifically, by breaking the "long-standing link between income and employment, and end(ing) the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment, and citizenship." The author shows why basic income is preferrable to stakeholding with these goals in mind. The paper would therefore be interesting to discuss in relation to feminist politics or a survey of the basic income literature, especially assigned in tandem with some of the literature treated as UBI canon or core, such as Phillipe Van Parijs' work.
Williams, Melissa. Citizenship as Identity, Citizenship as Shared Fate, and the Functions of Multicultural Education2003, In Kevin McDonough & Walter Feinberg (eds.), Citizenship and Education in Liberal-Democratic Societies: Teaching for Cosmopolitan Values and Collective Identities. Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
This is the second of the four essays in Part II of the book on liberalism and traditionalist education; all four are by authors who would like to find ways for the liberal state to honour the self-definitions of traditional cultures and to find ways of avoiding a confrontation with differences. Melissa Williams examines citizenship as identity in relation to the project of nation-building, the shifting boundaries of citizenship in relation to globalization, citizenship as shared fate, and the role of multicultural education within the view of citizenship-as-shared-fate. She argues the other side of the same coin to that presented by Shelley Burtt in the previous chapter: according to Williams, the liberal state often demands too much in the way of loyalty from traditional groups, and when it does, it runs a strong risk of becoming oppressive and illiberal. Moreover, she holds that there is no need for a single shared identity among citizens of the liberal state. Her conception of people tied together by a shared fate is to this extent compatible with Burtt’s attempt to make liberalism’s commitment to autonomy more hospitable to groups of individuals encumbered by unchosen attachments, but her notion of citizenship as shared fate also goes further than that, and possibly stands in some tension with, Burtt’s view, since it allows and even encourages people to develop primary affiliation to all kind of groups – traditional as well as global.
Comment: This text explores existing conceptions of citizenship as identity and the challenges these pose for the ideal liberal state. In addition, the author proposes a previous unrecognised conception of citizenship as shared fate. In doing so, the paper touches on a variety of topics in contemporary political philosophy and theory, such as multiculturalism and globalization, the boundaries of political identity, the grounding of liberal democracy, and the project of civic education. As such, it would be most useful as a supplemental reading in undergraduate level political philosophy courses discussing any of the aforementioned topics, or in more specific contexts to explore questions about citizenship and what it means to share an idenitity with a group of others, with whom we may never meet face-to-face or have direct interpersonal dealings. The article itself has interesting implications for questions of social cohesion and group identity.
Gutmann, Amy. Civic Education and Social Diversity1995, Ethics 105 (3):557-579-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
How can civic education in a liberal democracy give social diversity its due? Two complementary concerns have informed a lot of liberal thinking on this subject. Liberals like John Stuart Mill worry that "the plea of liberty" by parents not block "the fulfillment by the State of its duties" to children. They also worry that civic education not be conceived or conducted in such a way as to stifle "diversity in opinions and modes of conduct."' Some prominent contemporary theorists add a new and interesting twist to these common--concerns. They criticize liberals like Mill and Kant for contributing to one of the central problems, the stifling of social diversity, that they are trying to resolve. The comprehensive liberal aim of educating children not only for citizenship but also for individuality or autonomy, these political liberals argue, does not leave enough room for social diversity. Would a civic educational program consistent with political liberalism accommodate significantly more social diversity than one guided by comprehensive liberalism?
Political liberals claim that it would, and some recommend political liberalism to us largely on this basis. This article shows that political liberalism need not, and often does not, accommodate more social diversity through its civic educational program than comprehensive liberalism.Comment: This article examines the relationship between political and comprehensive liberalism with an eye towards evaluating whether the former encourages a greater degree of social diversity when it comes to models of civic education. Utimately, Gutmann argues that the difference between political and comprehensive liberalism is exaggerated: what matters more, in determining which approaches to civic education facilitate greater degrees of social and individual diversity, is 'a substantive understanding of what good citizenship entails' and what the aims of civic education are. In it's method, this paper is located at the intersection of political philosophy and political theory. For this reason, it might be useful in an intermediate undergraduate or master's level political philosophy course with significant crossover in the political theory / political science discipline. Gutmann focuses heavily on the work of historic and contemporary liberals, including Mill, Rawls, Raz, Galston, and Macedo, so the article may be useful as further reading in courses which examine these authors approaches to civic education, or contemporary approaches to civic education in general.
Davis, Angela. The Black Woman’s Role in the Community of Slaves1971, The Bancroft Library-
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael Greer
Introduction: The paucity of literature on the black woman is outrageous on its face. But we must also contend with the fact that too many of these rare studies must claim as their signal achievement the reinforcement of fictitious cliches. They have given credence to grossly distorted categories through which the black woman continues to be perceived.Comment (from this Blueprint): Content warning: Details of cruelties of slavery, sexual assault. In this 1971 text written while incarcerated, Angela Davis makes an argument against the truth of a stereotype of the black enslaved woman. She argues that, contrary to popular belief, the stereotype of a black woman under slavery as the “matriarch” (i.e., dominating the men in their lives and colluding with the white slaver in black people’s oppression) is not true. Instead, she argues, appealing to empirical evidence and marxist theory, that black women’s position in the community of slaves uniquely positioned them to aid in liberation struggles. She argues it is empirically borne out that they in fact were crucial to both explicit and everyday resistance efforts.
Willis, Ellen. Toward a Feminist Sexual Revolution1982, Social Text, 6: 3-21.-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
In this essay I argue that a sexual liberationist perspective is essential to a genuinely radical analysis of women's condition. Much of my argument centers on the psychosexual dynamics of the family, where children first experience both sexism and sexual repression. This discussion refers primarily to the family as it exists - actually and ideologically - for the dominant cultures of modern industrial societies. Clearly, to extend my focus backward to feudal societies or outward to the Third World would require (at the very least) a far longer, more complex article. I strongly suspect, however, that in its fundamentals the process of sexual acculturation I describe here is common to all historical (i.e., patriarchal) societies.Comment (from this Blueprint): Willis describes the double binds women are in: between being too good – boring, frigid, a sexual failure, a cold bitch – and being bad – easy, insatiable, demanding. Willis argues that the only way to solve this is to end the association between sex and badness. This presents an answer to Bartky's dilemma: we should choose to eradicate sexual shame, rather than our desires.
Zheng, Robin. Why Yellow Fever Isn’t Flattering: A Case Against Racial Fetishes2016, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2(3): 400 - 419.-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
Most discussions of racial fetish center on the question of whether it is caused by negative racial stereotypes. In this paper I adopt a different strategy, one that begins with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than those who possess it; that is, I shift focus away from the origins of racial fetishes to their effects as a social phenomenon in a racially stratified world. I examine the case of preferences for Asian women, also known as ‘yellow fever’, to argue against the claim that racial fetishes are unobjectionable if they are merely based on personal or aesthetic preference rather than racial stereotypes. I contend that even if this were so, yellow fever would still be morally objectionable because of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places on Asian and Asian-American women, along with the role it plays in a pernicious system of racial social meanings.Comment (from this Blueprint): Zheng argues that some sexual desires are morally problematic - namely, racial fetishes. Some people defend racial fetishes by claiming they are mere aesthetic preferences, lacking racist content or origins. Zheng responds that they are objectionable regardless because of their role in the sexual objectification of certain racial groups. This is useful as a case study of a "bad" desire: is it really bad? What is bad about it? Can someone change it?
Bartky, Sandra Lee. Femininity and Domination1990, Routledge.-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MoorePublisher’s Note:
Bartky draws on the experience of daily life to unmask the many disguises by which intimations of inferiority are visited upon women. She critiques both the male bias of current theory and the debilitating dominion held by notions of "proper femininity" over women and their bodies in patriarchal culture.Comment (from this Blueprint): Chapter 4 is about what a feminist should do when they have a sexual desire which is in tension with their feminist beliefs in a way that makes them feel ashamed. There are two natural choices: to give up the shame and continue to have the desire, or to give up the desire. Bartky examines both of these choices and finds us in a tricky situation: it is sometimes apt and understandable to feel shame about a sexual desire (when it really is in tension with your principles), but she is sceptical about the view that we can change our desires at will or with therapy.
Tilton, Emily, Jenkins Ichikawa, Jonathan. Not What I Agreed To: Content and Consent2021, Ethics, 132(1): 127-154.-
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Added by: Emma Holmes, David MacDonald, Yichi Zhang, and Samuel Dando-MooreAbstract:
Deception sometimes results in nonconsensual sex. A recent body of literature diagnoses such violations as invalidating consent: the agreement is not morally transformative, which is why the sexual contact is a rights violation. We pursue a different explanation for the wrongs in question: there is valid consent, but it is not consent to the sex act that happened. Semantic conventions play a key role in distinguishing deceptions that result in nonconsensual sex (like stealth condom removal) from those that don’t (like white lies). Our framework is also applicable to more controversial cases, like those implicated in so-called “gender fraud” complaints.Comment (from this Blueprint): Tilton and Ichikawa attempt to work out what goes wrong in certain deception cases but not in others. This is useful as a reply to Dougherty's argument that sex from deception is always morally serious and it engages with the issues Fischel raises around gender deception.
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Vredenburgh, Kate. Bureaucratic discretion, legitimacy, and substantive justice
2023, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (2):251-259
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