Topic: Social Philosophy -> Gender Sex and Sexuality
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Hartley, Christie, Watson, Lori. Equal Citizenship and Public Reason. A Feminist Political Liberalism
2018, New York: Oxford University Press
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Saranga Sudarshan

Publisher's Note: This book is a defense of political liberalism as a feminist liberalism. The first half of the book develops and defends a novel interpretation of political liberalism. It is argued that political liberals should accept a restrictive account of public reason and that political liberals' account of public justification is superior to the leading alternative, the convergence account of public justification. The view is defended from the charge that such a restrictive account of public reason will unduly threaten or undermine the integrity of some religiously oriented citizens and an account of when political liberals can recognize exemptions, including religious exemptions, from generally applicable laws is offered. In the second half of the book, it is argued that political liberalism's core commitments restrict all reasonable conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine, substantive equality for women and other marginalized groups. Here it is demonstrated how public reason arguments can be used to support law and policy needed to address historical sites of women's subordination in order to advance equality; prostitution, the gendered division of labor and marriage, in particular, are considered.

Comment: Defends Rawlisan Political Liberalism on feminist grounds, contrary to many longstanding critiques of Rawls's views.
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Hartman, Saidiya. Venus in Two Acts
2008, Small Axe, 12 (2): 1–14

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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael Greer
Abstract:
This essay examines the ubiquitous presence of Venus in the archive of Atlantic slavery and wrestles with the impossibility of discovering anything about her that hasn't already been stated. As an emblematic figure of the enslaved woman in the Atlantic world, Venus makes plain the convergence of terror and pleasure in the libidinal economy of slavery and, as well, the intimacy of history with the scandal and excess of literature. In writing at the limit of the unspeakable and the unknown, the essay mimes the violence of the archive and attempts to redress it by describing as fully as possible the conditions that determine the appearance of Venus and that dictate her silence.
Comment (from this Blueprint): Content warning: very explicit details of cruelties of slavery, sexual assault. In this seminal black feminist theory text, the Foucauldian scholar Saidiya Hartman considers the “archive” which is what she terms the collection of historical evidence that one writes about the past with. She reckons with the difficulty and ethics of writing about past figures and people who were subject to immense violence, degradation and oppression, since often the only records left of their existence are those written or approved by their oppressors or people who were complict in their oppression, and those records are often at best only caricatures of the person they pretend to represent.
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Haslanger, Sally. Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?
2000, Nous 34(1): 31-55.

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Added by: Carl Fox
Abstract: This paper proposes social constructionist accounts of gender and race. The focus of the inquiry--inquiry aiming to provide resources for feminist and antiracist projects--are the social positions of those marked for privilege or subordination by observed or imagined features assumed to be relevant to reproductive function, or geographical origins. I develop these ideas and propose that other gendered and racialized phenomena are usefully demarcated and explained by reference to these social positions. In doing so, I address the concern that attempts to define race or gender are misguided because they either assume a false commonality or marginalize some members of the group in question.
Comment: Seminal reading for modules on gender or race.
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Haslanger, Sally. Resisting reality: Social Construction and Social Critique
2012, OUP USA.

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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Publisher's Note: Contemporary theorists use the term "social construction" with the aim of exposing how what's purportedly "natural" is often at least partly social and, more specifically, how this masking of the social is politically significant. In these previously published essays, Sally Haslanger draws on insights from feminist and critical race theory to explore and develop the idea that gender and race are positions within a structure of social relations. On this interpretation, the point of saying that gender and race are socially constructed is not to make a causal claim about the origins of our concepts of gender and race, or to take a stand in the nature/nurture debate, but to locate these categories within a realist social ontology. This is politically important, for by theorizing how gender and race fit within different structures of social relations we are better able to identify and combat forms of systematic injustice. Although the central essays of the book focus on a critical social realism about gender and race, these accounts function as case studies for a broader critical social realism.
Comment: The book as a whole explores the interface between analytic philosophy and critical theory. As it is a collection of essays, particular chapters can easily be used separately, some serving as introductory, others as more advanced readings. It could be of interest for undergraduate or postgraduate courses in political philosophy, philosophy of language and philosophical methodology.
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Haslanger, Sally. Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)
2007, Hypatia, 23 (2): 210–23

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Added by: Rebecca Buxton
Abstract:
There is a deep well of rage inside of me. Rage about how I as an individual have been treated in philosophy; rage about how others I know have been treated; and rage about the conditions that I'm sure affect many women and minorities in philosophy, and have caused many others to leave. Most of the time I suppress this rage and keep it sealed away. Until I came to MIT in 1998, I was in a constant dialogue with myself about whether to quit philosophy, even give up tenure, to do something else. In spite of my deep love for philosophy, it just didn't seem worth it. And I am one of the very lucky ones, one of the ones who has been successful by the dominant standards of the profession. Whatever the numbers say about women and minorities in philosophy, numbers don't begin to tell the story. Things may be getting better in some contexts, but they are far from acceptable.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In her 2007 paper, Haslanger sets out the situation of women in philosophy with a particular focus on instutional academic settings. This paper discusses how women are excluded from philosophy (both contemporary and historical) as well as thinking about disciplnary boundaries: why is it that feminist philosophy is not often thought of as 'real' philosophy?
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Hein, Hilde. Refining Feminist Theory: Lessons from Aesthetics
2010, In Hilde Hein and Carolyn Korsmeyer (eds.), Aesthetics in Feminist Perspective. Indiana University Press.

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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: Because it embraces a domain that is invincibly pluralistic and dynamic, aesthetic theory can serve as a model for feminist theory. Feminist theory, which takes gender as a constituted point of departure, pluralizes theory, thereby challenging its unicity. This anomalous approach to theory is also implicit in conventional aesthetics, which has for that reason been spurned by centrist philosophy. Whilst aesthetics therefore merits attention from feminists, there is reason to be wary of such classic aesthetic doctrines as the the thesis that art is "autonomous" and properly percevied "disinterestedly". That belief has roots in somatophobic dualism which ultimately leads to consequences as negative for art and the aesthetic as for women. Feminists rightly join with other critics of traditional dominative dualisms; yet they can learn from the expansive tendency in aesthetics toward openness and self-reflexive innovation.
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Hewitt Suchocki, Marjorie. The Idea of God in Feminist Philosophy
1994, Hypatia 9(4): 57-68.

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Added by: Emily Paul
Abstract: The marginal position of women within the Western tradition provides a critical vantage point for feminist redevelopment of the notion of God. Feminists tend to replace the classical categories of substance philosophies traditionally used for God with relational categories often drawn from organic philosophies. They also project the dynamic character of language itself into the discussion of God. This essay focuses on these issues as they are developed by Mary Daly and Rebecca Chopp
Comment: A good overview and development of some key feminist philosophies of religion that seek to redevelop the notion of God. If being used in a standard philosophy of religion course, it would be good to set this reading after covering the 'traditional' conceptions of God, and then to have a debate to find out the views of students regarding how we ought to conceive of God.
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Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. Denying Relationality: Epistemology and Ethics and Ignorance
2007, In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. SUNY Press.

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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Summary: In this chapter, the author argues that epistemological and ethical practices of ignorance are strategic and involve a strategic denial of relationality, namely, of the way in which subjects are formed through relation with each other.
Comment: Good as a further reading for a course on epistemology of ignorance.
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Holmstrom, Nancy. “Women’s Work”, the Family and Capitalism
1981, Science & Society 45(2): 186–211
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa
Abstract:

From the introduction: It is striking that just when women are becoming an increasingly important part of the paid work force (43% in the U.S.),1 theoretical debate has centered on their work within the family. Some of the discussion of women's domestic labor seems shockingly out of touch with the dramatic change in their working lives. This lack of awareness is evident in reference
to domestic labor as "women's work." Nevertheless, as many feminists have vigorously argued, women's lives are still dominated by their role in the family, even when they are also wage workers. The question arises as to whether and how far this fact can change. Can women be integrated into the work force on an equal basis with men? What impact would equality in the work force have on their role in the family? Can the family be eliminated under capitalism?

Comment: A key text for a discussion on capitalism and feminism, which could be included in an introductory course on Feminist Philosophy, or as background on a more advanced course alongside some more contemporary texts on the debate (e.g. Holmstrom and Cudd, Capitalism, for and Against: A Feminist Debate). Holmstrom provides some exegesis on Marx, so little background knowledge on the topic is required. The text is on the longer side (27 pages), so perhaps better suited to a seminar rather than a lecture.
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Holroyd, Jules. Responsibility for Implicit Bias
2012, Journal of Social Philosophy 43(3): 274-306.

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Added by: Emily Paul
Introduction: Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive.
Comment: A great paper for a feminist philosophy, critical race theory, moral philosophy, applied ethics course or similar. Holroyd lays out 4 different arguments that we might NOT be blameworthy for harbouring implicit biases in premise-conclusion form, before arguing that they are invalid. Could e.g. break students into groups and ask each group to discuss a different argument and Holroyd's treatment of it.
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