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Added by: Jie GaoAbstract: This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the evidence, as it is commonly thought. It should be determined instead by the combination of the conditional probability and the prior probability. This is also true of the degree of incremental confirmation, and I argue that any measure of epistemic justification is also a measure of incremental confirmation. However, the degree of epistemic justification must meet an additional condition, and all known measures of incremental confirmation fail to meet it. I describe this additional condition as well as a measure that meets it. The paper then applies the measure to the conjunction fallacy and proposes an explanation of the fallacy.Comment: This interesting paper on epistemic justification requires prerequisite knowledge on formal epistemology. It is hence suitable for an advanced undergraduate course or graduate course on epistemology or formal epistemology.Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: Further, SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
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Added by: Laura JimenezIntroduction: Mark Twain said that, for people whose only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. In Thinking about Technology, Joe Pitt's main tools appear to be those of the philosopher of science, so it is not surprising that he claims most problems of philosophy of technology are epistemic problems. As he puts it: 'The strategy here is straightforward. Philosophers of science have examined in detail a number of concepts integral to our understanding of what makes science what it is. The bottom line is this: philosophical questions about technology are first and foremost questions about what we can know about a specific technology and its effects and in what that knowledge consists' . Although Pitt points out important disanalogies between scientific and technological knowledge, nevertheless he emphasizes that philosophy of technology is primarily epistemology. Pitt has stipulatively defined ethical and political analyses of technology as not part of philosophy and philosophy of technology. While claiming to assess the foundations of philosophy of technology, he has adopted a reductionist approach to his subject matter, one that ignores or denigrates the majority of work in philosophy of technology. Does Pitt's bold, reductionist move succeed?Comment: Good as further reading for philosophy of science courses or as introductory reading for courses specialized in philosophy of technology. It is an easy paper but the topic is very specific, so in this last sense it is more suitable for postgraduates.
Keywords: bias; biostatistics; environment; public health; special-interest science
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Added by: Laura JimenezAbstract: Lawyers often work pro bono to liberate death-row inmates from flawed legal verdicts that otherwise would kill them. This is the first book on practical philosophy of science, how to practically evaluate scientific findings with life-and-death consequences. Showing how to uncover scores of scientific flaws - typically used by special interests who try to justify their pollution - this book aims to liberate many potential victims of environmentally induced disease and death.It shows how citizens can help uncover flawed science and thus liberate people from science-related societal harms such as pesticides, waste dumps, and nuclear power. It shows how flawed biology, economics, hydrogeology, physics, statistics, and toxicology are misused in ways that make life-and-death differences for humans. It thus analyzes science at the heart of contemporary controversies - from cell phones, climate change, and contraceptives, to plastic food containers and radioactive waste facilities. It illustrates how to evaluate these scientific findings, instead of merely describing what they are. Practical evaluation of science is important because, at least in the United States, 75 percent of all science is funded by special interests, to achieve specific practical goals, such as developing pharmaceuticals or showing some pollutant causes no harm. Of the remaining 25 percent of US science funding, more than half addresses military goals. This means that less than one-eighth of US science funding is for basic science; roughly seven-eighths is done by special interests, for practical projects from which they hope to profit. The problem, however, is that often this flawed, special-interest science harms the public.Comment: Recommended for students in philosophy of science, environmental ethics or science policy. Could serve as an introductory reading for practical philosophy of science. It is easy to read and suitable for undergraduate students.Difficulty: EasyRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane Fairbank
From the Introduction: "Modern mathematics is based on the axiomatic method. We choose axioms and a deductive system---rules for deducing theorems from the axioms. This methodology is designed to guarantee that we can proceed from "obviously" true premises to true conclusions, via inferences which are "obviously" truth-preserving. [...] New and interesting questions arise if we give up as myth the claim that our theorizing can ever be separated out from the complex dynamic of interwoven social/political/historical/cultural forces that shape our experiences and views. Considering mathematics as a set of stories produced according to strict rules one can read these stories for what they tell us about the very real human desires, ambitions, and values of the authors (who understands) and listen to the authors as spokespersons for their cultures (where and when). This paper is the self-respective and self-conscious attempt of a mathematician to retell a story of mathematics that attends to the relationships between who we are and what we know."
Comment: available in this BlueprintDifficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Keywords: Distinctness; Grounding; fundamentality; identity
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Added by: Bjoern Freter, Contributed by: Zach ThorntonAbstract: Identity and distinctness facts are ones like “The Eiffel Tower is identical to the Eiffel Tower,” and “The Eiffel Tower is distinct from the Louvre.” This paper concerns one question in the metaphysics of identity: Are identity and distinctness facts metaphysically fundamental or are they nonfundamental? I provide an overview of answers to this question.Comment: This is an introductory text on the topic of grounding identity and distinctness facts. This topic is connected to the literature on Leibniz's Law and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. This paper provides an overview of arguments for and against the view that identity and distinctness facts are fundamental, ultimately favoring the view that they are not.Difficulty: EasyRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Keywords: content; perception; phenomenology; properties
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Added by: Andrea BlomqvistAbstract: In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Siegel argues that high-level properties should be attributed to percception itself. That, high-level properties can be the content of perception.Comment: This paper is interesting to consider in the cognition/perception debate, since high-level properties such as being a natural kind, or emotions and intentions, are normally taken to be features of cognition rather than perception. It raises interesting questions about the relationship between concepts, the content of perception and perceptual experience. It would be good in a third year module on perception.Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
Keywords: experience; naive realism; perception; representational content
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Will HornettSummary: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.Comment: It is a fairly difficult paper because it has some technical sections and her main argument is rather dense. However, it is generally very clearly written, with numerous helpful examples, and a broad discussion of views on contemporary debate on perception. This paper could be used in a senior year or postgraduate course on the philosophy of perception as seminar reading since it is a detailed and controversial discussion of the metaphysics of perception. It has also been central to recent debates. It is is useful to teach alongside Thomas Raliegh's "Phenomenology Without Representation" (2013). It is a fairly difficult paper because it has some technical sections and her main argument is rather dense. However, it is generally very clearly written, with numerous helpful examples, and a broad discussion of views on contemporary debate on perception. This paper could be used in a senior year or postgraduate course on the philosophy of perception as seminar reading since it is a detailed and controversial discussion of the metaphysics of perception. It has also been central to recent debates. It is is useful to teach alongside Thomas Raliegh's "Phenomenology Without Representation" (2013).Difficulty: AdvancedRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: properties. The book starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. It then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. It then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kind properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. The book goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. The book's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.Comment: Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: SpecialisedComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.Comment: This can be used as background reading for a course on epistemology of perception, insofar as the author presents clearly the Content View and its main implications (a useful overview especially in section 1).Difficulty: IntermediateRecommended use: Further, OverviewComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: In this article, the author provides a great overview on the topic of perceptual content, by addressing the following main issues: i) what are perceptual experiences? ii) what can constitute the content of our experience? iii) what is the relation between the content and our experience? iv) in virtue of what experiences have content?Comment: Great article to be used as background/overview reading for undergraduate course on the philosophy of perception.Difficulty: EasyRecommended use: IntroductoryComments (0): Read and add advice on using this text.