Thalos, Mariam. A modest proposal for interpreting structural explanations
1998, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49(2): 279-295.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Social sciences face a well-known problem, which is an instance of a general problem faced as well by psychological and biological sciences: the problem of establishing their legitimate existence alongside physics. This, as will become clear, is a problem in metaphysics. I will show how a new account of structural explanations, put forward by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, which is designed to solve this metaphysical problem with social sciences in mind, fails to treat the problem in any importantly new way. Then I will propose a more modest approach, and show how it does not deserve the criticism directed at a prototype by Jackson and PettitComment: An interesting argument for the value of structual explanations in sociology. Useful in the context of a discussion of reductionism or of the proper classification of social sciences as real science.
Thalos, Mariam. Truth deserves to be believed
2013, Philosophy 88(2): 179-196.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Science seems generally to aim at truth. And governmental support of science is often premised on the instrumental value of truth in service of advancing our practical objectives, both as individuals and as communities, large and small. While there is some political expediency to this view, it is not correct. The value of truth is nowise that it helps us achieve our aims. In fact, just the contrary: truth deserves to be believed only on the condition that its claim upon us is orthogonal to any utility it might have in the service of (any and all) practical endsComment: A good anti-pragmatist argument, useful in an exploration of the aims of science, or a good introduction to truth and objectivity in science as an illustration of the reason that might matter. Suitable for both undergraduate and graduate teaching.
Thalos, Mariam. Explanation is a genus: An essay on the varieties of scientific explanation
2002, Synthese 130(3): 317-354.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explainswithout drawing attention to causes-that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinctfrom that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes theexplanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation ofthe standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physicaltheories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals oraspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insightfor a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstoneof a new theory of scientific method.Comment: A striking argument that science does not employ causal explanations. Since this is a commonly-held assumption, this would be interesting to present in the context of scientific methodology, or in an exploration of causation as part of a challenge to whether the idea of causation is actually useful or necessary. Provides good historical context to support its claims. Best taught at an advanced or graduate level.
Thalos, Mariam. Nonreductive physics
2006, Synthese 149(1): 133-178.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: This paper documents a wide range of nonreductive scientific treatments of phenomena in the domain of physics. These treatments strongly resist characterization as explanations of macrobehavior exclusively in terms of behavior of microconstituents. For they are treatments in which macroquantities are cast in the role of genuine and irreducible degrees of freedom.Comment: A good argument against reduction, grounded in scientific practice. Would be useful in a philosophy of science or a metaphysics context to explore and challenge the idea of reduction. Does a good job of explaining some fairly technical concepts as clearly as possible, but still best suited to graduate or upper-level undergraduate teaching.
The Chan School. Chapter 26: The Zen (ch’an) School of Sudden Enlightenment
1963, In Chan,Wing-tsit (ed.), A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton University Press
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Xintong WeiAbstract:
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy covers the entire historical development of Chinese philosophy from its ancient origins to today, providing the most wide-ranging and authoritative English-language anthology of Chinese thought available. This superb book brings together key selections from all the great thinkers and schools in every period—ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary—and presents these texts in their entirety. Each selection is accompanied by explanatory aids and scholarly documentation that shed invaluable light on all aspects of Chinese thought. Featuring elegant and faithful translations of some of the most important classical writings, some translated here for the first time, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is an indispensable resource for students, scholars, and anyone interested in Chinese philosophy and culture.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Thomas, Angie. The Hate U Give
2017, HarperCollins Publishers.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Nadia MehdiSummary: The Hate U Give is a young adult novel by Angie Thomas. It follows events in the life of a black 16-year-old girl, Starr Carter, who is drawn to activism after she witnesses the police shooting of a childhood friend.Comment: This book could be easily paired with a number of papers in the philosophy of race and racism including Charlies Mills' 'White Ignorance', or Kristie Dotson's 'Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing'. Concepts that are perhaps trickier for younger philosophers to wrap their heads around are elaborated in the film and book version of this piece.
Thomasson, Amie. Ontology Made Easy
2015, OUP USA.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Existence questions have been topics for heated debates in metaphysics, but this book argues that they can often be answered easily, by trivial inferences from uncontroversial premises. This 'easy' approach to ontology leads to realism about disputed entities, and to the view that metaphysical disputes about existence questions are misguided.Comment: An interesting presentation of a way to avoid ontological disputes. Would work well as a conclusion to a course or section on ontology, to show students there might be a way to simply avoid these debates if desired.
Thomasson, Amie. Answerable and Unanswerable Questions
2009, In MetaMetaphysics, eds. David Chalmers, Ryan Wasserman, and David Manley. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 444-471.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Jamie CollinSummary: Thomasson argues that merely verbal disputes arise in metaphysics when ontologists misuse the words 'thing' and 'object'. Application conditions fix the conditions under which a claim can be applied or refused, but some ontological disputes involve using the terms 'thing' and 'object' in such a way that they lack application conditions. When this happens there is no way to determine the truth values of the claims being made.Comment: This would be useful in a course on metaphysics, ontology or metametaphysics. It gives an interesting and plausible articulation of the idea that some metaphysical disputes are illegitimate in some sense (an intution that some students share). This isn't an easy paper, but it is clearly written and suitable for advanced undergraduates or graduates.
Thomasson, Amie L.. Research Problems and Methods in Metaphysics
2012, In Robert Barnard & Neil Manson (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. Continuum International.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Nora BerenstainAbstract: This article offers a guide to a key area on metaphysics and covers the fundamental questions asked in metaphysics - areas that have continued to attract interest historically as well as topics that have emerged more recently as active areas of research. It is especially focused on research methods and problems.
Thomasson, Amie L.. Fiction and Metaphysics
1998, Cambridge University Press.
-
Expand entry
-
Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirPublisher's Note: This challenging study places fiction squarely at the centre of the discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of metaphysics. The book develops an 'artifactual' theory of fiction, whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as laws or symphonies or works of literature. By understanding fictional characters we come to understand how other cultural and social objects are established on the basis of the independent physical world and the mental states of human beings.
Can’t find it?
Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!