Gannett, Lisa. Echoes From the Cave: Philosophical Conversations Since Plato
2014, Oup Canada.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktPublisher's Note: Echoes from the Cave: Philosophical Conversations since Plato is an anthology of classic and contemporary readings in philosophy compiled to introduce students to the main problems discussed by philosophers past and presentComment: This is an anthology of texts on central topics in philosophy, many of which might be suitable for the DRL.
Garavaso, Pieranna. The Woman of Reason: On the Re-appropriation of Rationality and the Enjoyment of Philosophy
2015, Meta-Philosophical Reflection on Feminist Philosophies of Science, pp.185-202.
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
This paper starts out from two feminist criticisms of classical logic, namely Andrea Nye’s general rejection of logic and Val Plumwood’s criticism of the standard notion of negation in classical logic. I then look at some of Gottlob Frege’s reflections on negation in one of his later Logical Investigations. It will appear clear that Frege’s notion of negation is not easily pegged in the general category of ‘Otherness’ that Plumwood uses to characterize negation in classical logic. In the second half of the paper, I discuss the claim that the adversarial method of argumentation in philosophy is hostile to feminist goals and perhaps responsible for the low numbers of women engaged in academic philosophy. Against this hypothesis, I claim that a more naturalistic perspective on logic can avoid essentialism and provide a feminist friendly and pluralist view of logic, human reasoning, and philosophical argumentation.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Garcia, Jorge L. A.. Health versus Harm: Euthanasia and Physicians’ Duties
2007, Journal of Medicine and Philsophy, 31 (1): 7-24.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordAbstract: This essay rebuts Gary Seay's efforts to show that committing euthanasia need not conflict with a physician's professional duties. First, I try to show how his misunderstanding of the correlativity of rights and duties and his discussion of the foundation of moral rights undermine his case. Second, I show aspects of physicians' professional duties that clash with euthanasia, and that attempts to avoid this clash lead to absurdities. For professional duties are best understood as deriving from professional virtues and the commitments and purposes with which the professional as such ought to act, and there is no plausible way in which her death can be seen as advancing the patient's medical welfare. Third, I argue against Prof. Seay's assumption that apparent conflicts among professional duties must be resolved through 'balancing' and argue that, while the physician's duty to extend life is continuous with her duty to protect health, any duty to relieve pain is subordinate to these. Finally, I show that what is morally determinative here, as throughout the moral life, is the agent's intention and that Prof. Seay's implicitly preferred consequentialism threatens not only to distort moral thinking but would altogether undermine the medical (and any other) profession and its internal ethics.Comment: This text will mostly be of use to advanced students (or courses) focusing on the ethics of physician assisted suicide or euthanasia. It presents a detailed rebuttal to Seay's "Euthanasia and Physicians' Moral Duties," so it will be of most use to students who have read Seay's text or are deeply familiar with defenses of euthanasia based in consequentialist moral reasoning.
Garcia, Laura. Ontological Arguments for God’s Existence
2017, in Kelly James Clark (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Reigion - Third Edition. Broadview Press.
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Added by: Emily PaulSummary: A clear introduction to the Ontological Argument for God's existence, and different versions of it.Comment: A nice introduction to the Ontological Argument, suitable for an introductory philosophy of religion course. Would work as either a primary or secondary reading, depending on how much attention you want to give to the ontological argument.
Garcia, Laura. Teleological and Design Arguments
2008, in Charles Taliaferro & Philip Quinn (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition. Wiley-Blackwell: 375-384.
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Added by: Emily PaulSummary: This chapter takes you through the history of teleological arguments and an analysis of them: beginning with traditional teleological arguments and their origins, and moving to discuss modern day 'fine tuning' and 'many worlds' arguments. Along the way, Garcia considers criticisms of these various arguments.Comment: An excellent and thorough introduction to the Teleological Argument, suitable for an introductory philosophy of religion course as a core reading. It could be good to ask students to compare classical 'design' arguments with 'fine-tuning' arguments, based on their reading of Garcia.
Gardiner, Georgi. Attunement: On the Cognitive Virtues of Attention
2022, In Social Virtue Epistemology, eds. Mark Alfano, Colin Klein, and Jeroen de Ridder. Routledge, 48–72
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular social positions. A recurring theme is that disproportionate attention can distort, mislead, and misrepresent even when all the relevant claims are true and well supported by evidence. In the informational cacophony of the internet age, epistemology must foreground the cognitive virtues of attunement.Comment: This text provides a broad overview of the epistemology of attention, especially its applications to media and social institutions. It could also be used in a survey of virtue ethics or virtue epistemology. Gardiner also has a "cheat sheet" on her website for teaching this essay.
Gardiner, Georgi. We Forge the Conditions of Love
2023, In Carlos Montemayor & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Linguistic Luck: Safeguards and Threats to Linguistic Communication. Oxford University Press, pp. 279–314.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
This essay is not about what love is. It is about what self-ascriptions of love do. People typically self-ascribe romantic love when a nexus of feelings, beliefs, attitudes, values, commitments, experiences, and personal histories matches their conception of romantic love. But what shapes this conception? And (how) can we adjudicate amongst conflicting conceptions? Self-ascriptions of love do not merely describe the underlying nexus of attitudes and beliefs. They also change it. This essay describes how conceptions of love affect romantic experience. I limn distinctions between love and obsessive infatuation and explore ways language can cultivate queer romantic preferences. Since conceptions of love are shaped, often implicitly, by terms available in one’s linguistic community, the resulting nexus of concepts and conceptions manifests linguistic luck. I suggest ways we might sculpt the language of love to better understand—and change—ourselves. Love can help us flourish and so can our “love” language.
Comment: This paper discusses controversial ideas that may apply to student's lived experience of love, infatuation, and sexuality. The essay can be taught in two parts: Sections 1-7 for one lesson, and sections 8-13 for the following lesson. Sections 5 & 6 (on sexuality) can be skipped or given their own lesson. Those sections are especially controversial and can be used to ceate an in-class debate. Gardiner has a webpage, podcasts, and cheat sheet for teaching this essay. (See her website.)
Gardiner, Georgi. The Reasonable and the Relevant: Legal Standards of Proof
2019, Philosophy & Public Affairs 47(3): 288–318.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
According to a common conception of legal proof, satisfying a legal burden requires establishing a claim to a numerical threshold. Beyond reasonable doubt, for example, is often glossed as 90% or 95% likelihood given the evidence. Preponderance of evidence is interpreted as meaning at least 50% likelihood given the evidence. In light of problems with the common conception, I propose a new ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for legal standards of proof. Relevant alternative accounts of knowledge state that a person knows a proposition when their evidence rules out all relevant error possibilities. I adapt this framework to model three legal standards of proof—the preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt standards. I describe virtues of this framework. I argue that, by eschewing numerical thresholds, the relevant alternatives framework avoids problems inherent to rival models. I conclude by articulating aspects of legal normativity and practice illuminated by the relevant alternatives framework.Comment: This can introduce upper-level epistemology students to the relevant alternatives theory. For epistemology training, it pairs well with David Lewis "Elusive Knowledge" or (for a more applied approach) can also be paired with an essay on the proof paradox.
Gardiner, Georgi. Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment
2018, In Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Springer, 169–95.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
Moral encroachment holds that the epistemic justification of a belief can be affected by moral factors. If the belief might wrong a person or group more evidence is required to justify the belief. Moral encroachment thereby opposes evidentialism, and kindred views, which holds that epistemic justification is determined solely by factors pertaining to evidence and truth. In this essay I explain how beliefs such as ‘that woman is probably an administrative assistant’—based on the evidence that most women employees at the firm are administrative assistants—motivate moral encroachment. I then describe weaknesses of moral encroachment. Finally I explain how we can countenance the moral properties of such beliefs without endorsing moral encroachment, and I argue that the moral status of such beliefs cannot be evaluated independently from the understanding in which they are embedded.Comment: Best paired with something by Rima Basu. Potential debate questions include whether moral factors affect whether you should withhold belief about people.
Gardiner, Georgi. The She Said, He Said Paradox and the Proof Paradox
2021, In Zachary Hoskins and Jon Robson (eds.), The Social Epistemology of Legal Trials. Routledge, pp. 124–143.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Georgi GardinerAbstract:
This essay introduces the ‘she said, he said’ paradox for Title IX investigations. ‘She said, he said’ cases are accusations of rape, followed by denials, with no further significant case-specific evidence available to the evaluator. In such cases, usually the accusation is true. Title IX investigations adjudicate sexual misconduct accusations in US educational institutions; I address whether they should be governed by the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard of proof or the higher ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. Orthodoxy holds that the ‘preponderance’ standard is satisfied if the evidence adduced renders the litigated claim more likely than not. On this view, I argue, ‘she said, he said’ cases satisfy the ‘preponderance’ standard. But this consequence conflicts with plausible liberal and feminist claims. In this essay I contrast the ‘she said, he said’ paradox with legal epistemology’s proof paradox. I explain how both paradoxes arise from the distinction between individualised and non-individualised evidence, and I critically evaluate responses to the ‘she said, he said’ paradox.Comment: This can be paired with an essay on the proof paradox in legal epistemology. Gardiner has a "cheat sheet" on her website for teaching this essay.
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