McLean, Sheila. A Patient’s Right to Know: Information Disclosure, the Doctor and the Law
1995, Aldershot: Dartmouth.
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Added by: Simon FoktPublisher’s Note:
Comment: This volume addresses issues concerning the rights of patients. Particular issues examined include the patient's right to consent to or refuse treatment, and issues related to valid consent and its dependence on information, including full details regarding the risks associated with a particular course of treatment. Useful as further reading in applied ethics classes, or in any moral or political philosophy teaching related to consent. Additionally, can be useful in discussions on the differences and similarities between the moral and legal approaches to the issue of consent.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time
2018, Lexington Books
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández VillarrealPublisher’s Note:
This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the î and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In the preface and conclusion, McLeod introduces some relevant methodological aspects that must be considered in order to understand Mayan philosophy. The first one, is that of the nature of the sources from which we can reconstruct Mayan philosophical thought that are available to use. Unlike the source of Ancient Mexica intellectual culture which are relatively abundant, the availability of Mayan sources is more limited. The second one, is about the nature of Mayan language: written Maya consists of pictograms which represent both ideograms or glyphs and syllabic sounds. The author also discusses the fact that some forms of Mayan languages and Mayan peoples are alive. Finally, this section of McLeod’s book also discusses the philosophical concepts of truth and personhood.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya: Lords of Time
2018, Lexington Books
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment (from this Blueprint): McLeod begins by asking whether, for ancient Mayans, the name of rulers or gods is a case of proper names or of function names, i.e. a description of a role. He is interested in a Mayan view discussed in previous chapters according to which the attributes of e.g. an exemplary ruler are attached to the role they fulfilled. For McLeod, the Mayan view is partly supported by their metaphysical views on the self. As preamble to his discussion of the Mayan notion of personhood, McLeod provides some comparison between the Mayan view of the self to that of other traditions. He refers, too, to the sacrality of objects discussed in the previous session. McLeod, then, moves on to discuss the ideas that Mayan personhood can be collective and that someone’s essence can extend to material artifacts. The text also includes a discussion of the Mayan notion of substitution (k’ex), the act in which someone took the essence of a god.
McLeod, Alexus. Philosophy of the Ancient Maya. Lords of Time
2018, Lexington Books
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández Villarreal
Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
McPherson, Lionel K.. Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?
2007, Ethics 117(3): 524-546.
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Added by: Helen MorleyIntroduction: Many people, including philosophers, believe that terrorism is necessarily and egregiously wrong. I will call this “the dominant view.” The dominant view maintains that terrorism is akin to murder. This forecloses the possibility that terrorism, under any circumstances, could be morally permissible—murder, by definition, is wrongful killing. The unqualified wrongness of terrorism is thus part of this understanding of terrorism. I will criticize the dominant view. Some philosophers have argued that terrorism might not be impermissible on either a rights‐based or a consequentialist analysis. But I will not pursue the question of whether terrorism could ever be justifiable. Rather, I will argue that the dominant view’s condemnatory attitude toward terrorism as compared to conventional war cannot be fully sustained. I propose that a version of the argument that terrorists do not have adequate authority to undertake political violence—and not the prominent argument that noncombatants should be immune from deliberate use of force against them—is the most plausible basis for finding terrorism objectionable.Comment: McPherson challenges the view that there is something distinctively wrong about terrorism as compared to conventional warfare. In addition to a discussion on terrorism it presents challenges to traditional interpretations of just war theory.
McShane, Katie. Neosentimentalism and Environmental Ethics
2011, Environmental Ethics, 33 (1): 5-23.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFordAbstract: Neosentimentalism provides environmental ethics with a theory of value that might be particularly useful for solving many of the problems that have plagued the field since its early days. In particular, a neosentimentalist understanding of value offers us hope for making sense of (1) what intrinsic value might be and how we could know whether parts of the natural world have it; (2) the extent to which value is an essentially anthropocentric concept; and (3) how our understanding of value could be compatible with both a respectable naturalism and a robust normativity.Comment: This reading is could be used well as a response to Rolston or Callicott's versions of environmental value. The article also covers a number of problems endemic to formal value theory (especially a neosentimentalist theory of the nature of value). It would work best in an upper level undergraduate course on value theory or environmental ethics.
McSweeney, Michaela Markham. Logical Realism and the Metaphysics of Logic
2019, Philosophy Compass. 14:e12563.
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘ One True Logic ’ ; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world; and third, that the mind ‐ and ‐ language ‐ independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism.
Comment: The paper provides a simple, lucid argument for why many metaphysical views are committed to what the author calls metaphysical logical realism. For the purpose of discussion, it may be paired with an attempt to resist the commitment. More generally, it might be helpful as a survey of logical commitments of metaphysical views.
McTernan, Emily. How to Make Citizens Behave: Social Psychology, Liberal Virtues, and Social Norms
2014, Journal of Political Philosophy 22(1): 84-104.
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Added by: Carl FoxAbstract: It is widely conceded by liberals that institutions alone are insufficient to ensure that citizens behave in the ways required for a liberal state to flourish, be stable, or function at all. A popular solution proposes cultivating virtues in order to secure the desired behaviours of citizens, where institutions alone would not suffice. A range of virtues are proposed to fill a variety of purported gaps in the liberal political order. Some appeal to virtues in order to secure state stability; Rawls, for instance, claims that ‘citizens must have a sense of justice and the political virtues that support political and social institutions’ in order to ensure an ‘enduring society’. For Galston, citizens must possess a range of virtues in order for the state to function, including the virtues of courage, independence, tolerance, willingness to engage in public discourse, and law-abidingness.Comment: Challenges the relevance of debates about virtue for liberals concerned with stability and argues that they would be better advised to look to social norms for assistance. Raises some interesting questions for proponents of liberalism and does a nice job of envisioning the instrumental potential of social norms for political theorists. Very useful further reading for anyone interested in (or writing on) either stability or social norms.
McWeeny, Jennifer. Which Bodies Have Minds? Feminism, Panpsychism, and the Attribution Question
2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 272-293
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Abstract:
This article develops a new framework for addressing the attribution question, the question of which bodies have minds, by bringing a feminist perspective to metaphysical considerations about the mind. McWeeny argues that the attribution question, when applied to individuals who have been subject to different sorts of oppression, is not only a question about whose bodies have minds but also a question about the degree of "mentality" attributed to certain individuals and the mental constitution of those individuals.Comment (from this Blueprint): McWeeny provides a novel examination of the attribution question by looking into what might be considered one of the most inclusive theories about the mind: panpsychism. According to Panpsychism, "mentality is ubiquitous in nature". Thus, we should expect panpsychism to hold an equal attribution across all bodies, and assert that all bodies have minds, without discrimination. McWeeny shows us, upon further examination, how mainstream panpsychist views (Russelian or physicalist panpsychism) fail to do so. McWeeny provides a detailed analysis of how Cavendishian Panpsychism is more well-placed to give a feminist perspective on the attribution question.
McWeeny, Jennifer, Keya Maitra. Introduction: What Is Feminist Philosophy of Mind?
2022, in McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-37
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Added by: Adriana Alcaraz Sanchez and Jodie RussellAbstract:
McWeeny and Maitra motivate the adoption of a feminist perspective in contemporary debates within the philosophy of mind to further illuminate the nature of conscious experience. They argue that the adoption of a feminist perspective leads to the implementation of a more nuanced investigation of the mind, one that avoids a conceptualization of the mind as a "uniform" concept across beings or groups, and instead, considers the role of the body and different societal contexts. In philosophy of mind, when thinking about "the mind", we are usually prompted to think about the mind as a universal thing, as something that we all (humans) have. Moreover, when exploring and investigating what makes the mind to be what it is ( i.e. which are the intrinsic and special features or consciousness), traditionally, we have been encouraged to think about certain properties of the mind that are universal and can be attributed to anyone. McWeeny and Maitra argue that this mainstream methodology in philosophy of mind is a simplistic one. Not only it overlooks the many inter and intrapersonal nuances of each individual's "mind", but also the impact of social constructs, such as gender, race, and class, in our understanding of what the mind is, and who has a mind.Comment (from this Blueprint): This is the introductory chapter to the anthology "Feminist Philosophy of Mind" (OUP). In here, McWeeny and Maitra (the editors) offer one of the first definitons "feminist philosophy of mind" as a subdiscipline and as a methodology to the study of the mind. They argue that current methods and theoretical work in philosophy of mind has highly overseen the role of the body and society in our understanding of the mind. This text works as a prompt to intitiate the blueprint and to consider how the study of the mind could benefit from the application of tools from feminist philosophy.
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