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Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics
2011, in Christian Miller (ed.), The Continuum (or Bloomsbury) Companion to Ethics.
Topics: Mental States and Processes; Metaethics; Normative Ethics
Keywords: action; character; ethics; right action; virtue
Traditions: Analytic; Australasian/Oceanian
Languages: English

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Introduction: Part I of this article discusses the nature of virtue ethics as a type of normative ethical theory, alongside primarily consequentialism and Kantianism. However, since the virtue concepts are central to all types of virtue ethics, attention needs to be paid to the notion of virtue as an excellence of character, and related notions such as the virtue concepts as aplied to actions (e.g., kind act). Part II discusses the notion of virtue as an excellence of character, while part III further elucidates the nature of virtue ethics by considering a number of central but selected issues, such as the notion of virtuous action and virtue ethical conceptions of right action. Needless to say not all of interest can be treated here.
Comment: A good, detailed overview of virtue ethics, including a good examination of the degree of diversity virtue ethical views can have. It would serve as a good first introduction to the topic, either in an undergraduate course on moral theory generally or virtue ethics specifically.
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Introductory

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Swanton, Christine. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View
2003, Clarendon Press.
Topics: Mental States and Processes; Metaethics; Normative Ethics
Keywords: Aristotle; Nietzsche; character; non-eudaimonistic virtue ethics; virtue; virtue ethics
Traditions: Analytic; Australasian/Oceanian
Languages: English

Figures: Aristotle; Friedrich Nietzsche

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Added by: Nick Novelli
Publisher's Note: This book offers a comprehensive virtue ethics that breaks from the tradition of eudaimonistic virtue ethics. In developing a pluralistic view, it shows how different 'modes of moral response' such as love, respect, appreciation, and creativity are all central to the virtuous response and thereby to ethics. It offers virtue ethical accounts of the good life, objectivity, rightness, demandingness, and moral epistemology.
Comment: This book offers an interesting, distinctive form of virtue ethics. It would be valuable as a different perspective and an illustration of the different directions one can take virtue theory. Due to its complexity, it is best taught to graduate students or upper-level/honours undergraduates, who have already received a grounding in the fundamentals of virtue ethics.
Difficulty: Advanced
Recommended use: Further

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Sznajder, Marta. Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum on Analogical Reasoning: New Sources
2022, Erkenntnis 89(4): 1349–1365.
Topics: Formal Epistemology; Logic and Mathematics Keywords:
Traditions: Analytic; European; Historical Languages: English; Polish
Figures: Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum; Rudolf Carnap
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Added by: Viviane Fairbank
Abstract:

Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum is a known figure in philosophy of probability of the 1930s. A previously unpublished manuscript fills in the blanks in the full picture of her work on inductive reasoning by analogy, until now only accessible through a single publication. In this paper, I present Hosiasson’s work on analogical reasoning, bringing together her early publications that were never translated from Polish, and the recently discovered unpublished work. I then show how her late work relates to Rudolf Carnap’s approach to “analogy by similarity” developed in the 1960s. Hosiasson turns out to be a predecessor of the line of research that models analogical influence as inductive relevance. A translation of Hosiasson’s manuscript concludes the paper.

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Difficulty: Advanced
Recommended use: Specialised
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TallBear, Kim. Making Love and Relations Beyond Settler Sexuality
2016, Lecture. The Ecologies of Social Difference Research Network. University of British Columbia.
Topics: Applied Ethics; Culture; Gender Sex and Sexuality
Keywords: anti-colonialism; ethical non-monogamy; kinship; natal justice; politics of monogamy; population ethics; sustainability
Traditions: Critical; Cultural; North American
Languages: English

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Added by: Sonja Dobroski and Quentin Pharr
Abstract:
Lecture as part of the Social Justice Institute Noted Scholars Lecture Series, co-presented by the Ecologies of Social Difference Research Network at the University of British Columbia.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Difficulty: Easy
Recommended use: Introductory

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Tan, Sor-Hoon. Why Equality and Which Inequalities?: A Modern Confucian Approach to Democracy
2016, Philosophy East and West 66(2): 488–514
Topics: Culture; Equality; Forms of Government; Justice; Political Authority and Legitimacy Keywords: Confucianism; democracy; equality
Traditions: East Asian; Historical; Methodological Languages: Classical Chinese; English
Figures: Confucius
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Wilson Lee
Abstract:

Abstract: This article challenges the conventional view that Confucianism has no place for the value of equality by shifting the focus from direct justification of equality (Why equality?) to concerns about actual social and political problems (Which inequalities are objectionable?). From this perspective, early Confucian texts endorse some inequalities, in particular those based on virtue, while objecting to others, especially socioeconomic inequalities. Confucians do not consider equality or inequality as inherently valuable, but evaluate them in relation to issues of good government.

Comment: Coming from a Confucian perspective, the paper examines the relation between equality and democracy with implications for both reconstructing Confucian political philosophy for today and democratic theory as such. This is an important point of dialogue for Anglophone political philosophers to have a more objective picture of Confucian political philosophy instead of the usual imperialist caricatures. The point of dialogue is also being explored by a Singaporean scholar in Singapore (despite having been once a crown colony its scholarship is unfortunately very much ignored in the Anglophone world), whose work and life lies at the intersection of Chinese and Anglo-European intellectual traditions.
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Specialised
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Tanesini, Alessandra. Teaching Virtue: Changing Attitudes
2016, Logos and Episteme 7(4): 503-527.
Topics: Education; Social Epistemology
Keywords: attitude; education; intellectual arrogance; self-affirmation; vice; virtue epistemology
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; European
Languages: English

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Added by: Rie Izuka
Abstract: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
Comment: This article examines the intellectual vice of arrogance, and also touches upon the issue of how to teach virtues. The author is urging caution about the efficacy of exemplarism: a popular view on the education for virtues, and instead offers an alternative method of teaching virtues: self-affirmation.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory

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Tanesini, Alessandra. “Calm down, dear”: intellectual arrogance, silencing and ignorance
2016, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90(1): 71-92.
Topics: Education; Social Epistemology
Keywords: attitude; education; epistemic injustice; intellectual arrogance; self-affirmation; vice; virtue epistemology
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; European
Languages: English

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Added by: Rie Izuka
Abstract: In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion in the arrogant themselves.
Comment: This article examines intellectual vices of arrogance, and its counterpart: servility. The author explains how the former vice develops the latter: culpably breaking of the norms of turn-taking of conversation locutionarily silences other conversants, and such disrespectful behavior would lead conversants to fall into a vice of intellectual servility.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory

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Tanesini, Alessandra. Teaching Virtue Changing Attitudes
2016, Logos and Episteme 7(4): 503-527.
Topics: Applied Ethics; Education
Keywords: attitude education intellectual arrogance self-affirmation vice epistemology virtue epistemology
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; European
Languages: English

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Added by: Rie Izuka
Abstract: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation through exposure to positive exemplars.
Comment: This article examins an intellecutal vice of arrogance, and also touches upon the issue of how to teach virtues. This paper works well in teaching individual vice to undergrads, it does not require any prior knowledge of virtue epistemology, hence, perfect for introductory course of virtue epistemology.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory

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Tanesini, Alessandra. “Calm down, dear”: intellectual arrogance, silencing and ignorance
2016, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90(1): 71-92.
Topics: Culture; Education; Gender Sex and Sexuality; Race; Social Epistemology
Keywords: attitude; education; epistemic injustice; intellectual arrogance; intellectual humility; self-affirmation; vice; virtue epistemology
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; European
Languages: English

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Added by: Rie Izuka
Abstract: In this paper I provide an account of two forms of intellectual arrogance which cause the epistemic practices of conversational turn-taking and assertion to malfunction. I detail some of the ethical and epistemic harms generated by intellectual arrogance, and explain its role in fostering the intellectual vices of timidity and servility in other agents. Finally, I show that arrogance produces ignorance by silencing others (both preventing them from speaking and causing their assertions to misfire) and by fostering self-delusion in the arrogant themselves.
Comment: This article examines intellectual vices of arrogance, and its counterpart: servility. The author explains how the former vice develops the latter: culpably breaking of the norms of turn-taking of conversation locutionarily silences other conversants, and such disrespectful behavior would lead conversants to fall into a vice of intellectual servility. This paper works well in teaching individual vice to undergrads, it does not require any prior knowledge of virtue epistemology, hence, perfect for introductory course of virtue epistemology.
Difficulty: Easy, Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory

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Tanesini, Alessandra. An introduction to Feminist Epistemologies
1998, Wiley-Blackwell
Topics: Gender Sex and Sexuality; Metaepistemology Keywords: feminist theory; theory of knowledge
Traditions: Analytic; Critical; European; Geographical Languages: English
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio

Publisher's Note: Could gender, race, and sexuality be relevant to knowledge? Although their positions and arguments differ in several respects, feminists have asserted that science, knowledge, and rationality cannot be severed from their social, political, and cultural aspects. This book presents a comprehensive introduction to feminist epistemologies situated at the intersection of philosophical, sociological, and cultural investigations of knowledge. It provides several critiques of more traditional approaches, and explores the alternatives proposed by feminists. In particular, this book contains extensive discussions of topics such as objectivity, rationality, power, and subject. Drawing on a variety of sources, the author also argues that when knowledge is conceived in terms of practices, it becomes possible to see it as normative and socially constituted."

Comment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
Difficulty: Intermediate
Recommended use: Introductory
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