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Nussbaum, Martha. Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance
2004, In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press
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Added by: Andrea BlomqvistAbstract: Nussbaum argues for a cognitivist theory of emotions, whereby an emotion is similar to a judgement. An emotion has an intentional object which is being evaluated as e.g. bad for one. On her view, our emotional reactions to different situations are connected to the idea of eudaimonia, and emotions could be seen as a guide to a flourishing life. As such, Nussbaum aims to explain how certain emotions feel like they're tearing us apart (e.g. grieving a dead family member), since they are literally bad for us. She thus departs from the Jamsian tradition whereby the psychological component of an emotion is emphasised (or emotions are sometimes reduced to physiological responses), and argues instead that the physiological response is not a necessary component of an emotion.Comment: This paper offers a good introduction into the cognitivist theories of emotions and their basic claims. It would be good to pair with non-cognitivist theories such as William James's or Jesse Prinz's.
Siegel, Susanna. Which Properties are Represented in Perception?
2006, In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press: 481-503.
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Added by: Andrea BlomqvistAbstract: In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Siegel argues that high-level properties should be attributed to percception itself. That, high-level properties can be the content of perception.Comment: This paper is interesting to consider in the cognition/perception debate, since high-level properties such as being a natural kind, or emotions and intentions, are normally taken to be features of cognition rather than perception. It raises interesting questions about the relationship between concepts, the content of perception and perceptual experience. It would be good in a third year module on perception.
Gertler, Brie. Renewed Acquaintance
2012, In: Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar (ed.). Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123
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Added by: Lukas SchwengererSummary: This chapter elaborates and defends a set of metaphysical and epistemic claims that comprise what is called the acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge of the phenomenal qualities of experience. The hallmark of this approach is the thesis that, in some introspective judgments about experience, (phenomenal) reality intersects with the epistemic, that is, with the subject's grasp of that reality. While this approach is a descendant of Russell's acquaintance theory, it is epistemically more modest than that theory. The chapter shows that the acquaintance approach's hallmark thesis does not carry the ambitious epistemic implications often associated with acquaintance views. And the chapter defends that thesis from objections stemming from what is required for an epistemically substantial grasp of the phenomenal, and from Stalnaker's worry that, if the thesis were true, information about the phenomenal would be incommunicable.Comment: An in-depth discussion of the acquaintance approach to introspection, providing a clear explanation and defense of the approach.
Ritchie, Katherine. What are groups?
2013, Philosophical Studies 166(2): 257-272.
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Added by: Lukas SchwengererAbstract: In this paper I argue for a view of groups, things like teams, committees, clubs and courts. I begin by examining features all groups seem to share. I formulate a list of six features of groups that serve as criteria any adequate theory of groups must capture. Next, I examine four of the most prominent views of groups currently on offer - that groups are non-singular pluralities, fusions, aggregates and sets. I argue that each fails to capture one or more of the criteria. Last, I develop a view of groups as realizations of structures. The view has two components. First, groups are entities with structure. Second, since groups are concreta, they exist only when a group structure is realized. A structure is realized when each of its functionally defined nodes or places are occupied. I show how such a view captures the six criteria for groups, which no other view of groups adequately does, while offering a substantive answer to the question, 'What are groups?'Comment: The paper is ideal as an introduction to the ontology of groups and a good example for social metaphysics in general. It includes an easy to follow discussion of difference features of groups and accounts that aim to capture these features. The paper is especially well suited as part of an introductory metaphysics courses, but can also work as an introductory text in a course on social metaphysics.
Bar-On, Dorit, James Sias. Varieties of Expressivism
2013, Philosophy Compass 8(8): 699-713.
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Added by: Lukas SchwengererAbstract: After offering a characterization of what unites versions of 'expressivism', we highlight a number of dimensions along which expressivist views should be distinguished. We then separate four theses often associated with expressivism - a positive expressivist thesis, a positive constitutivist thesis, a negative ontological thesis, and a negative semantic thesis - and describe how traditional expressivists have attempted to incorporate them. We argue that expressivism in its traditional form may be fatally flawed, but that expressivists nonetheless have the resources for preserving what is essential to their view. These resources comprise a re-configuring of expressivism, the result of which is the view we call 'neo-expressivism'. After illustrating how the neo-expressivist model works in the case of avowals and ethical claims, we explain how it avoids the problems of traditional expressivism.Comment: This paper provides a clear discussion of the core principles of expressivism. Moreover, it engages with classic objections (e.g. the Frege-Geach problem) and develops the neo-expressivist proposal as a response. It is an accessible starting point for neo-expressivism and as such both suitable for meta-ethics and epistemology courses discussing expressivist positions.
Hanson, Louise. The Reality of (Non-Aesthetic) Value
2013, Philosophical Quaterly 63(252): 492-508.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: It has become increasingly common for philosophers to make use of the concept of artistic value, and, further, to distinguish artistic value from aesthetic value. In a recent paper, 'The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value', Dominic Lopes takes issue with this, presenting a kind of corrective to current philosophical practice regarding the use of the concept of artistic value. Here I am concerned to defend current practice against Lopes's attack. I argue that there is some unclarity as to what aspect of this practice Lopes is objecting to, and I distinguish three kinds of objection that he could be read as making. I argue that none of these is adequately supported by Lopes's arguments, and that the corresponding three aspects of current philosophical practice are on firmer footing than Lopes's paper suggests. A new, plausible characterisation of artistic value will emerge from this discussion.Comment: This paper would be useful for undergrads and postgrads studying and questioning the difference between aesthetic value and artistic value, the dependence relation between features of works and their value, and generally the metaphysical basis of value in art. Hanson is very clear about her argumentative strategy. This makes the paper a prime example of good philosophical methodology.
Woollard, Fiona, Lindsey Porter. Breastfeeding and defeasible duties to benefit
2017, Journal of Medical Ethics 43(8): 515-518.
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Added by: Rie IizukaAbstract: For many women experiencing motherhood for the first time, the message they receive is clear: mothers who do not breastfeed ought to have good reasons not to; bottle feeding by choice is a failure of maternal duty. We argue that this pressure to breastfeed arises in part from two misconceptions about maternal duty: confusion about the scope of the duty to benefit and conflation between moral reasons and duties. While mothers have a general duty to benefit, we argue that this does not imply a duty to carry out any particular beneficent act. Therefore, the expectation that mothers should breastfeed unless they have sufficient countervailing reasons not to is morally unwarranted. Recognising the difference between reasons and duties can allow us to discuss the benefits of breastfeeding and the importance of supporting mothers who wish to breastfeed without subjecting mothers who bottle feed to guilt, blame and failure.Comment: This paper is a good and clear introduction of the debate about breastfeeding. By appealing to the difference between reasons and duties the author discusses the benefits of breastfeeding and the importance of supporting mothers who wish to breastfeed. This paper is a good and clear introduction of the debate about breastfeeding. By appealing to the difference between reasons and duties the author discusses the benefits of breastfeeding and the importance of supporting mothers who wish to breastfeed.
Jenkins, Carrie. What Is Love? An Incomplete Map of the Metaphysics
2015, Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1(2): 349-364.
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Added by: Rie IizukaAbstract: The paper begins by surveying a range of possible views on the metaphysics of romantic love, organizing them as responses to a single question. It then outlines a position, constructionist functionalism, according to which romantic love is characterized by a functional role that is at least partly constituted by social matters (social institutions, traditions, and practices), although this role may be realized by states that are not socially constructed.Comment: This paper is a good and clear introduction to metaphysics of love. The author offers a map of the options for a metaphysician of love, and she proposes her own view called constructionist functionalism on love.
Zagzebski, Linda. Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About
2004, Philosophical Papers 33(3): 353-377.
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Added by: Rie Iizuka, Contributed by: Wayne RiggsAbstract: In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of beliefs which it is not wrong to hold unconscientiously. I also argue that epistemic values enjoy a privileged place in the panorama of what we care about because they are entailed by anything we care about. That means that when there is a conflict between caring about knowledge or true belief and caring about something else, that conflict cannot be resolved simply by following the one we care about the most because caring about knowledge in any domain is entailed by caring about that domain. Finally, I argue that whereas caring demands different degrees of conscientiousness in different contexts, contextualism about knowledge is less plausible.Comment: An interesting paper on the concept of care in virtue epistemology. This paper might be useful in the course of virtue epistemology or philosophy of care.
Gertler, Brie. Introspecting Phenomenal States
2001, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(2): 305-328.
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Added by: Lukas SchwengererAbstract: This paper defends a novel account of how we introspect phenomenal states, the Demonstrative Attention account (DA). First, I present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal state introspection which are not psychological, but purely metaphysical and semantic. Next, to explain how these conditions can be satisfied, I describe how demonstrative reference to a phenomenal content can be achieved through attention alone. This sort of introspective demonstration differs from perceptual demonstration in being non-causal. DA nicely explains key intuitions about phenomenal self-knowledge, makes possible an appealing diagnosis of blindsight cases, and yields a highly plausible view as to the extent of our first-person epistemic privilege. Because these virtues stem from construing phenomenal properties as non-relational features of states, my defense of DA constitutes a challenge to relational construals of phenomenal properties, including functionalism and representationalism. And I provide reason to doubt that they can meet this challenge.Comment: This paper is a good and clear example of an acquaintance account of introspection with regard to phenomenal states. It can be used as a specialised reading on introspection, or as a supplement to discussions of phenomenal states. Because it involves a challenge to relational construals of phenomenal properties it can also be used in advanced philosophy of mind discussing the nature of phenomenal properties.