Freter, Björn. Abosede Priscilla Ipadeola’s Philosophy of Liberation
2025, in Chimakonam, A. E. and Idika, C. (eds.), Her-storical Perspectives in African Philosophy. Cham: Springer
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
This contribution aims to present the work of Abosede Priscilla Ipadeola. The text attempts to reconstruct her thoughts on male supremacy, epistemic tyranny, and, most importantly, her ingenious way of redefining epistemic freedom. It concludes with Ipadeola’s suggestions regarding rewriting history and education. This reconstructive work is necessary to disseminate Ipadeola’s wisdom more widely and recommend it with fervor to anyone who partakes in the discourses surrounding African philosophy, feminism, colonialism, and marginalization. The contributions of African women philosophers need to be recentered, reclaimed, and revealed. It is our sincere hope that this overview, in some way, and be it in the smallest, contributes to that vital work. The contemporary significance and relevance of Ipadeola’s work cannot be denied. Unfortunately, it also cannot be denied that it is becoming increasingly important these days, and we would do well to learn as much as possible from it, as quickly as possible. Let us, then, begin our work.Comment (from this Blueprint): There are virtually no explicit and extended secondary sources on Ipadeola; this paper will allow students to develop an overview of her ethical and epistemological thought.
Freter, Björn. Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlé on Yoruba Philosophy, Knowing, Not-Knowingand the Pain of Letting Go
2024, in Agada, A., Ofuasia, E. and Ikuli, B. Y. (eds.), Contemporary African Metaphysical Thought. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
This contribution will outline some important aspects of Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlés' groundbreaking work on Yorùbá oral philosophy. Using the Yorùbá story ‘The Toothless Queen’ as a vehicle, we will outline her understanding of oral philosophy as philosophy proper and investigate her radically inclusive, non-absolutist, anti-nihilist conception of philosophy as well as the fundamental onto-epistemological axioms of Yorùbá thought. We will especially focus on Olúwọlés radical and revolutionary philosophical approach to rationality and rational conjectures. We will finish our paper with Olúwọlés’ reflections on some of the obstacles that must be overcome to make her revolution a reality in the global philosophical community, that is, the pain of letting theories, ideas, and principles dear to us go.Comment (from this Blueprint): There is only a handful of secondary literature on Sophie Bọsẹdé Olúwọlé. This recent paper addresses the issues of rationality and oral philosophy and is thus a helpful additional resource for the study of Olúwọlé.
Freter, Yvette. Difference in African Educational Contexts
2020, In: Imafidon, E. (ed.) Handbook of African Philosophy of Difference. Cham: Springer, 217-237
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, Contributed by: Björn FreterAbstract: Educational institutions pull together students of different genders, abilities, races, classes, and religions and are the microcosm of their communities. In African contexts, schools have been the location of “cultural parochialism” and “colonial epistemicide and the consolidation of colonization” (Lebakeng et al. 72, 2006). Thus an additional dimension of difference drawn along the fallacious line of the superior dominant Eurowestern colonizer versus the inferior indigenous African population has been institutionalized within the educational system. I engage in a philosophical examination of the African context of difference in the sphere of education. I consider the hopeful gaze philosophy offers in the light of difference, by considering the concept of pluralism, and argue for a view of difference that is both inclusive and appreciative of diversity and suggests ways educators can critically assess their own differences by considering their positionality. I conclude by applying the philosophical outlook that embraces pluralism to our classroom spaces and suggests multicultural theory that embraces difference by including both dominant and marginalized educators to impact education in an efficacious way.
Fricker, Elizabeth. Against Gullibility
1994, In: Matilals, Bimal K. & Chakrabarti, A. (eds.), Knowing from Words: Western and Indian philosophical analysis of understanding and testimony. Kluwer. 125-161
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Added by: Jie GaoSummary: This paper refutes the PR thesis according to which the hearer has such a special presumptive right to trust the speaker's assertion. The refutation consists of 1) arguing against that it is not possible for a hearer to obtain independent confirmation that a given speaker is trustworthy - that what she says will be true; 2) a full rejection to various positive arguments for a PR which may be made.Comment: This paper defends anti-reductionism by refuting arguments for reductionism. It is useful paper for teachings on testimony in a upper-level undergraduate course on epistemology.
Fricker, Elizabeth. Critical notice: Telling and trusting: Reductionism and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony
1995, Mind 104 (414): 393-411.
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Added by: Jie GaoAbstract: In this review I focus on the arguments advanced by Coady in the main task to which he addresses himself in Testimony: arguing the case against the reductive position, and in favour of a non-reductive conception of testimonial knowledge. I introduce some distinctions which I believe enable the subject to taken further.Comment: This review critically discusses the first book on testimony in contemporary philosophy and advances the dabates. It is a very good background reading for courses on epistemology or social epistemology. It saves students from reading Coady's original book.
Fricker, Elizabeth. Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others – and Argument from Analogy?
2014, in Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Emily PaulAbstract: Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one's own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances - there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one's religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationality requires that one assess the credentials of those whom one trusts.Comment: A great primary reading for a religious epistemology course, or otherwise a great secondary reading for a more general philosophy of religion course, for a unit on Faith. If being used as a primary reading, it could be good to ask students to explain whether and why they agree that religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others - and, if they do agree, whether this is problematic? What other (non-religious) cases can they think of where our beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others?
Fricker, Miranda. Rational Authority and Social Power: Toward a Truly Social Epistemology
1998, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98(2): 159-177.
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Added by: Jie GaoAbstract: This paper explores the relation between rational authority and social power, proceeding by way of a philosophical genealogy derived from Edward Craig's Knowledge and the State of Nature. The position advocated avoids the errors both of the 'traditionalist' (who regards the socio-political as irrelevant to epistemology) and of the 'reductivist' (who regards reason as just another form of social power). The argument is that a norm of credibility governs epistemic practice in the state of nature, which, when socially manifested, is likely to imitate the structures of social power. A phenomenon of epistemic injustice is explained, and the politicizing implication for epistemology educed.Comment: In this paper, Fricker lays out an approach to social epistemology, one that gives the field a particular tight connect to political philosophy. Suitable as an introductory reading for courses on social epistemology or epistemology in general.
Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Jie GaoPublisher's Note: In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.Comment: In this book, Fricker names the phenomenon of epistemic injustice, and distinguish two central forms of it, with their corresponding remedies. It touches the central issues in social epistemology and philosophy of gender and race. It is thus an essential reading for relevant courses on those two areas.
Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: The Power and Ethics of Knowing
2007, Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerPublisher’s Note:
Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. In epistemology, the very idea that there is a first-order ethical dimension to our epistemic practices — the idea that there is such a thing as epistemic justice — remains obscure until we adjust the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. This book argues that there is a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value. The book identifies two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. In doing so, it charts the ethical dimension of two fundamental epistemic practices: gaining knowledge by being told and making sense of our social experiences. As the account unfolds, the book travels through a range of philosophical problems. Thus, the book finds an analysis of social power; an account of prejudicial stereotypes; a characterization of two hybrid intellectual-ethical virtues; a revised account of the State of Nature used in genealogical explanations of the concept of knowledge; a discussion of objectification and ‘silencing’; and a framework for a virtue epistemological account of testimony. The book reveals epistemic injustice as a potent yet largely silent dimension of discrimination, analyses the wrong it perpetrates, and constructs two hybrid ethical-intellectual virtues of epistemic justice which aim to forestall it.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this excerpt, Miranda Fricker introduces the concept of testimonial injustice.
Fridland, Ellen. They’ve lost control: reflections on skill
2014, Synthese 191 (12):2729-2750.
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Added by: Andrea BlomqvistAbstract: In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of control for precisely the same reason: each reduce control to a passive, mechanistic, automatic process, which then prevents them from producing a substantive account of how controlled processes can be characterized by seemingly intelligent features and integrated with personal-level states. I will end by introducing three different kinds of control, which are constitutive of skilled action: strategic control, selective, top-down, automatic attention, and motor control.Comment: It would be suitable to teach this paper in a module on skill, especially if considering the relationship between skill and control. It would be most suitable in a senior year module.
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