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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag Uidhir
Abstract: We apply Carol Gilligan's distinction between a "male" mode of moral reasoning, focussed on justice, and a "female" mode, focussed on caring, to the reading of literature. Martha Nussbaum suggests that certain novels are works of moral philosophy. We argue that what Nussbaum sees as the special ethical contribution of such novels is in fact training in the stereotypically female mode of moral concern. We show this kind of training is appropriate to all readers of these novels, not just to women. Finally, we explore what else is involved in distinctively feminist readings of traditional novelsComment : This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand itRogers, Dorothy. America’s First Women Philosophers2005, Bloomsbury.-
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Added by: Alison Stone
Publisher's Note: The American idealist movement started in St. Louis, Missouri in 1858, becoming more influential as women joined and influenced its development. Susan Elizabeth Blow was well known as an educator and pedagogical theorist who founded the first public kindergarten program in America (1873-1884). Anna C. Brackett was a feminist and pedagogical theorist and the first female principal of a secondary school (St. Louis Normal School, 1863-72). Grace C. Bibb was a feminist literary critic and the first female dean at the University of Missouri, Columbia (1878-84). American idealism took on a new form in the 1880s with the founding of the Concord School of Philosophy in Massachusetts. Ellen M. Mitchell participated in the movement in both St. Louis and Concord. She was one of the first women to teach philosophy at a co-educational college (University of Denver, 1890-92). Lucia Ames Mead, Marietta Kies, and Eliza Sunderland joined the movement in Concord. Lucia Ames Mead became a chief pacifist theorist in the early twentieth century. Kies and Sunderland were among the first women to earn the Ph.D. in philosophy (University of Michigan, 1891, 1892). Kies wrote on political altruism and shared with Mitchell the distinction of teaching at a coeducational institution (Butler College, 1896-99). These were the first American women as a group to plunge into philosophy proper, bridging those years between the amateur, paraprofessional and professional academic philosopher. Dorothy Rogers's new book at last gives them the attention they deserve.Comment : A book covering many US 19th-century women philosophers, mostly influenced by Hegel to some extent. Could be used as supplementary reading on a history of philosophy course if it covers the nineteenth century, so that students are aware there were women active in philosophy then.Rogers, Dorothy. The Other Philosophy Club: America’s First Academic Women Philosophers2009, Hypatia 24(2): 164-185.-
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Added by: Alison Stone
Abstract: Recent research on women philosophers has led to more discussion of the merits of many previously forgotten women in the past several years. Yet due to the fact that a thinker’s significance and influence are historical phenomena, women remain relatively absent in 'mainstream' discussions of philosophy. This paper focuses on several successful academic women in American philosophy and takes notice of how they succeeded in their own era. Special attention is given to three important academic women philosophers: Mary Whiton Calkins, Ellen Bliss Talbot, and Marietta Kies.Comment : Focusing on three nineteenth-century women philosophers, Mary Whiton Calkins, Ellen Bliss Talbot, and Marietta Kies. Could be used as supplementary reading on a history of philosophy course if it covers the nineteenth century.Root, Deborah. Fat-Eaters and Aesthetes: The Politics of Display1996, in Cannibal Culture: Art, Appropriation, and the Commodification of Difference. USA: Westview Press.-
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: Root employs Méxica mythology as a lens for revealing the consumptive, and even cannibalistic, character of power. In particular, she points to the way colonial power sets up Westerners as "experts" and arbiters of art and culture, presenting appreciation of culture as a pretext for violence and control.Comment : This chapter serves as an introduction to Root's booklength study of these themes, so the presentation only gestures at these relationships and provides a brief selection of examples that illustrate them. However, if can be useful for raising initial questions about the relationships among power, art, and culture. It provides a counterpoint to a more sanguine perspective on cross-cultural appreciation expressed by Thomas Heyd in "Rock Art Aesthetics and Cultural Appropriation."Ross, Steven, Warenski, Lisa. Socratic Metaethics Imagined2017, Sophia and Philosophia 1.3., 1-8-
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Added by: Björn Freter
Abstract: A time machine mysteriously appeared one day in ancient Athens. Curious about the future of philosophical dialogue, Socrates entered the device and traveled to the 21st Century. He spent several months in the United Kingdom and United States discussing metaethics before returning to Athens, now a devoted and formidable quasi-realist moral genderexpressivist.
Rudder Baker, Lynne. Is the first-person perspective gendered?2022, In McWeeny, J. and Maitra, K. (eds) Feminist Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 41-53-
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Added by: Adriana Alcaraz Sanchez and Jodie RussellAbstract:
The notion of gender identity has been characterized as "one's sense of oneself as male, female or transgender." To have a sense of oneself at all, one must have a robust first-person perspective - a capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself in the first person. A robust first-person perspective requires that one have a language complex enough to express thoughts like "I wonder how I am going to die." Since a robust first-person perspective requires that one have a language, and languages embed whole worldviews, the question arises: in learning a language, does the robust first-person perspective itself introduce gender stereotypes? Without denying that we unconsciously acquire attitudes about gender that shape our normative expectations, this chapter argues that one's gender identity is not just attributable to the biases implicit in the language one speaks. So the robust first-person perspective itself is not responsible for which gender-specific attitudes a person acquires.Comment (from this Blueprint): Rudder Baker's chapter on the first-person perspective and gender identity is a great starting place to begin thinking about what it means to experience the world through the lens of gender. Rudder Baker's chapter also poses interesting thought experiements, such as whether a disembodied being would have a gender idetity (she argues "no") or whether it is possible to live in a gender-less society. The chapter also introduces the reader to the necessary conditons by which we might want to say that someone has a gender identity andso is a fruitful springboard for further and deeper discussions about not only gender, but language and personal identity more broadly.Ruether, Rosemary R.. Symbolic and Social Connections of the Oppression of Women and the Domination of Nature1999, in Adams, C. J. (eds), Ecofeminism and the sacred, New York: Continuum.-
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Comment : This text offers an introduction to ecofeminism. It discusses the history of associating maleness with culture and femaleness with nature and identifies some of the issues which led to the current ecological crisis. The text has the potential to challenge received views and inspire a lively discussion, and as such it is best used as an introductory text in classes on environmental ethics and on feminist ethics.Russell, Gillian. Logic isn’t Normative2020, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and how we ought to reason, so that pluralism about the consequence relation would result in an incoherent or unattractive pluralism about those things. In this paper I argue that logic isn’t normative. I distinguish three different ways in which a theory – such as a logical theory – can be entangled with the normative and argue that logic is only entangled in the weakest of these ways, one which requires it to have no normativity of its own. I use this view to show what is wrong with three different arguments for the conclusion that logic is normative.
Comment : Appropriate for any course touching on the normativity of logic question. Familiarity with the question and with logical pluralism is helpful, but not required. Could be paired with a defense of normativity for discussion.Russell, Gillian. Logic: A Feminist Approach2020, In Garchar, Kimberly K. and Shew, Melissa M. (Ed.). Philosophy for girls: An invitation to a life of thought, pp. 79-98-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
This chapter asks whether there is any such thing as feminist logic. It defines feminism and logic, and then goes on to present and evaluate four possible views, introducing and critiquing the work of Andrea Nye, Val Plumwood, and Susan Stebbing. It argues that Stebbing’s approach—on which feminism is one among many political applications of logic—is correct, but that feminist logic could do more, by providing a formal framework for the study of social hierarchies, much as it presently provides a formal framework for the study of numbers and similarity rankings among possible worlds.
Comment : Ideal for an intro course to either feminist philosophy or logic, to introduce possible interactions between the fields. More advanced courses (in either direction) might want to adopt G. Russell's "From Anti-Exceptionalism to Feminist Logic" instead, which covers the same topic in a lot more detail.Russell, Gillian. From Anti-Exceptionalism to Feminist Logic2023, Hypatia, forthcoming-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
Anti-exceptionalists about formal logic think that logic is continuous with the sciences. Many philosophers of science think that there is feminist science. Putting these two things together: can anti-exceptionalism make space for feminist logic? The answer depends on the details of the ways logic is like science and the ways science can be feminist. This paper wades into these details, examines five different approaches, and ultimately argues that anti-exceptionalism makes space for feminist logic in several different ways.
Comment : available in this BlueprintCan’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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Robinson, Jenefer, Ross, Stephanie. Women, Morality, and Fiction
1990, Hypatia 5 (2):76-90.