Olsaretti, Serena. The Concept of Voluntariness – A Reply
2008, Journal of Political Philosophy 16(1): 165-188.
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Added by: Carl FoxAbstract: In his paper on 'The Concept of Voluntariness', Ben Colburn helpfully takes up the task of developing my view about the sense of voluntariness that is relevant for judgments of substantive responsibility, or judgments about individuals' liability to pick up some costs of their choices. On my view, a necessary condition for holding people responsible for their choices is that those choices be voluntary in the sense that they are not made because there is no acceptable alternative, where the standard for the acceptability of options is an objective standard of well-being. [...] Colburn's first point is entirely well-taken. By way of endorsing it, I ask whether we are justified in taking some but not all kinds of beliefs to affect the voluntariness of choice, as his elaboration of my view suggests. However, I find Colburn's second point less convincing, and argue that we should allow for the moral character of options to affect the voluntariness of choice.Comment: Short debate article responding to some criticisms of Olsaretti's account of voluntariness made by Ben Colburn and probably best read in conjunction with Colburn's article. Does a good job of responding to the criticisms and explaining her account. Good further reading for teaching about voluntariness and autonomy.
Orlandi, Nicoletta. Ambiguous Figures and Representationalism
2011, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10 (2011), 307-323
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Simon Prosser
Abstract: Ambiguous figures pose a problem for representationalists, particularly for representationalists who believe that the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual (MacPherson in Nous 40(1):82–117, 2006). This is because, in viewing ambiguous figures, subjects have perceptual experiences that differ in phenomenal properties without differing in non-conceptual content. In this paper, I argue that ambiguous figures pose no problem for non-conceptual representationalists. I argue that aspect shifts do not presuppose or require the possession of sophisticated conceptual resources and that, although viewing ambiguous figures often causes a change in phenomenal properties, this change is accompanied by a change in non-conceptual content. I illustrate the case by considering specific examples.
Comment: Specialised further reading on nonconceptual content and representationalism.
Overall, Christine. Miracles as Evidence Against the Existence of God
1985, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 23(3): 3447-353.
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De CruzAbstract: An assumption in debates about the philosophical significance of miracles is that if a miracle (a violation of natural law or a permanently inexplicable event) were to occur, it would be evidence for the existence of the Christian God. The paper explores reservations by several philosophers about this connection between God and miracles, and presents arguments to show that if a miracle would occur there would be good reason to deny that God exists.Comment: Great text that would spark a lot of debate. Could be a core reading for a unit on miracles or on agnosticism/atheism. If the latter, this would be particularly useful if miracles had already been discussed. Could be discussed alongside Hume on Miracles.
Pacherie, Elisabeth. Qualia and representations
1999, In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution. Springer. pp. 119--144.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: Dretske has recently offered a representational theory of perceptual experience - considered as paradigmatic of the qualitative and phenomenal aspects of our mental life. This theory belongs, as do his previous works, to a naturalistic approach to mental representation
Padró, Barrio, Eduardo A.. El problema de la adopción de reglas lógicas
2022, Análisis Filosófico, 42(1): 33-42.
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
¿Seguimos reglas de inferencia al razonar? Por más intuitiva que resulte la respuesta positiva a esta pregunta, hay una serie de dificultades para vincular reglas lógicas y prácticas inferenciales. El Problema de la Adopción de Reglas de Inferencia constituye un desafío para todo aquel que proponga que podemos seguir nuevos patrones inferenciales a partir del reconocimiento de reglas. En esta sección temática se exploran diversos asuntos conectados a si podemos seguir un nuevo patrón inferencial en virtud de una regla.
Comment: This is a clear, Spanish-language introduction to the so-called Adoption Problem in the philosophy of logic.
Patricia Churchland. The Hornswoggle Problem
1996, Journal of Consciousness Studies (3):5-6: 402-408.
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Greg MillerAbstract: Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have proposed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem-. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine- arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine a mechanism is a rather uninteresting psychological fact about us, not an interesting metaphysical fact about the world. Rather than worrying too much about the meta-problem of whether or not consciousness is uniquely hard, I propose we get on with the task of seeing how far we get when we address neurobiologically the problems of mental phenomena.Comment: This paper can be best used to frame the contemporary debate over the 'hard problem' of consciousness. The paper neatly expresses the relevant ideas and criticisms in a brief, easy manner. The paper is also a prime example of an eliminativist response to the hard problem. This paper is highly accessible for students.
Patterson, Sarah. The explanatory role of belief ascriptions
1990, Philosophical Studies 59 (3):313-32.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Simon FoktAbstract: The aim of this paper is to argue that belief ascription in common- sense discourse is not uniformly non-individualistic, as Burge's conclusion suggests. (In concentrating on belief ascriptions I follow the usual practice of treating belief as the paradigm propositional attitude.) I shall present some examples which suggest that when giving common-sense explanations of action we do not individuate thoughts with reference to agents' linguistic environment in the manner indicated by Burge's thought-experiment. The challenge supposedly presented to the Continuity Thesis by Burge's thought-experiment is thus removed. I then discuss whether the mode of individuation characteristic of our explanatory practice deserves to be called individualistic, and conclude with some remarks on the expressibility of thought contents.
Paul, L. A. Temporal Experience
2010, The Journal of Philosophy 107(7): 333-359.
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Added by: Emily PaulIntroduction: The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.Comment: For an intermediate/advanced philosophy of time course, this paper would be brillliant for a unit on psychological arguments in philosophy of time - which of course is a growing research area within philosophy of time. In a standard metaphysics course, this would make for a good further reading in philosophy of time. Students tend to favour the A-theory, and this is a very powerful argument for the B-theory that also lays out the different views in a crystal clear way.
Paul, L. A.. What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting
2015, Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23 (2015)
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Added by: Andrea BlomqvistAbstract: It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. This suggests we should reject our ordinary conception of how to make this life-changing decision, and raises general questions about how to rationally approach important life choices.Comment: Good to use as a shorter introductory reading to L.A. Paul's work and how to make decisions about life choices. It could be used in a module on decision making, or imagination.
Paul, L. A., Hall, Edward J. (Hall, Ned). Causation: A User’s Guide
2013, Oxford University Press UK.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Tyron GoldschmidtPublisher's Note: Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Neither common sense nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation, or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Causation: A User's Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing but vital landscape. L. A. Paul and Ned Hall guide the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples as landmarks. They clarify the central themes of the debate about causation, and cover questions about causation involving omissions or absences, preemption and other species of redundant causation, and the possibility that causation is not transitive. Along the way, Paul and Hall examine several contemporary proposals for analyzing the nature of causation and assess their merits and overall methodological cogency.The book is designed to be of value both to trained specialists and those coming to the problem of causation for the first time. It provides the reader with a broad and sophisticated view of the metaphysics of the causal relation.Comment: An excellent overview of the debate on causation which would work well in any undergraduate or postgraduate metaphysics course which covered causation.
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