Misak, Cheryl. Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth
2004, Oxford University Press
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, Contributed by: Quentin PharrPublisher’s Note:
C.S. Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, argued that truth is what we would agree upon, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could fruitfully go. In this book, Misak argues for and elucidates the pragmatic account of truth, paying attention both to Peirce's texts and to the requirements of a suitable account of truth. An important argument of the book is that we must be sensitive to the difference between offering a definition of truth and engaging in a distinctively pragmatic project. The pragmatic project spells out the relationship between truth and inquiry; it articulates the consequences of a statement's being true. The existence of a distinct pragmatic enterprise has implications for the status of the pragmatic account of truth and for the way in which philosophy should be conducted.Comment : For students wanting to know more about Peirce's conception of truth, as it relates to the end of inquiry, Misak's book is an excellent first book to study. It is highly readable and authoritative. It is also a great book for understanding some of the major differences between Peirce and James, as early proponents of pragmatism who disagreed on the nature of truth. Prior readings of Peirce's philosophy will help - but, by and large, Misak provides everything that is needed for a first appreciation of the substance of his views. It is also a helpful guide for students to gather a sense of how pragmatists who are not necessarily Jamesians believe we should philosophize and inquire.Mitchell, Sandra. Dimensions of Scientific Law2000, Philosophy of Science 67(2): 242-265.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Biological knowledge does not fit the image of science that philosophers have developed. Many argue that biology has no laws. Here I criticize standard normative accounts of law and defend an alternative, pragmatic approach. I argue that a multidimensional conceptual framework should replace the standard dichotomous law/ accident distinction in order to display important differences in the kinds of causal structure found in nature and the corresponding scientific representations of those structures. To this end I explore the dimensions of stability, strength, and degree of abstraction that characterize the variety of scientific knowledge claims found in biology and other sciences.Comment : Really interesting paper that examines the nature of scientific laws by focusing on the case of laws in biology. It would be recommendable to read Carnap's analysis of the acceptance of different linguistic forms within science before reading this article. Could be used as a paper for a senior undergraduate course or for postgraduate courses in Philosophy of Science.Mitchell, Sandra. Complexity and explanation in the social sciences2009, Mitchell, Sandra. "Complexity and explanation in the social sciences." Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (Hg.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice, Cambridge (2009): 130-145.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Patricia Rich
Abstract: To answer Condorcet, in this chapter I will investigate what it is about the social world that makes the universal, exceptionless generalizations that are heralded as the foundation of knowledge of the physical world so elusive. I am not going to rehearse all the arguments for and against the possibility of laws in the social realm. What I aim to do is not to take either side of the debate, that is, not to say - "YES! Social science does have laws just like physics (or close enough any-way)" or "NO! Social science can never have laws like those of physics; knowledge of the social has a wholly different character." Rather I will suggest replacing the standard conception of laws that structure the debate with a more spacious conceptual framework that not only illuminates what it is about knowledge of the social that is similar to knowledge of the physical, but also explains what is so different in the two scientific endeavors.Comment : When studying the philosophy of the social sciences, the nature of explanation and the role of laws in explanation are important issues. This text provides a valuable argument on this topic, provides an example of how philosophy of biology is relevant to the social sciences, and brings in some other useful philosophical concepts.2009, In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
The chapter is an overview of Indian logic, with a general introduction followed by specialized sections on four different schools: Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic, Jaina logic, and Navya-Nyāya logic.
Comment : Can be used as a general reference for a course focusing on Indian logic. The various sections are independent, so each can on its own serve as a reading in any course wanting to include discussion of a particular system of logic (e.g. a general logic course, or a course in Indian philosophy).Mojica, Laura. The enactive naturalization of normativity: from self-maintenance to situated interactions2021, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43(4), pp. 1-27-
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
The autopoietic enactive account of cognition explains the emergence of normativity in nature as the norm of self-maintenance of life. The autonomous nature of living agents implies that they can differentiate events and regulate their responses in terms of what is better or worse to maintain their own precarious identity. Thus, normative behavior emerges from living organisms. Under this basic understanding of normativity as self-maintenance, autopoietic enactivism defends a continuity between biological, cognitive, and social norms. The self-maintenance of an agent’s sensorimotor identity establishes the cognitive norms that regulate its behavior, and the self-maintenance of its social identity determines the social norms. However, there is no clear explanation of how individuals, who by their very constitution are primarily moved to interact with the world under the norm of self-maintenance, could interact with the world driven by non-individual norms. Furthermore, understanding all normativity as self-maintenance makes it unclear how agents establish genuine social interactions and acquire habits that have no implication for their constitution as individuals. So, to face these challenges, I propose an alternative notion of normativity grounded on a Wittgensteinian, action-oriented, and pragmatic conception of meaning that distinguishes between an agent with a normative point of view and external normative criteria. I defend that a normative phenomenon is an interaction that is established by an individual point of view as defined by autopoietic enactivism and that is part of a self-maintaining system. The latter establishes the external normative criteria to evaluate the interaction, and it may or may not coincide with the identity of the interacting agent. Separating external normative criteria from the self-constitution of the interactant agent not only solves the challenge but potentially explains the situated and relational character of agency.Comment : available in this BlueprintMorgan, Mary S.. The curious case of the prisoner’s dilemma: model situation? Exemplary narrative?”2007, Science Without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, Exemplary Narratives. Science and cultural theory, ed. by Creager, Angela N. H., Lunbeck, Elizabeth, Norton Wise, M., Duke University Press, Durham, 157-185-
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Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Anna Alexandrova
Abstract: The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is one of the classic games discussed in game theory, the study of strategic decision making in situations of conflict, which stretches between mathematics and the social sciences. Game theory was primarily developed during the late 1940s and into the 1960s at a number of research sites funded by various arms of the U.S. military establishment as part of their Cold War research.
Comment : I assign this piece to give students a sense of where Prisoner's Dilemma comes from and what its ubiquity teaches us about economics (that laws matter less than exemplary situations).Morris, Rebecca Lea. Intellectual Generosity and the Reward Structure of Mathematics2021, Synthese, 199(1): 345-367.-
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Added by: Fenner Stanley TanswellAbstract:
Prominent mathematician William Thurston was praised by other mathematicians for his intellectual generosity. But what does it mean to say Thurston was intellectually generous? And is being intellectually generous beneficial? To answer these questions I turn to virtue epistemology and, in particular, Roberts and Wood's (2007) analysis of intellectual generosity. By appealing to Thurston's own writings and interviewing mathematicians who knew and worked with him, I argue that Roberts and Wood's analysis nicely captures the sense in which he was intellectually generous. I then argue that intellectual generosity is beneficial because it counteracts negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics that can stymie mathematical progress.Comment (from this Blueprint): In this paper, Morris looks at ascriptions of intellectual generosity in mathematics, focusing on the mathematician William Thurston. She looks at how generosity should be characterised, and argues that it is beneficial in counteract some of the negative effects of the reward structure of mathematics.Morrison, Margaret. Fictions, representations, and reality2009, In Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Fictions in Science: Philosophical Essays on Modeling and Idealization. Routledge.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Uses Maxwell's model of the ether as a case study in accounting for the role of fictions in science. Argues that we should understand idealisation and abstraction as being different from fiction. Fictional models for Morrison are those that are deliberately intended to be such that the relationship between their structure and the structure of the concrete systems they model is not (immediately) apparent. This is different from mere idealisation, where certain structural features are omitted to make calculations more tractable.Comment : Very useful as a primary or secondary reading in an advanced undergraduate course on philosophy of science (or perhaps on philosophy of fiction). It is philosophically sophisticated, but also treats the science in enough detail to provide students with some clear ideas about the nature of scientific representational practices themselves. Would be appropriate in sections on scientific representation or modelling.Morrison, Margaret. Spin: All is not what it seems2007, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38(3): 529-55.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Spin is typically thought to be a fundamental property of the electron and other elementary particles. Although it is defined as an internal angular momentum much of our understanding of it is bound up with the mathematics of group theory. This paper traces the development of the concept of spin paying particular attention to the way that quantum mechanics has influenced its interpretation in both theoretical and experimental contexts. The received view is that electron spin was discovered experimentally by Stern and Gerlach in 1921, 5 years prior to its theoretical formulation by Goudsmit and Uhlenbeck. However, neither Goudsmit nor Uhlenbeck, nor any others involved in the debate about spin cited the Stern-Gerlach experiment as corroborating evidence. In fact, Bohr and Pauli were emphatic that the spin of a single electron could not be measured in classical experiments. In recent years experiments designed to refute the Bohr-Pauli thesis and measure electron spin have been carried out. However, a number of ambiguities surround these results - ambiguities that relate not only to the measurements themselves but to the interpretation of the experiments. After discussing these various issues the author raises some philosophical questions about the ontological and epistemic status of spin.Comment : The goal of the paper is to uncover and isolate how spin presents problems for traditional realism and to illustrate the power that theories like quantum mechanics have for shaping both philosophical questions and answers. It is adequate for higher-level postgraduate courses in Philosophy of Science.Morrison, Margaret and, Mary S. Morgan. Models as mediating instruments1999, In M. S. Morgan and M. Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge University Press.-
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Added by: Jamie Collin
Summary: Morrison and Morgan argue for a view of models as 'mediating instruments' whose role in scientific theorising goes beyond applying theory. Models are partially independent of both theories and the world. This autonomy allows for a unified account of their role as instruments that allow for exploration of both theories and the world.Comment : Useful as a primary or secondary reading in an advanced undergraduate course on philosophy of science, particularly within a section on scientific modeling. The paper is particularly useful in teaching because it is not unduly technical.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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