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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Introduction: Structural realism was born in the attempt to reach a compromise between a realist argument and an antirealist one, namely the 'no miracle' argument and the 'pessimistic meta-induction', respectively. In recent years, John Worrall has drawn attention to an epistemological version of structural realism, which he traces back to Henri Poincaré. French and Ladyman, on the other hand, have urged a metaphysical or ontic structural realism, which offers a 'reconceptualisation of ontology, at the most basic metaphysical level, which effects a shift from objects to structures.' French and Ladyman want to maintain the distance from neo-Kantianism and detach metaphysical structural realism from neo-Kantian epistemology so as to do justice to the realist's demand for mind-independence. This manoeuvre raises, however, some difficulties that have been at the centre of a recent ongoing debate: can we really 'dissolve' entities into mathematical structures? How can we even conceive of structural relations without relata? In this paper the author offers a diagnosis of the current standoff within structural realism between the epistemological and the metaphysical variant, by drawing attention to some important assumptions underlying the structural realist programme, and to their philosophical sources. It is the heterogeneity of these sources - she suggests - that is mainly responsible for the current stand-off within structural realism.Massimi, Michela. Saving Unobservable Phenomena2007, British Journal of Philosophy of Science 58(2): 235-262.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: In this paper the author argues -against van Fraassen's constructive empiricism-that the practice of saving phenomena is much broader than usually thought, and includes unobservable phenomena as well as observable ones. Her argument turns on the distinction between data and phenomena: She discusses how unobservable phenomena manifest themselves in data models and how theoretical models able to save them are chosen. She presents a paradigmatic case study taken from the history of particle physics to illustrate her argument. The first aim of this paper is to draw attention to the experimental practice of saving unobservable phenomena, which philosophers have overlooked for too long. The second aim is to explore some far-reaching implications this practice may have for the debate on scientific realism and constructive empiricism.Comment: This article is appropriate for studying the relationship between theoretical models and data models, as well as the scientific practice of saving unobservable phenomena. For a better understanding of this article, it could be really useful to have a previous basic knowledge on Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism. The article is appropriate for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science. It is especially interesting for those interested in theoretical models in particle physics.
Massimi, Michela. Three tales of scientific success2016, Philosophy of Science 83(5): 757-767.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Abstract: Success-to-truth inferences have been the realist stronghold for long time. Scientific success is the parameter by which realists claim to discern approximately true theories from false ones. But scientific success needs be probed a bit deeper. In this paper, the author tells three tales of scientific success, by considering in turn success from nowhere, success from here now, and success from within. She argues for a suitable version of success from within that can do justice to the historically situated nature of our scientific knowledge. The outcome is a new way of thinking about success-to-truth inferences along perspectivalist lines.Comment: This paper examines scientific success as something relative to perspectival standpoints. The author analyses three possible approaches to a comparative notion of success. This reading could be really useful for postgraduate students in philosophy of science. It is recommendable that students have some previous knowledge about the continuity between Fresnel's and Maxwell's theory of light.
Masuda, Takahiko, others. Culture and aesthetic preference: comparing the attention to context of East Asians and Americans2008, Personality and social psychology bulletin 34(9): 1260-1275.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt
Abstract: Prior research indicates that East Asians are more sen- sitive to contextual information than Westerners. This article explored aesthetics to examine whether cultural variations were observable in art and photography. Study 1 analyzed traditional artistic styles using archival data in representative museums. Study 2 investigated how contemporary East Asians and Westerners draw landscape pictures and take portrait photographs. Study 3 further investigated aesthetic preferences for portrait photographs. The results suggest that (a) traditional East Asian art has predominantly context-inclusive styles, whereas Western art has predominantly object- focused styles, and (b) contemporary members of East Asian and Western cultures maintain these culturally shaped aesthetic orientations. The findings can be explained by the relation among attention, cultural resources, and aesthetic preference.Comment: This text is an excellent example of experimental aesthetics and psychology of art: it presents evidence that what seems natural or aesthetically pleasing can differ across cultures. This makes it useful in classes focusing on non-Western art or on the universality vs. relativity of taste. Since the text is focused on the psychology, it will likely be best used as a background reading alongside more philosophical works.
Matilal, Bimal Krishna. Perception: An Essay on Classic Indian theories of Knowledge1986, Oxford: Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Giada Fratantonio
Abstract: This book is a defence of a form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyaya-Vaid'sesika school in classical India. The author presents the Nyaya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. His reconstruction of Nyaya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalistsComment: This can be used as a reading for a course on indian philosophy, focusing on epistemology, and philosophy of science
Matsuda, Mari. Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story1993, In: Words that Wound; Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, by Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, published by Westview Press-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Patricia A Blanchette
Introduction: The threat of hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the neo-Nazi skinheads goes beyond their repeated acts of illegal violence. Their presence and the active dissemination of racist propaganda means that citizens are denied personal security and liberty as they go about their daily lives. Professor Richard Delgado recognized the harm of racist speech in his breakthrough article, Words That Wound, in which he suggested a tort remedy for injury from racist words. This Article takes inspiration from Professor Delgado's position, and makes the further suggestion that formal criminal and administrative sanction - public as opposed to private prosecution - is also an appropriate response to racist speech.
In making this suggestion, this Article moves between two stories. The first is the victim's story of the effects of racist hate messages. The second is the first amendment's story of free speech. The intent is to respect and value both stories. This bipolar discourse uses as method what many outsider intellectuals do in silence: it mediates between different ways of knowing in order to determine what is true and what is just.
Comment: Argues for legal restrictions on hate speech in the United States, in keeping with an emerging international recognition of the harms of hate speech and the rights of the victims of such speech. Useful in discussions of free speech (e.g. after reading Mill), in discussions of hate speech and minority rights, and in discussions of American and international conceptions of rights.
Matthen, Mohan. How Things Look (and What Things Look That Way)2010, In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.-
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Added by: Andrea Blomqvist, Contributed by: Will Hornett
Abstract: What colour does a white wall look in the pinkish light of the late afternoon? What shape does a circular table look when you are standing next to it? These questions seem simple enough, but philosophers disagree sharply about them. In this paper, I attempt to provide a new approach to these questions, based on the idea that perception modifies our epistemic dispositions regarding specific environmental objects. I shall argue that by determining which object is involved in this way, we can determine the subject of visual predication. This enables us to parcel out visual features to different visual objects in a way that enables us to reconcile conflicting philosophical intuitions.Comment: Matthen's discussion of perceptual constancy is very clear and is centered on a philosophical analysis of the perceptual psychology. For this reason, it serves as a useful empirically informed companion to other philosophical discussions of perceptual constancy which are less empirically informed. It would be great in a third year or postgraduate course in Philosophy of Perception.
McCallum, Kate. Untangling Knots: Embodied Diagramming Practices in Knot Theory2019, Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, 9(1): 178-199.-
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Added by: Fenner Stanley TanswellAbstract:
The low visibility and specialised languages of mathematical work pose challenges for the ethnographic study of communication in mathematics, but observation-based study can offer a real-world grounding to questions about the nature of its methods. This paper uses theoretical ideas from linguistic pragmatics to examine how mutual understandings of diagrams are achieved in the course of conference presentations. Presenters use shared knowledge to train others to interpret diagrams in the ways favoured by the community of experts, directing an audience’s attention so as to develop a shared understanding of a diagram’s features and possible manipulations. In this way, expectations about the intentions of others and appeals to knowledge about the manipulation of objects play a part in the development and communication of concepts in mathematical discourse.Comment (from this Blueprint): McCallum is an ethnographer and artist, who in this piece explores the way in which mathematicians use diagrams in conference presentations, especially in knot theory. She emphasises that there are a large number of ways that diagrams can facilitate communication and understanding. The diagrams are dynamic in many way, and she shows how the way in which a speaker interacts with the diagram (through drawing, erasing, labelling, positioning, emphasising etc.) is part of explaining the mathematics it represents.
McConaughey, Zoe. Judgments vs Propositions in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Conception of Logic2024, History and Philosophy of Logic: 1–15-
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
This paper stresses the importance of identifying the nature of an author’s conception of logic when using terms from modern logic in order to avoid, as far as possible, injecting our own conception of logic in the author’s texts. Sundholm (2012) points out that inferences are staged at the epistemic level and are made out of judgments, not propositions. Since it is now standard to read Aristotelian sullogismoi as inferences, I have taken Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentaries to Aristotle’s logical treatises as a basis for arguing that the premises and conclusions should be read as judgments rather than as propositions. Under this reading, when Alexander speaks of protaseis, we should not read the modern notion of proposition, but rather what we now call judgments. The point is not just a matter of terminology, it is about the conception of logic this terminology conveys. In this regard, insisting on judgments rather than on propositions helps bring to light Alexander’s epistemic conception of logic.
Comment: This text uses the case of Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentaries to Aristotle’s logical treatises as a basis for making a philosophical argument about the distinction between conceptions of logic that focus on propositions, and those that focus on judgments. It is appropriate for students who already have some background in Ancient logic as well as contemporary philosophy of logic. Although the text requires some prior understanding of relevant concepts, it is clear and accessible, and would be appropriate for a course on the history of logic.
McGowan, M.K. The Metaphysics of Squaring Scientific Realism with Referential Indeterminacy1999, Erkenntnis 50(1): 87-94.-
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Added by: Laura Jimenez
Introduction: Scientific realism and the claim that there is radical referential indeterminacy are important and compelling philosophical theses. Each thesis has advocates and for good reason. On cursory examination, however, it seems that these theses are at odds with one another. It seems that one cannot both claim that science seeks to describe an objective reality and yet deny that reality is objectively structured in such a way as to determine the referents of our terms. Since there are compelling reasons in favour of each thesis and since it appears that some philosophers actually advocate both theses (Quine himself may be one such example), finding a way to square the theses would be multiply advantageous. On this paper, the author argues that despite the prima facie tension between them, these theses are indeed cotenable.Comment: Interesting paper that lies on the intersection between philosophy of science and philosophy of language. It could be used as a secondary reading for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science, in particular for lectures on the topic of scientific realism. The level of difficulty is not high, but it is more recommendable for students who have been introduced before to concepts such as realism, subjective supervientism and referential indeterminacy.
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Massimi, Michela. Structural Realism: A Neo-Kantian Perspective
2010, In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 1-23.
Comment: In this paper the author gives an excellent overview of the philosophical sources of structural realism: Poincaré, Cassier and Russell. The paper also explains with clarity the Newman problem and reviews the Fresnel-Maxwell case. The chapter serves as a good introduction to the topic of Structural Realism. It serves as well as a good introduction to the rest of the chapters present in the same book. This reading is best suited for courses in philosophy of science.