Diversity Reading List

Abstract: The argument from existence is often used as an attempted justification for our use of animals in commercial practices, and is often put forward by lay-persons and philosophers alike. This paper provides an analysis of the argument from existence primarily within the context of blood-sports (applying the argument to the example of game-birding), and in doing so addresses interesting and related issues concerning the distinction between having a life and living, or worthwhile life and mere existence, as well as issues surrounding our responsibilities to prospective and actual beings. However, my analysis of the argument will go beyond the animal ethics context; it is important that it does so in order to reveal the troublesome implications of the argument and to highlight the sorts of unethical practices it supports. In particular, in applying the argument to a relevant example concerning human beings, I will discuss how the argument from existence could be used to justify the ownership of slaves who were reared for slavery. My objective is to show just how problematic the argument from existence is, with the aim of laying the argument to rest once and for all.

Abstract: This paper aims to assess R. G. Frey’s analysis of Leonard Nelson’s argument (that links interests to rights). Frey argues that claims that animals have rights or interests have not been established. Frey’s contentions that animals have not been shown to have rights nor interests will be discussed in turn, but the main focus will be on Frey’s claim that animals have not been shown to have interests. One way Frey analyses this latter claim is by considering H. J. McCloskey’s denial of the claim and Tom Regan’s criticism of this denial. While Frey’s position on animal interests does not depend on McCloskey’s views, he believes that a consideration of McCloskey’s views will reveal that Nelson’s argument (linking interests to rights) has not been established as sound. My discussion (of Frey’s scrutiny of Nelson’s argument) will centre on the dialogue between Regan and Frey in respect of McCloskey’s argument. I will endeavor to update the dialogue by providing a re-interpretation of ‘rights’ in Nelson’s argument.

Abstract:
In recent years, there has been a growing concern for the well-being of animals reared in factory farms and used in scientific experiments. Most people have learned to accept that they have a moral responsibility to their pets, and there appears to be some recognition and reflection of the fact that farm and experimental animals are animals that may be much like our pets. However, legislation and reform to improve the welfare of animals used in experiments have been virtually non-existent. This is not to say that efforts to improve animal welfare have not been made in the case of animal experimentation. Campaign groups fight tirelessly to improve the lives of animals used in experiments. Rather, the reason why the practice of animal experimentation does not welcome legislation and reform seems, in part, connected to an idea of science as a special sort of field, with a different status to other fields of work. Seen as such, it may be seen as separated from certain moral values. The laboratory is often seen as a place where great knowledge is attained at the expense of animals, and therefore may be somehow seen as a place ‘insulated from certain kinds of moral criticism’ (Diamond, 1995, p.361), particularly in respect of animals. Indeed, there appears to a widespread conviction that animals used for scientific purposes should be perceived or at least treated differently from animals in other contexts. Indeed, this conviction is reflected in law, where there exists separate legislation for the treatment of pet animals and experimental animals.1 Legislation and reform for factory farm animals have been more successfully introduced, largely through the efforts of non-governmental organisations. However, in spite of increasing uneasiness about the suffering of animals in factory farms, the majority of people in the West eat factory-farmed meat. Consistently standing in opposition to factory farming would mean having to restrain one’s eating habits and change one’s lifestyle, something that many people are just not willing to do. In the West there seems to be a food culture, or way of life, which involves being able to eat what one wants, whenever one wants, even to the detriment of one’s health. Whereas meat was once seen as the luxury part of the meal, meat is now so commonplace in Western diet that it could be seen as the staple food for many people. In spite of existing new technologies, animal experiments have actually increased and, with the Western food culture as it is, the practice of factory farming looks to be a permanent fixture and the main system of farming in the future. In the light of this and considering the immense suffering animals endure in the practices of factory farming and animal experimentation the future looks bleak for animals destined for the factory farm and the laboratory, and it is arguably our urgent duty to interrogate, ‘What is the moral status of animals reared in factory farms and used in experiments?’ In order to answer this question one firstly needs to ask ‘What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for X to have moral standing?’ (see Goodpaster’s discussion of this question in ‘On Being Morally Considerable’, 1978, p.309). Reflections concerning anthropocentric attitudes towards animals necessitate concerns for environmental ethics, as animals, the environment and humans are interrelated. Indeed, answers to questions concerning the extent of our moral responsibilities towards animals may also provide answers to questions concerning the extent of our moral obligations towards the environment, and vice versa, since both involve ethical reflections that attempt to throw light on the extent of moral standing. In this respect, at a more fundamental level, environmental ethics and animal ethics merge, and, rather than being viewed as two distinct fields of ethics, should form one coherent ethic. Thus, they are both based on issues arising from answers to the question as to what kinds of entities can be said to have moral standing.

Abstract: This paper aims to provide an ethical assessment of the shooting of animals for sport. In particular, it discusses the use of partridges and pheasants for shooting. While opposition to hunting and shooting large wild mammals is strong, game birds have often taken a back seat in everyday animal welfare concerns. However, the practice of raising game birds for sport poses significant ethical issues. Most birds shot are raised in factory-farming conditions, and there is a considerable amount of evidence to show that these birds endure extensive suffering on these farms. Considering the fact that birds do have interests, including interests in life and not suffering, what are the ethical implications of using them for blood sports? Indeed, in the light of the suffering that game birds endure in factory farms, it may be that shooting such birds for sport is more morally problematic than other types of hunting and shooting which many people are often fiercely opposed to, for while it seems plausible to say that some animals may be harmed more by death than others (due to, say, their greater capacities), there may be harms that are worse than death (such as a life of intolerable suffering). The objective of this paper is to assess the ethics of shooting animals for sport, and in particular the practice of raising game birds for use in blood sports, by applying principles commonly used in ethics; specifically the principle of non-maleficence and equal consideration of (like) interests

Abstract: In the light of the current environmental crisis, different approaches to mitigating climate change have been put forward, some more plausible than others. However, despite problems with anthropocentric approaches to global warming (whether these be weak or strong versions of the approach), it seems that because of the largely anthropocentric outlook of the Western world, an internationally united approach to mitigating climate change will (perhaps inevitably) come from human-centred values. But what are the long-term implications of this? Such values need to be at the very least challenged if we are interested in providing justifiable and sustainable solutions to the current crisis. Indeed, this paper will analyse sentientism as an alternative environmental ethic stance and will discuss why it provides a more plausible approach than anthropocentric ones whilst recognising where it falls short.

Abstract: The killing of Cecil the lion in 2015 by a trophy hunter sparked a global debate regarding the killing of lions for ‘sport’. While many were outraged by Cecil’s killing, Cecil was just one of the millions of animals that have been used in the sports-shooting industry. Cecil’s killing brings with it the question of whether so-called ‘blood sports’ (whether these involve killing big game or smaller animals) are actually ‘sports’ at all, in the ordinary sense. As such, this paper aims to provide an analysis of blood-sport as a concept. The objective will be to examine whether blood-sports are games and to analyse to what extent, if any, blood-sports can be called ‘sports’ properly. Such an analysis will be presented through employing a generalised notion of sport and through a discussion of fair-play. Pace S. P. Morris (2014) who argues that hunting which incorporates a fair-chase code is a game and a sport, this current paper concludes that it is doubtful that blood-sport is a game, and that even if one assumes that it is a game, it cannot be classed as sport, and further that any fair-chase code undermines itself in the context of so-called ‘blood-sports’.

Abstract: The considerable conservation research on environmental problems and climate change tends to focus on species “biodiversity” rather than individuals. Individuals of the same species get categorized as “wild” or “captive”, with the latter often omitted from conservationists’ concerns. But wild and captive animals, although they may require different treatment, have comparable interests as individuals. Equity requires taking this into account in conservation efforts.

Introduction: There are two sorts of descriptions, or accounts, that we can give of works of art or of anything else that makes up our world of relatively stable objects. I can describe a painting, a chair, a mountain, or a man in terms of colors, shapes, spatial relation of parts, and so on. I can also describe the same four objects by talking about the dynamic ten sions of the first, or its lack of visual balance; the grace and elegance of the second; the gloominess or majesty of the third; and the trimness or gawkiness of the fourth. The first sort of description, or account, may answer a wide variety of general purposes, central among them that of identifying particular objects. A museum curator might so describe a painting for future reference in identifying the particular work of one painter; an auctioneer identifies pieces of furniture by such descriptions; a map-maker, a mountain; and a police department, a Man Wanted. The second sort of account of the same objects could not usefully serve such purposes. The second sort, usually if not always, is found in the context of the evaluating of objects. "This is a fine Sheraton chair-it is graceful, but sturdy." Here, relevant reasons are furnished for an aesthe tic rating of an object, and the first sort of description does not, and could not, serve this function

Abstract: We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others

Abstract: I argue that the aim to neutralize the influence of luck on distribution cannot provide a basis for egalitarianism: it can neither specify nor justify an egalitarian distribution. Luck and responsibility can play a role in determining what justice requires to be redistributed, but from this we cannot derive how to distribute: we cannot derive a pattern of distribution from the 'currency' of distributive justice. I argue that the contrary view faces a dilemma, according to whether it understands luck in interpersonal or counterfactual terms.