Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks
1967, Translated by C.L. Markmann. Grove Press.
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Added by: Zoé Grange-MarczakAbstract:
Fanon (1925-1961) was born in the French West Indies and studied in France before moving to Algeria to join the independence struggle. In this text, originally published in French in 1952, he addresses the Black man's condition, and more particularly his subjectivity and experience in the colonial context of the French West Indies and of France in general, also drawing parallel with North Africa and Indochina. Black Skin, White Masks is both a minute and complex description of the violence of colonization and a sketch of a liberation from its effects. A psychiatrist by training, Fanon investigates the psychological impact of both racism and colonization, with a strong focus on inter-subjective relations, including the intersection of race and gender relations. He uses a large variety of resources: philosophy (a critical reading of Sartre, an elaboration of Hegel's slave-master dialectic, Leiris, Marcel, and contemporary linguistics) ; Marxism (materialism and alienation); psychiatry and psychoanalysis; the literary Négritude movement (Black Francophones writers who, starting in the 1930s, wrote about lived experience of blackness, displacement and colonialism). Its reception, though belated, has nevertheless made it one of the seminal works of postcolonial theory.
Comment: This work is rather difficult by its intricacy, the importance of often implicit philosophical references, and its inscription in hyper-contemporary debates in philosophy, literature and psychology. However, both its radicalism and the descriptions of lived first-person experiences make it a rather didactic and striking short essay. A classical text of postcolonial theory and French thought in general.
Farkas, Katalin. What is externalism?
2003, Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Nora Heinzelmann
Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
Felappi, Giulia. ‘There is no reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction.’ Margaret Macdonald on logical necessity
2025, The Philosophical Quarterly, pqaf052
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Added by: Viviane Fairbank, Contributed by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
This paper aims at contributing to the recent enterprise of rediscovering Margaret Macdonald’s views, by focusing on her reflections on the necessity of logic, a theme that runs through many of her papers and reviews. We will see both Macdonald’s negative views about what the necessity of logic is not (Section I), and her positive view about what it is and how it supports her claim that it is in fact irrational to ask for a reason for the necessity of the ultimate principles of deduction, such as the Principle of Contradiction (Section II). To show how her view on the necessity of logic is different from others, such as David Lewis’s, we will then consider what she would reply to current rejectors of the Principle of Contradiction (Section III).Comment: This article provides a useful introduction to Margaret MacDonald's work in the mid-twentieth century on the topic of logical necessity. It goes over several possible accounts of the grounds of logical necessity and clearly articulates MacDonald's objections to them, as well as her own positive view on the matter; the final section places MacDonald's view in a contemporary context. As such, it might relevantly be included in any intermediate/advanced course on the epistemology and metaphysics of logic.
Ficara, Elena. The Form of Truth: Hegel’s Philosophical Logic
2020, De Gruyter
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Added by: Franci MangravitiPublisher’s Note:
This book is a consideration of Hegel’s view on logic and basic logical concepts such as truth, form, validity, and contradiction, and aims to assess this view’s relevance for contemporary philosophical logic. The literature on Hegel’s logic is fairly rich. The attention to contemporary philosophical logic places the present research closer to those works interested in the link between Hegel’s thought and analytical philosophy, Koch 2014, Brandom 2014, 1-15, Pippin 2016, Moyar 2017, Quante & Mooren 2018 among others). In this context, one particularity of this book consists in focusing on something that has been generally underrated in the literature: the idea that, for Hegel as well as for Aristotle and many other authors, logic is the study of the forms of truth, i.e. the forms that our thought can assume in searching for truth. In this light, Hegel’s thinking about logic is a fundamental reference point for anyone interested in a philosophical foundation of logic.
Comment: The book could be used in any course on Hegel's logic, either as a main textbook (if focusing on the author's overall interpretation) or as further reading. The latter approach is facilitated by the structure of the book, since each part is focused on a distinct logical notion (logic, logical form, truth, validity, contradiction). Given the author's thesis that Hegel can be considered as a genuine interlocutor of philosophical logic as it is understood today, one might even try discussing some chapters in a course focusing on a particular logical notion.
Fileva, Iskra. Moral Testimony and Collective Moral Governance
2023, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):722-735.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Ethan LandesAbstract:
I suggest that a moderate version of pessimism about moral testimony succeeds. However, I claim also that all major pessimist accounts—Understanding, Affect, Virtue, and Autonomy—fail. Having argued for these claims, I propose a new pessimist alternative.
Comment: The paper would offer a good overview of the current state of the moral testimony literature, specifically focusing on moral arguments against moral testimony. The paper moves through the literature quickly and breezily, explaining the key positions then offering a counterargument. It requires minimal knowledge of the literature, although it does presuppose some familiarity with what testimony is meant to be.
Finlayson, Lorna. The Political is Political: Conformity and the Illusion of Dissent in Contemporary Political Philosophy
2015, London: Rowman and Littlefield International
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Added by: Carl Fox, Contributed by: Emily DysonPublisher's Note: Nobody should really have to point out that political philosophy is political. Yet in this highly original and provocative book Lorna Finlayson argues that in fact it is necessary to do so. Offering a critique of mainstream liberal political philosophy through close, critical engagement with a series of specific debates and arguments, Finlayson analyzes the way in which apparently neutral methodological devices such as 'charitable interpretation' and 'constructive criticism' function so as to protect against challenges to the status quo. At each stage, Finlayson demonstrates that political philosophy is suffering from a complex process of 'depoliticization.' Even in cases where it appears that the dominant framework of liberal political philosophy is being strongly challenged - as, for example, in the case of the 'realist' critique of 'ideal theory' - this book argues that the debate is set up in such a way as to impose strict limits on the kind of dissent that is possible. Only by dragging these hidden presuppositions into the foreground can we arrive at a clear-eyed appreciation of such debates, and perhaps look beyond the artificially constricted landscape in which they seek to confine us.Comment: Good further or advanced reading on the methodology of political philosophy, and an incredibly illuminating critical complement to a Rawls-heavy syllabus. Finlayson provides an interesting and challenging critique of liberal presuppositions that are widespread in political philosophy. Individual chapters would also make very good further or advanced reading in their own right, especially the chapters on Rawls, the norm of philosophical charity, speech acts and silencing, and political realism.
Finn, Suki. Limiting Logical Pluralism
2019, Synthese (198): 4905–4923
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Added by: Viviane FairbankAbstract:
In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.Comment: This is an accessible discussion to logical pluralism and its relation to foundational issues in the epistemology of logic—notably the Adoption Problem. As such it can be included in any syllabus focused on special topics in the philosophy of logic. It does not require much background knowledge of logic or formal systems.
Foot, Philippa. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect
1967, Oxford Review 5:5-15, reprinted in Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Added by: Simon FoktIntroduction: One of the reasons why most of us feel puzzled about the problem of abortion is that we want, and do not want, to allow to the unborn child the rights that belong to adults and children. When we think of a baby about to be born it seems absurd to think that the next few minutes or even hours could make so radical a difference to its status; yet as we go back in the life of the foetus we are more and more reluctant to say that this is a human being and must be treated as such. No doubt this is the deepest source of our dilemma, but it is not the only one. For we are also confused about the general question of what we may and may not do where the interests of human beings conflict. We have strong intuitions about certain cases; saying, for instance, that it is all right to raise the level of education in our country, though statistics allow us to predict that a rise in the suicide rate will follow, while it is not all right to kill the feeble-minded to aid cancer research. It is not easy, however, to see the principles involved, and one way of throwing light on the abortion issue will be by setting up parallels involving adults or children once born. So we will be able to isolate the ‘equal rights’ issue and should be able to make some advance.Comment: The text introduces some crucial distinctions, discussing the difference between 'doing' and 'allowing to happen' and the related negative and positive duties. Foot argues that what matters in the Doctrine is not the directness of the actor's intention, but whether they intend to follow a negative or positive duty. This paper is most useful in teaching on the ethics of abortion and euthanasia, as well as the doctrine of double effect in general.
Foot, Philippa. Euthanasia
1977, Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (2):85-112. Reprinted in her Virtues and vices. Oxford: Blackwell.
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Synopsis generated from the paper: Foot argues that euthanasia is not a merely quiet or easy death. An act of euthanasia, including a deliberate omission, is a choice of another person’s death for that person’s own sake, because life is no longer a good for them. Life is normally a benefit even when it contains much pain, handicap, or unhappiness, but the connection between life and good breaks when a life no longer contains a minimum of ordinary human goods, as in some extreme illness, or when consciousness has sunk so low that life is neither a good nor, unless there is suffering, an evil. Foot then asks when such acts are morally permissible. She distinguishes justice, which concerns rights, from charity, which concerns the good of others, and she separates active from passive and voluntary from nonvoluntary euthanasia. Nonvoluntary active euthanasia is never justified, because the right to life includes a duty of noninterference that is not cancelled by the judgment that someone would be better off dead. Nonvoluntary passive euthanasia is not ruled out by that duty, except where a special right to life-preserving service exists, for instance under a doctor’s contract. Voluntary euthanasia, active or passive, need not infringe rights if the person has waived them. Where justice does not forbid the act, charity generally speaks in favor of it, since the aim is the good of the one who dies, though a wish to die is not itself proof that death is for their good. In practice, Foot notes that withholding life-prolonging treatment is already common. Allowing infants with Down’s syndrome to die because they burden others is not euthanasia in her sense. She supports something like a living will for previously expressed wishes, but warns against legalizing active euthanasia: it is open to abuse, and in a rich society it could erode the expectation that the old and the ill will be looked after.Comment: This text is of central interest in teaching about moral issues related to euthanasia. The text introduces the vital distinctions between active and passive, voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia, and argues in favour of moral permissibility of all but the active nonvoluntary type.
Foot, Philippa. Virtues and Vices
1978, Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by: Nomy ArpalyPublisher's Note: This collection of essays, written between 1957 and 1977, contains discussions of the moral philosophy of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, and some modern philosophers. It presents virtues and vices rather than rights and duties as the central concepts in moral philosophy. Throughout, the author rejects contemporary anti? naturalistic moral philosophies such as emotivism and prescriptivism, but defends the view that moral judgements may be hypothetical rather than (as Kant thought) categorical imperatives. The author also applies her moral philosophy to the current debates on euthanasia and abortion, the latter discussed in relation to the doctrine of the double effect. She argues against the suggestion, on the part of A. J. Ayer and others, that free will actually requires determinism. In a final essay, she asks whether the concept of moral approval can be understood except against a particular background of social practices.Comment: Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences. Since the author discusses multiple relevant topics (abortion, euthanasia, free will/determination, and the ethics of Hume and Nietzsche) this book is a really complete reading for Ethics courses. The book can be used in both, undergraduate and postgraduate courses, but the last eight essays are more suitable for postgraduates.
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