Ivanova, Milena. Friedman’s Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility
2011, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23 - 37.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman's relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman?s relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman's view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur's argument. This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman's view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman's view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman's view really implies mind dependenceComment: This is a stub entry. Please add your comments below to help us expand it
Ivanova, Milena, Paternotte, Cedric. Theory Choice, Good Sense and Social Consensus
2013, Erkenntnis 78 (5):1109-1132.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: There has been a significant interest in the recent literature in developing a solution to the problem of theory choice which is both normative and descriptive, but agent-based rather than rule-based, originating from Pierre Duhem's notion of 'good sense'. In this paper we present the properties Duhem attributes to good sense in different contexts, before examining its current reconstructions advanced in the literature and their limitations. We propose an alternative account of good sense, seen as promoting social consensus in science, and show that it is superior to its rivals in two respects: it is more faithful to Duhemian good sense, and it cashes out the effect that virtues have on scientific progress. We then defend the social consensus account against objections that highlight the positive role of diversity and division of labour in science
Ivanova, Milena. Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?
2014, In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Springer, Cham. pp. 207-226.
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Added by: Clotilde Torregrossa, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: This paper challenges the appeal to theory virtues in theory choice as well as the appeal to the intellectual and moral virtues of an agent as determining unique choices between empirically equivalent theories. After arguing that theoretical virtues do not determine the choice of one theory at the expense of another theory, I argue that nor does the appeal to intellectual and moral virtues single out one agent, who defends a particular theory, and exclude another agent defending an alternative theory. I analyse Duhem's concept of good sense and its recent interpretation in terms of virtue epistemology. I argue that the virtue epistemological interpretation does not show how good sense leads to conclusive choices and scientific progress.Comment: Philosophy of Science, Virtue Epistemology Theory Choice, Intellectual virtues
Ivanova, Milena. Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincare’s philosophy of science
2015, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):114-122.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: Poincare is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincare's epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincare's conventionalism and its position in Poincare's hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincare scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincare defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which precludes epistemic access to mind-independent structures.
Ivanova, Milena. Did Perrin’s Experiments Convert Poincare to Scientific Realism?
2013, Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 3 (1):1-19.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Milena IvanovaAbstract: In this paper I argue that Poincare's acceptance of the atom does not indicate a shift from instrumentalism to scientific realism. I examine the implications of Poincare's acceptance of the existence of the atom for our current understanding of his philosophy of science. Specifically, how can we understand Poincare's acceptance of the atom in structural realist terms? I examine his 1912 paper carefully and suggest that it does not entail scientific realism in the sense of acceptance of the fundamental existence of atoms but rather, argues against fundamental entities. I argue that Poincare's paper motivates a non-fundamentalist view about the world, and that this is compatible with his structuralism.
Jackson Balcerak, Magdalena. Justification by Imagination
2018, In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 209-226
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: The author argues that experience constraints the nature of imagination in such a way that this results having a justificatory role.Comment: Good to use as further reading in a course on the topic of the epistemology of imagination.
Jackson, Jennifer. Telling the Truth
1991, Journal of Medical Ethics 17(1): 5-9.
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract: Are doctors and nurses bound by just the same constraints as everyone else in regard to honesty? What, anyway, does honesty require? Telling no lies? Avoiding intentional deception by whatever means? From a utilitarian standpoint lying would seem to be on the same footing as other forms of intentional deception: yielding the same consequences. But utilitarianism fails to explain the wrongness of lying. Doctors and nurses, like everyone else, have a prima facie duty not to lie - but again like everyone else, they are not duty-bound to avoid intentional deception, lying apart; except where it would involve a breach of trust.Comment: Useful in teaching on applied ethics issues related to trust, and general values in normative ethics. To provide an interesting narrative and selection of views, this text can be used alongside Jennifer Saul's 'Just go ahead and lie' and Clea Rees' 'Better lie!'
Jackson, Jennifer. An Introduction to Business Ethics
1996, London: Blackwell.
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Publisher’s Note:
Publisher: This book is a concise overview of the relevance and application of moral philosophy to all those involved in business and employment. It is the ideal introduction for beginning students of applied philosophy, business or management ethics.Comment: This is an excellent introduction to business ethics for undergraduate students, presented mostly from a virtue ethics perspective. It is written in a very accessible way and chapters are concluded with sets of study questions. The book can be used as a textbook in applied and business ethics modules, though it might be useful to supplement it with some more general introduction to ethical theory and other readings which are not embedded in virtue ethics.
Jackson, Jennifer. Common Codes: Divergent Practices
1994, In Chadwick, Ruth (ed.), Ethics and the Professions. Avebury: Ashgate.
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Added by: Simon FoktAbstract:
Comment: Jackson explores the differences between variations in application and in interpretation of codes of ethics in professional settings, and argues that differences in application need not be problematic. She distinguishes aspirational obligations and obligations imposing side constraints in codes of ethics, and argues that they should not be confused. The text is most useful in teaching applied and professional ethics classes on codes of ethics, but can also offer a good further reading in introduction to ethics modules which aim to show the practical relevance of moral philosophy.
Jackson, Jennifer. Ethics in medicine: Virtue, Vice and Medicine
2006, Cambridge: Polity.
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Publisher’s Note:
Publisher: How, in a secular world, should we resolve ethically controversial and troubling issues relating to health care? Should we, as some argue, make a clean sweep, getting rid of the Hippocratic ethic, such vestiges of it as remain? Jennifer Jackson seeks to answer these significant questions, establishing new foundations for a traditional and secular ethic which would not require a radical and problematic overhaul of the old. These new foundations rest on familiar observations of human nature and human needs. Jackson presents morality as a loose anatomy of constituent virtues that are related in different ways to how we fare in life, and suggests that in order to address problems in medical ethics, a virtues–based approach is needed. Throughout, attention is paid to the role of philosophy in medical ethics, and how it can be used to clarify key notions and distinctions that underlie current debates and controversial issues. By reinstating such concepts as justice, cardinal virtue, and moral duty, Jackson lays the groundwork for an ethics of health care that makes headway toward resolving seeming dilemmas in medical ethics today. This penetrating and accessible book will be invaluable to students of sociology and health care, as well as those who are interested in the ethical uncertainties faced by the medical world.Comment: Particularly useful in teaching is Chapter 10 which discusses abortion, reviewing arguments made by J.J. Thompson and M. Tooley, and enquiring into what makes killing wrong. Chapter 9 looks at distributive justice in medicine, reviewing some problematic cases and distinguishing between bad luck and injustice. Chapter 5 treats on conscientious objection and issues related to toleration and imposition of values.
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