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Added by: Franci Mangraviti
From the Introduction: "Andrea Nye is also concerned with the role of logic in science, linking the adequacy of logic with its applicability in a domain of scientific knowledge. Nye argues that the dominant predicate logic cannot adequately represent the issues surrounding attempts to divide organisms into species. Feminist critiques of the extensional theory of meaning lay the ground for alternative theories of categorization. Without renewed models of categorization, Nye submits, science is in danger of becoming a self-enclosed “logical” system, rather than an instrumental model of reality."
O'Connor, Cailin. The Evolution of Vagueness2013, Erkenntnis (S4):1-21.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Cailin O'Connor
Abstract: Vague predicates, those that exhibit borderline cases, pose a persistent problem for philosophers and logicians. Although they are ubiquitous in natural language, when used in a logical context, vague predicates lead to contradiction. This paper will address a question that is intimately related to this problem. Given their inherent imprecision, why do vague predicates arise in the first place? I discuss a variation of the signaling game where the state space is treated as contiguous, i.e., endowed with a metric that captures a similarity relation over states. This added structure is manifested in payoffs that reward approximate coordination between sender and receiver as well as perfect coordination. I evolve these games using a variation of Herrnstein reinforcement learning that better reflects the generalizing learning strategies real-world actors use in situations where states of the world are similar. In these simulations, signaling can develop very quickly, and the signals are vague in much the way ordinary language predicates are vague - they each exclusively apply to certain items, but for some transition period both signals apply to varying degrees. Moreover, I show that under certain parameter values, in particular when state spaces are large and time is limited, learning generalization of this sort yields strategies with higher payoffs than standard Herrnstein reinforcement learning. These models may then help explain why the phenomenon of vagueness arises in natural language: the learning strategies that allow actors to quickly and effectively develop signaling conventions in contiguous state spaces make it unavoidableComment:
Obdrzalek, Suzanne. Moral transformation and the love of beauty in Plato’s symposium2010, Journal of the History of Philosophy 48(4): 415-444-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: AnonymousAbstract:
This paper defends an intellectualist interpretation of Diotima’s speech in Plato’s Symposium. I argue that Diotima’s purpose, in discussing the lower lovers, is to critique their erōs as aimed at a goal it can never secure, immortality, and as focused on an inferior object, themselves. By contrast, in loving the form of beauty, the philosopher gains a mortal sort of completion; in turning outside of himself, he also ceases to be preoccupied by his own incompleteness.
Comment: On Eros in the Symposium. Would be great in any course that has a unit on this.
Okruhlik, Kathleen. Gender and the Biological Sciences1994, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24(sup1): 21-42.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Summary: Okhrulik offers a feminist critique of biology, a "real" science, to show that it is not just the "soft" social sciences that are affected by bias. She argues that preconceptions can interfere not only in cases of "bad science", but even when the rules of scientific practice are followed. There is no safeguard against the effects of bias in the context of discovery. Even if theories are rigorously tested to remove bias, some theories might not even be generated and so would not get to the point of being counted as competitors in the testing stage. This is illustrated by a number of case studies. Okhrulik concludes that a diversity of viewpoints is crucial.Comment: Presents a good case for why feminist critiques are relevant even to "harder" sciences, made more salient with easy-to-understand examples. Raises issues of theory-ladenness of observation and underdetermination of theory. A good introduction to reasons to doubt that science is completely "objective".
Olberding, Amy, Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.). Mortality in Traditional Chinese Thought2011, SUNY Press.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Publisher's note: Mortality in Traditional Chinese Thought is the definitive exploration of a complex and fascinating but little-understood subject. Arguably, death as a concept has not been nearly as central a preoccupation in Chinese culture as it has been in the West. However, even in a society that seems to understand death as a part of life, responses to mortality are revealing and indicate much about what is valued and what is feared. This edited volume fills the lacuna on this subject, presenting an array of philosophical, artistic, historical, and religious perspectives on death during a variety of historical periods. Contributors look at material culture, including findings now available from the Mawangdui tomb excavations; consider death in Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions; and discuss death and the history and philosophy of war.Comment: This volume contains a number of excellent essays on mortality as it appears in Chinese philosophy. It would be useful in a history of Chinese philosophy course, or to provide an additional perspective in a course on philosophy of death, immortality and the afterlife. Of particular value for this purpose is Tao Jiang's chapter comparing Linji Yixuan's views on immortality to those of William James, discussing the degree to which remembrance counts as immortality.
Olberding, Amy. It’s not Them, it’s You: A Case Study in the Exclusion of Non-Western Philosophy2015, Comparative Philosophy 6(2): 14-34.-
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Added by: Nick Novelli
Abstract: My purpose in this essay is to suggest, via case study, that if Anglo-American philosophy is to become more inclusive of non-western traditions, the discipline requires far greater efforts at self-scrutiny. I begin with the premise that Confucian ethical treatments of manners afford unique and distinctive arguments from which moral philosophy might profit, then seek to show why receptivity to these arguments will be low. I examine how ordinary good manners have largely fallen out of philosophical moral discourse in the west, looking specifically at three areas: conditions in the 18th and 19th centuries that depressed philosophical attention to manners; discourse conventions in contemporary philosophy that privilege modes of analysis not well fitted to close scrutiny of manners; and a philosophical culture that implicitly encourages indifference or even antipathy toward polite conduct. I argue that these three areas function in effect to render contemporary discourse inhospitable to greater inclusivity where Confucianism is concerned and thus, more broadly, that greater self-scrutiny regarding unexamined, parochial western commitments and practices is necessary for genuine inclusivityComment: This article provides an excellent look at the reasons for the exclusion of Confucian philosophy from the Western tradition. It would be useful as a set-up in a course or part of a course on Asian or Confucian philosophy, or in the context of metaphilosophy or a discussion about race and culture in philosophy.
Olberding, Amy. Confucius’ Complaints and the Analects’ Account of the Good Life2013, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 12 (4):417-440.-
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Added by: Simon Fokt, Contributed by: Ian James Kidd
Abstract: The Analects appears to offer two bodies of testimony regarding the felt, experiential qualities of leading a life of virtue. In its ostensible record of Confucius' more abstract and reflective claims, the text appears to suggest that virtue has considerable power to afford joy and insulate from sorrow. In the text's inclusion of Confucius' less studied and apparently more spontaneous remarks, however, he appears sometimes to complain of the life he leads, to feel its sorrows, and to possess some despair. Where we attend to both of these elements of the text, a tension emerges. In this essay, I consider how Confucius' complaints appear to complicate any clean conclusion that Confucius wins a good life, particularly where we attend to important pre-theoretical sensibilities regarding what a 'good life' ought to include and how it ought to feel for the one who leads it.Comment: A rich text that explains the role of complaints - and, more broadly, disappointment, regret, and sadness - in the moral life. Especially good for challenging the idea that the moral life will insulate a person from such negative affects. Also points out the tendency of some moral philosophers to downplay certain aspects of human beings when constructing their ideals.
Olberding, Amy. A Sensible Confucian Perspective on Abortion2015, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 14 (2):235-253.-
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner
Abstract: Confucian resources for moral discourse and public policy concerning abortion have potential to broaden the prevailing forms of debate in Western societies. However, what form a Confucian contribution might take is itself debatable. This essay provides a critique of Philip J. Ivanhoe's recent proposal for a Confucian account of abortion. I contend that Ivanhoe's approach is neither particularly Confucian, nor viable as effective and humane public policy. Affirmatively, I argue that a Confucian approach to abortion will assiduously root moral consideration and public policy in evidence-based strategies that recognize the complexity of the phenomena of unplanned pregnancy and abortion. What most distinguishes a Confucian approach, I argue, is a refusal to treat abortion as a moral dilemma that stands free of the myriad social conditions and societal inequities in which empirical evidence shows it situates.Comment: This paper could be usefully coupled with the Ivanhoe paper it criticizes, but it does a good job of summarizing that view and so can also stand on its own. It's an especially useful example of how to apply Confucian principles to a vexed contemporary moral issue. It also provides a good model of a Confucian-inspired philosopher criticizing another on grounds internal to that tradition, which can be used to dispel the thought that Confucian particularism leads to an "anything goes" approach to moral problems.
Olberding, Amy. The Wrong of Rudeness: Learning Modern Civility From Ancient Chinese Philosophy2019, New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasPublisher’s Note:
Being rude is often more gratifying and enjoyable than being polite. Likewise, rudeness can be a more accurate and powerful reflection of how I feel and think. This is especially true in a political environment that can make being polite seem foolish or naive. Civility and ordinary politeness are linked both to big values, such as respect and consideration, and to the fundamentally social nature of human beings. This book explores the powerful temptations to incivility and rudeness, but argues that they should generally be resisted. Drawing on early Chinese philosophers who lived during great political turmoil but nonetheless sought to “mind their manners,” it articulates a way of thinking about politeness that is distinctively social. It takes as a given that we can feel profoundly alienated from others, and that other people can sometimes be truly terrible. Yet because we are social neglecting the social and political courtesies comes at great cost. The book considers not simply why civility and politeness are important, but how. It addresses how small insults can damage social relations, how separation of people into tribes undermines our better interests, and explores how bodily and facial expressions can influence how life with other people goes. It is especially geared toward anyone who feels the temptation of being rude and wishes it were easier to feel otherwise. It seeks to answer a question of great contemporary urgency: When so much of public and social life with others is painful and fractious, why should I be polite?
Comment: This book provides a philosophical take on what it means to be civil in a modern, diverse, and radically changing social and political landscape. While the author draws on ancient Chinese philosophers to make her case, the argument is nonetheless firmly rooted in contemporary philosophical questions and in doing so, remains attentive to the particular social and ethical problems that frequently arise in modern conversation and disagreement. The book is highly readable and accessible for non-academic, non-philosophical audiences, and is written in a casual, engaging style that relies on anecdotes and stories to illustrate its points and claims. At the same time, it presents a clear and rigorous philosophical argument, and draws on many academic sources as well. The book, therefore likely spans a broad range of uses. For example, it might be used in a reading group or specialised course focusing on interpersonal ethics, political bias and polarization, or even a more interdisciplinary course (straddling, say, political science, sociology, and philosophy) looking at post-2016 politics and social landscape in America.
Olberding, Amy. Community Practices and Getting Good at Bad Emotions2023, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 93:9-21-
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Added by: Deryn Mair ThomasAbstract:
Early Confucian philosophy is remarkable in its attention to everyday social interactions and their power to steer our emotional lives. Their work on the social dimensions of our moral-emotional lives is enormously promising for thinking through our own context and struggles, particularly, I argue, the ways that public rhetoric and practices may steer us away from some emotions it can be important to have, especially negative emotions. Some of our emotions are bad – unpleasant to experience, reflective of dissatisfactions or even heartbreak – but nonetheless quite important to express and, more basically, to feel. Grief is like this, for example. So, too, is disappointment. In this essay, I explore how our current social practices may fail to support expressions of disappointment and thus suppress our ability to feel it well.
Comment: This essay explores the ways that society and social culture can either facilitate or inhibit our opportunities to practice feeling, experiencing, and managing bad (or undesirable) emotions, and the problems that might be associated with our failure to do so. In particular, the author focuses on the feelings of grief and dissapointment, highlighting their importance in the context of a full and flourishing life. Without them, we may lose other interpersonal and empathetic skills which allow us to live well with others and approach others in good faith. As such, this essay bears obvious relevance to topic areas such as philosophy of death and Confucian philosophy, but also applies more broadly to questions about the practice of virtue, philosophy of emotions, applied/everday ethics, and the cultivation of pro-social habits.
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Nye, Andrea. Saying What It Is: Predicate Logic and Natural Kinds
2002, In Falmagne, R.J. and Hass, M. eds. Representing Reason: Feminist Theory and Formal Logic. Rowman & Littlefield
Comment:
available in this Blueprint