Maddy, Penelope. Naturalism in Mathematics
1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Jamie CollinPublisher's Note: Our much-valued mathematical knowledge rests on two supports: the logic of proof and the axioms from which those proofs begin. Naturalism in Mathematics investigates the status of the latter, the fundamental assumptions of mathematics. These were once held to be self-evident, but progress in work on the foundations of mathematics, especially in set theory, has rendered that comforting notion obsolete. Given that candidates for axiomatic status cannot be proved, what sorts of considerations can be offered for or against them? That is the central question addressed in this book. One answer is that mathematics aims to describe an objective world of mathematical objects, and that axiom candidates should be judged by their truth or falsity in that world. This promising view - realism - is assessed and finally rejected in favour of another - naturalism - which attends less to metaphysical considerations of objective truth and falsity, and more to practical considerations drawn from within mathematics itself. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be helpfully applied in the assessment of candidates for axiomatic status in set theory. Maddy's clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.Comment: Good further reading in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, naturalism or philosophy of mathematics. Sections from the book - for instance, the chapters in Part II on indispensability considerations in scientific and mathematical practice - could be profitably read on their own. These sections may also be of interest in philosophy of science courses, as they provide a careful analysis of scientific practice (as it relates to what scientists take themselves to be ontologically committed to).
Maddy, Penelope. Three Forms of Naturalism
2005, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, (ed.) S. Shapiro. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Added by: Jamie CollinSummary: A clear introduction to mathematical naturalism and its Quinean roots; developing and defending Maddy's own naturalist philosophy of mathematics. Maddy claims that the Quinian ignores some nuances of scientific practice that have a bearing on what the naturalist should take to be the real scientific standards of evidence. Historical studies show that scientists sometimes do not take themselves to be committed to entities that are indispensably quantified over in their best scientific theories, hence the Quinian position that naturalism dictates that we are committed to entities that are indispensably quantified over in our best scientific theories is incorrect.Comment: Good primary reading in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, naturalism or philosophy of mathematics. This would serve well both as a clear and fairly concise introduction to Quinean naturalism and to the indispensability argument in the philosophy of mathematics.
Maddy, Penelope. The Philosophy of Logic
2012, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18(4): 481-504.
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Added by: Berta Grimau, Contributed by: Matt ClemensAbstract: This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic - what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics - Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism - and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam are among the philosophers considered along the way.Comment: This is a survey article which considers positions within philosophy of logic analogous to the views held by the various schools of the philosophy of mathematics. The article touches briefly on many positions and authors and is thus an excellent introduction to the philosophy of logic, specially for students already familiar with the philosophy of mathematics. The text is informal and it does not involve any proofs.
Maffie, James. Philosophy without Europe
2019, In Latin American and Latinx Philosophy, Robert Eli Sánchez (ed.). Routledge
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández VillarrealAbstract:
Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative Introduction is a beginner’s guide to canonical texts in Latin American and Latinx philosophy, providing the non-specialist with necessary historical and philosophical context, and demonstrating their contemporary relevance. It is written in jargon-free prose for students and professors who are interested in the subject, but who don’t know where to begin. Each of the twelve chapters, written by a leading scholar in the field, examines influential texts that are readily available in English and introduces the reader to a period, topic, movement, or school that taken together provide a broad overview of the history, nature, scope, and value of Latin American and Latinx philosophy. Although this volume is primarily intended for the reader without a background in the Latin American and Latinx tradition, specialists will also benefit from its many novelties, including an introduction to Aztec ethics; a critique of “the Latino threat” narrative; the legacy of Latin American philosophy in the Chicano movement; an overview of Mexican existentialism, Liberation philosophy, and Latin American and Latinx feminisms; a philosophical critique of indigenism; a study of Latinx contributions to the philosophy of immigration; and an examination of the intersection of race and gender in Latinx identity.
Comment (from this Blueprint): In this chapter, Maffie compares the general framework of Western philosophy and that of Mexica or Aztec philosophy. The latter offers a genuine alternative to the former, for Mexica’s philosophy, in general, is “path-seeking” rather than “truth-seeking”. This means that the main purpose of philosophy consists in following and expanding a particular way of life. The author also introduces some important features of Mexica philosophy, namely, that there is no clear-cut distinction between philosophy, religion, and spirituality. Furthermore, in this chapter we can also find a brief account of some interesting philosophical views. Firstly, the relationship between living beings and Mexica Deities (i.e., Creator Beings). The latter are not transcendent, and they have no ontological priority over the former insofar as the existence of both are deeply intertwined. Secondly, the author discusses the moral obligations of human beings towards Creator Beings, non-human animals, and other human beings. Finally, it discusses the Mexica notion of “personhood” (i.e., admits degrees and can belong to inanimate objects, and both human and non-human animals).
Magidor, Ofra, Stephen Kearns. Epistemicism about vagueness and meta-linguistic safety
2008, Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1): 277-304.
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Added by: Berta GrimauAbstract: The paper challenges Williamson's safety based explanation for why we cannot know the cut-off point of vague expressions. We assume throughout (most of) the paper that Williamson is correct in saying that vague expressions have sharp cut-off points, but we argue that Williamson's explanation for why we do not and cannot know these cut-off points is unsatisfactory. In sect 2 we present Williamson's position in some detail. In particular, we note that Williamson's explanation relies on taking a particular safety principle ('Meta-linguistic belief safety' or 'MBS') as a necessary condition on knowledge. In section 3, we show that even if MBS were a necessary condition on knowledge, that would not be sufficient to show that we cannot know the cut-off points of vague expressions. In section 4, we present our main case against Williamson's explanation: we argue that MBS is not a necessary condition on knowledge, by presenting a series of cases where one's belief violates MBS but nevertheless constitutes knowledge. In section 5, we present and respond to an objection to our view. And in section 6, we briefly discuss the possible directions a theory of vagueness can take, if our objection to Williamson's theory is taken on board.Comment: This paper would work well as a secondary reading in a course on vagueness with a section on epistemicism. For instance, the course could present Williamson's as the main proposal within that tradition and then turn to this paper for criticism and an alternative proposal within the same tradition.
Magidor, Ofra. Arguments by Leibniz’s Law in Metaphysics
2011, Philosophy Compass 6 (3):180-195
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Added by: Berta Grimau
Abstract: Leibniz's Law (or as it sometimes called, 'the Indiscerniblity of Identicals') is a widely accepted principle governing the notion of numerical identity. The principle states that if a is identical to b, then any property had by a is also had by b. Leibniz's Law may seem like a trivial principle, but its apparent consequences are far from trivial. The law has been utilised in a wide range of arguments in metaphysics, many leading to substantive and controversial conclusions. This article discusses the applications of Leibniz's Law to arguments in metaphysics. It begins by presenting a variety of central arguments in metaphysics which appeal to the law. The article then proceeds to discuss a range of strategies that can be drawn upon in resisting an argument by Leibniz's Law. These strategies divide into three categories: (i) denying Leibniz's Law; (ii) denying that the argument in question involves a genuine application of the law; and (iii) denying that the argument's premises are true. Strategies falling under each of these three categories are discussed in turn.
Comment: Ideal as a main reading in a course in general metaphysics with a section on Leibniz's Law, at both undergrad and postgrad level.
Mahāratnakūṭa Sūtra. Dwelling in the Forest
2000, in Stephanie Kaza and Kenneth Kraft (eds.), Dharma Rain Sources of Buddhist Environmentalism. Shambhala Publications.
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Added by: Kas BernaysAbstract:
A comprehensive collection of classic texts, contemporary interpretations, guidelines for activists, issue-specific information, and materials for environmentally-oriented religious practice. Sources and contributors include Basho, the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, Gary Snyder, Chögyam Trungpa, Gretel Ehrlich, Peter Mathiessen, Helen Tworkov (editor of Tricycle), and Philip Glass.Comment (from this Blueprint): A primary source which introduces what we might take to be considerations of duties to other beings, and the notion of non-action.
Mahtani, Anna. Imaginative resistance without conflict
2012, Philosophical Studies 158 (3):415-429.
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Added by: Chris Blake-Turner, Contributed by: Christy Mag UidhirAbstract: I examine a range of popular solutions to the puzzle of imaginative resistance. According to each solution in this range, imaginative resistance occurs only when we are asked to imagine something that conflicts with what we believe. I show that imaginative resistance can occur without this sort of conflict, and so that every solution in the range under consideration fails. I end by suggesting a new explanation for imaginative resistance - the Import Solution - which succeeds where the other solutions considered fail
Maibom, Heidi. The Space Between: How Empathy Really Works
2022,
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Added by: Jimena ClavelPublisher’s Note:
The Space Between argues that empathy makes us less, not more, biased, contrary to what many seem to think. How? The fact is that a person sits in the center of a web of relationships with her body, her environment, her interests, and other people. These relationships shape how she thinks about herself and the world around her, what she needs, what she wants, and what she values. This is a perspective. We each have one. It represents the significance of the world to us. At the same time, it ignores what matters to others and how or what we are to them. Taking another person’s perspective is a way of reorienting that egocentric image so that it centers on someone else. Relying on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, philosopher Heidi Maibom argues that although a perspective is unique to a person in some ways, it nonetheless possesses characteristics common to all perspectives. This commonality enables us to use our own first-person perspective to represent what matters to others, by imagining that we are at the center of their web of relationships. It also helps reveal who we actually are. It is this form of shifting perspectives that is at the core of impartiality, Maibom argues, and not the cold, scientific eye of so-called objectivity. Why? Because perspectives are ineliminable. A point of view is always a point of view, only an “objective” one leaves out many of the things that matter to human beings.Comment: This book discusses what empathy is, as well as its value in the face of a series of criticisms that have been advanced against it. It can be used in a course on moral psychology, philosophy of imagination, or philosophy of emotions to discuss empathy.
Maiese, Michelle. Mindshaping, Enactivism, and Ideological Oppression
2021, Topoi 41 (2), pp. 341-354
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Added by: Maria Jimena Clavel VazquezAbstract:
One of humans' distinctive cognitive abilities is that they develop an array of capacities through an enculturation process. In "Cognition as a Social Skill", Sally points to one of the dangers associated with enculturation: ideological oppression. To conceptualize how such oppression takes root, Haslanager appeals to notions of mindshaping and social coordination, whereby people participate in oppressive social practices unthinkingly or even willingly. Arguably, an appeal to mindshaping provides a new kind of argument, grounded in philosophy of mind, which supports the claims that feminist and anti-racist want to defend. However, some theorists worry that Haslanger's account does not shed much light on how individuals could exert their agency to resist oppression. I argue that enactivist conceptions of mindshaping and habit can help us to make sense of the power of social influences and how they have the potential to both enable and undermine cognition and agency. This moves us toward increased understanding of the workings of social oppression - distinguishing between constructive and enabling forms of heteronomy, and overdetermining and pernicious modes that lead to atrophied moral cognition and a narrowing of the field of affordances.Comment: available in this Blueprint
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